Descheneaux c. La Procureure générale du Canada						2017 QCCS 153
COUR SUPÉRIEURE
CANADA
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
DISTRICT DE			MONTRÉAL
N° :		500-17-048861-093
DATE :	20 JANVIER 2017*
______________________________________________________________________
SOUS LA PRÉSIDENCE DE :				L’HONORABLE	CHANTAL MASSE, J.C.S.
______________________________________________________________________
STÉPHANE DESCHENEAUX Et SUSAN YANTHA ET TAMMY YANTHA
Demandeurs
c.
LA PROCUREURE GÉNÉRALE DU CANADA
Défenderesse et CHEF RICK O’BOMSAWIN, NICOLE O’BOMSAWIN, CLÉMENT SADOQUES, ALAIN O’BOMSAWIN ET JACQUES THÉRIAULT WATSO, en leur propre nom et en leur qualité de conseil élu représentant LES ABÉNAKIS D’ODANAK et CHEF RAYMOND BERNARD, CHRISTIAN TROTTIER, KEVEN BERNARD, LUCIEN MILLETTE ET NAYAN BERNARD, en leur propre nom et en leur qualité de conseil élu représentant LES ABÉNAKIS DE WÔLINAK             Intervenants
______________________________________________________________________
JUGEMENT
______________________________________________________________________
*Les rectifications apportées par le jugement rectificatif du 10 février 2017 ont été  intégrées pour fins de publication.

[1]   La Procureure générale du Canada (la « PGC ») demande la prorogation jusqu’au 3 août 2017 de la suspension de la prise d’effet de  la conclusion du jugement rendu le 3 août 2015 déclarant inopérantes certaines dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens[1] ( « la Loi ») relatives à l’inscription au registre des Indiens. Subsidiairement, il laisse au Tribunal la possibilité de déterminer tout autre délai approprié.

[2]   Sans pouvoir ici faire état de toutes les nuances et détails de la décision rendue le 3 août 2015, laquelle compte 247 paragraphes, il faut tenter de faire état de l’essentiel de celle-ci.

[3]   Dans cette décision, le Tribunal a conclu que le demandeur Descheneaux était victime de discrimination fondée sur le sexe, n’ayant pas un statut aussi avantageux, aux fins de son droit à l’inscription, que d’autres personnes dans la même situation que lui sur le plan des ascendants Indiens, sauf quant au sexe de leur grands-parents Indien, un homme plutôt qu’une femme. La décision constate également que la Loi traite de façon discriminatoire la demanderesse Susan Yantha, parce qu’elle est l’enfant illégitime de sexe féminin d’un Indien,  par opposition à certains enfants illégitimes de sexe masculin, ainsi que sa fille, Tammy Yantha, en raison du sexe de son parent Indien né hors mariage, sur le plan de leur droit à l’inscription. Ces atteintes au droit à l’égalité ont été considérées comme n’étant pas justifiées et, par conséquent, les dispositions de la Loi entraînant celles-ci ont été déclarées inopérantes et inconstitutionnelles parce que contraires au droit à l’égalité prévu à l’art. 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés[2].

[4]   Les conclusions pertinentes du jugement du 3 août 2015 se lisent comme suit :

« [245]   DÉCLARE que les alinéas 6(1)a), c) et f) et le paragraphe 6(2) de la Loi sur les Indiens portent atteinte de manière injustifiée à l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et sont inopérants;

   [246]   SUSPEND la prise d'effet de la conclusion précédente pour une période de 18  mois; »

[5]   Les éléments explicitement considérés par la soussignée au moment de décider de suspendre la prise d’effet de la conclusion déclarant inopérantes les dispositions de la Loi pendant une durée de 18 mois apparaissent aux paragraphes 232 et 233 du jugement, et ont été retenus malgré les constats faits quant à la complexité de la Loi, notamment aux paragraphes 226 et 227 :

« [226]  Même si le Tribunal considère peu probable que l'option d'annuler les avantages conférés aux personnes à qui la règle de la double-mère s'applique soit retenue, le législateur doit quand même avoir une marge de manœuvre suffisante afin d'élaborer le détail des dispositions pouvant remédier à la discrimination.

[227]    Il est en effet mieux en mesure que le Tribunal de déterminer le détail de celles-ci et leur cohérence avec le nouveau régime en place, surtout considérant le caractère technique et la complexité de la Loi. Par exemple, l'arrimage entre ce qu'énonce le présent jugement et les articles 8 et suivants de la Loi, relatifs aux listes de bande et aux règles d'appartenance pouvant être fixées par une bande ayant assumé la responsabilité de sa liste devra être fait, comme cela a été le cas lors de l'ajout de l'alinéa 6(1)c.1) en 2010.

[…]

[232]  Le délai d'un an et demi pour décider des mesures à prendre paraît raisonnable, et ce, en tenant compte du contexte préélectoral ambiant et en considérant que ce n'est pas la première fois que le législateur est appelé à analyser la question et qu'il procède à des consultations à ce sujet. Il faut réitérer que la situation perdure depuis maintenant un peu plus de 30 ans sans qu'une solution complète y ait été apportée. Et le Tribunal fait abstraction des discussions relatives à la discrimination découlant de la Loi de 1951 lesquelles se sont déroulées bien avant que l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte canadienne soit en vue⁽⁶⁰⁾ Le délai retenu tient compte du fait que les problématiques dont il s'agit ici ont été dénoncées depuis plusieurs années. Même si de nouvelles consultations devaient être tenues, il faudra qu'il y soit procédé rondement.

[233]    Ce faisant, le Tribunal est bien conscient que les demandeurs et les autres personnes dans leur situation continueront d'être victimes de discrimination pendant la période de 18 mois accordée, à moins que le législateur agisse plus rapidement. C'est néanmoins le prix que comporte le respect du rôle fondamental du pouvoir législatif dans notre société, un rôle que le Tribunal ne saurait usurper.

___________________

60.  La juge de première instance fait état, dans ses motifs additionnels sur le remède, de discussions à ce sujet dès le début des années 70, McIvor v. The Registrar Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, précité, note 8.»

(Seule la note en bas de page numéro 60 a été conservée, les autres étant omises.)                                                                        

[6]   Enfin, le Tribunal suggérait qu’une approche plus large que celle préconisée après la décision rendue par la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique («CACB») dans McIvor c. Canada (Registrar of Indian  and Northern Affairs)[3] («McIvor») devrait être envisagée par le législateur, et ce, tout en apportant rapidement des correctifs suffisamment larges pour remédier à la discrimination identifiée dans le jugement, laquelle découle du traitement avantageux accordé à un groupe identifié dans l’affaire McIvor.  Les paragraphes 3 à 5, 8 à 10, 46, 47, 223 et 234 à 243 du jugement expliquent de façon plus précise pourquoi le Tribunal s’est permis cette suggestion:

« [3]     […] La décision rendue par la CACB dans l'affaire McIvor, la Cour suprême du Canada ayant refusé d'entendre l'affaire, a en effet donné lieu à un amendement législatif en 2010. La Loi de 2010 avait pour but de donner suite à cette décision en corrigeant la discrimination fondée sur le sexe découlant de certaines dispositions transitoires de la Loi de 1985.

[4]        Dans cette affaire, la CACB a jugé justifié le traitement discriminatoire subsistant en raison de la préservation des droits acquis sous l'ancienne législation.

[5]        La discrimination non justifiée identifiée par la CACB dans McIvor découlait d'un avantage additionnel conféré par la Loi de 1985 à un groupe particulier et non d'un droit acquis. Le législateur aurait pu décider d'identifier qui étaient les personnes souffrant d'une discrimination en raison d'un motif prohibé vis-à-vis ce groupe avantagé et tenter de remédier à cette discrimination. Il a plutôt choisi de restreindre le remède apporté aux seules parties au litige et aux personnes dans une situation rigoureusement identique à la leur.

[…]

[8]        Les demandeurs se sont tous trois déchargés de leur fardeau et ont prouvé des atteintes discriminatoires à leur droit à l'égalité. Le traitement discriminatoire dont ils souffrent découle d'une comparaison avec un sous-groupe faisant partie du groupe avantagé identifié par la CACB dans McIvor.  Comme dans cette affaire, le PGC n'a pu démontrer que ces atteintes dues à une discrimination fondée sur le sexe se justifient dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique.

[9]        Une discrimination de même nature que celle qui avait historiquement cours à l'endroit des Indiennes et de leurs descendants concernant leur inscription au Registre existe donc encore aujourd'hui malgré les tentatives du législateur de l'éradiquer en 1985 et en 2010. En fait, en traitant encore plus avantageusement un groupe déjà avantagé sous l'ancienne loi, la Loi de 1985 a accentué le traitement discriminatoire à l'endroit de certaines personnes, dont les demandeurs et d'autres personnes dans leur situation. La Loi de 2010 n'y a pas remédié ou, à tout le moins, pas pleinement. 

[10]      La discrimination fondée sur le sexe, bien que plus subtile qu'autrefois, a la vie dure.

[…]

[46]      Notons que ces commentaires de la CACB n'exemptaient certainement pas le législateur de poursuivre ses efforts dans le but d'édicter une loi exempte de toute discrimination ne pouvant être justifiée, comme c'est son obligation constitutionnelle de le faire. Au contraire, la CACB reconnaissait que plusieurs enjeux devaient être traités par le législateur.

[47]      La Loi de 2010 n'a cependant pas cherché à remédier à toute discrimination pouvant résulter du traitement avantageux que la Loi de 1985 a réservé aux personnes auxquelles la règle de la double-mère s'appliquait avant son entrée en vigueur. Le législateur a plutôt choisi des mesures ne s'appliquant qu'aux personnes qui étaient dans une situation rigoureusement identique à celle de Grismer.

[…]

[223]    Nous sommes en 2015. La Loi de 1985 dont découle la discrimination est en vigueur depuis un peu plus de 30 ans. Le constat général de discrimination fait dans la décision de 2009 rendue par la CACB dans McIvor aurait pu permettre au législateur de corriger plus largement que ce qu'accomplissent les mesures prises dans la Loi de 2010. La discrimination dont les demandeurs sont victimes découle de la même source que celle déjà identifiée dans cette affaire.

[…]

[234]    Le présent jugement vise à disposer du recours exercé par les demandeurs. 

[235]    Il n'exempte pas pour autant le législateur de prendre les mesures appropriées afin d'identifier et de régler toutes les autres situations discriminatoires pouvant découler de la problématique identifiée, fondées sur le sexe ou sur d'autres motifs prohibés, et ce, en conformité avec son obligation constitutionnelle de s'assurer que les lois respectent les droits consacrés à la Charte canadienne. 

[236]    Cette tâche du législateur est complexe et à la mesure de l'impact généralisé des lois qu'il adopte. Il doit tenir compte des effets d'une loi sur l'ensemble des situations auxquelles elle est susceptible de s'appliquer, et ce, notamment, à la lumière de rapports, d'études et de situations factuelles, discutés et mis de l'avant lors du processus d'adoption des lois de même qu'en considérant le droit applicable, incluant les principes énoncés dans les décisions judiciaires.

[237]     Les juges n'étant saisis que d'un litige particulier et de ce qui est mis en preuve et plaidé devant eux, ils ne sont pas les mieux placés pour saisir toutes les implications des lois et tous leurs effets potentiellement discriminatoires.

[238]     Le législateur, dans la Loi de 2010, a choisi de restreindre le remède apporté aux seules parties au litige dans McIvor et aux personnes dans une situation rigoureusement identique à la leur et n'a pas non plus cherché à identifier la pleine mesure du traitement avantageux accordé au groupe privilégié identifié dans cette affaire.

[239]     Lorsque le législateur choisit d'omettre de considérer les implications plus larges des décisions judiciaires en restreignant la portée de celles-ci à leur strict minimum, une certaine abdication du pouvoir législatif aux mains du pouvoir judiciaire est susceptible de prendre place. Les détenteurs du pouvoir législatif se contenteraient alors d'attendre que les tribunaux se prononcent au cas par cas avant d'agir et que leurs décisions forcent progressivement la modification des lois afin que celles-ci soient, finalement, conformes à la Constitution.

[240]    Du point de vue des citoyens canadiens, qui sont tous des justiciables potentiels, le manquement à cette obligation du législateur et l'abdication de pouvoir qui pourrait en résulter ne sont évidemment pas souhaitables.

[241]   D'abord, cela les obligerait à faire valoir à grands frais leurs droits constitutionnels dans l'arène judiciaire dans de multiples cas très connexes plutôt que de bénéficier des effets plus larges d'une décision de principe et plutôt que de compter sur ceux et celles qui exercent le pouvoir législatif pour assurer le respect de leurs droits lors de l'adoption et de la révision de lois qui relèvent d'eux. Ensuite, les ressources judiciaires limitées, sollicitées à plusieurs reprises pour des litiges qu'un jugement précédant bien interprété aurait dû régler,  sont ainsi dilapidées plutôt qu'utilisées de manière efficace, ce qui a des effets malheureux sur l'ensemble des justiciables.

[242]   Il est évident qu'en raison du caractère technique de la Loi, de son évolution dans le temps, et de ses effets multi-générationnels, s'assurer qu'elle n'a pas d'effets discriminatoires injustifiés représente un défi important.  Ce ne sont cependant pas là des motifs justifiant de ne pas tenter, une nouvelle fois, de le relever.

[243]   Une lecture aussi stricte du présent jugement que celle qui a été faite de la décision de la CACB dans McIvor, n'est pas la voie que devrait emprunter le législateur. S'il souhaite jouer pleinement son rôle, plutôt que de laisser le champ libre aux litiges, il fera autrement cette fois-ci, tout en apportant rapidement des correctifs suffisamment larges pour remédier à la discrimination constatée en l'espèce. L'un n'exclut pas l'autre.»

[7]   Dans sa demande de prorogation, la PGC invoque plusieurs arguments déjà considérés par la soussignée lorsqu’elle a décidé du délai exceptionnel de 18 mois suspendant la prise d’effet de la  conclusion déclarant inopérantes les dispositions de la  Loi, notamment, les élections, les consultations nécessaires ainsi que le caractère complexe et technique de la Loi.

[8]   La PGC a produit plusieurs affidavits et pièces faisant état de l’approche en deux temps que le gouvernement a choisi de privilégier.

[9]   Dans un premier temps, il préconise l’adoption de modifications à la Loi visant à remédier à la discrimination connue fondée sur le sexe. La discrimination fondée sur le sexe et identifiée dans le jugement ainsi que d’autres situations de même nature identifiées par le gouvernement ou soulevées à l’occasion des consultations ou rencontres pourraient faire l’objet de correctifs. Un projet de loi en ce sens est à l’étude, soit le projet de loi S-3 intitulé Loi modifiant la Loi sur les Indiens (élimination des iniquités fondées sur le sexe en matières d’inscription)[4], et a fait l’objet soit de consultations ou de rencontres d’information[5].

[10]        En second, lieu, le gouvernement  « s’est engagé à lancer un processus collaboratif avec les Premières Nations et d’autres groupes autochtones afin d’aborder des enjeux plus vastes touchant l’inscription des Indiens, l’appartenance à une bande et la citoyenneté en vue d’instaurer une éventuelle réforme. »[6] Suivant le plan d’action R-15, les enjeux liés à la discrimination fondée sur des motifs prohibés autres que le sexe seront abordés lors de cette seconde étape.   

[11]        La demande de prorogation fait notamment suite à une lettre du comité sénatorial permanent des peuples autochtones en date du 13 décembre 2016 indiquant que le comité  « a entendu des témoignages qui laissent à penser que des iniquités fondées sur le genre perdureront, même si ce projet de loi est adopté »[7] ainsi que « des témoignages indiquant que la Couronne pourrait avoir manqué à son obligation de consulter en vertu de l’article 35 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 »[8]. Le comité a spécifiquement demandé à ce  qu’une demande de prorogation soit faite auprès de la Cour supérieure du Québec afin de permettre « au ministère de poursuivre son processus de consultation sur les iniquités fondées sur le genre en matière d’inscription.»[9]

[12]        Le plan d’action R-15 fait état de la possibilité de tenir des discussions continues sur les modifications proposées au projet de loi S-3 afin d’aborder les iniquités résiduelles fondées sur le sexe en lien avec le droit à l’inscription au registre des Indiens. Ainsi, suivant le plan d’action, « une prorogation de six mois permettrait au gouvernement de mener d’autres consultations sur le projet de loi S-3 afin de confirmer que les modifications proposées présentent le redressement approprié pour les situations exposées dans l’affaires Descheneaux et de s’assurer que le projet de loi aborde d’autres situations d’iniquités fondées sur le sexe. »[10] 

[13]        La preuve soumise fait également état du processus parlementaire tout en soulignant l’impossibilité de prévoir précisément les délais qu’implique ce processus. La Chambre ajournera ses travaux pour l’été le 23 juin 2017 sous réserve de modifications et le Sénat fera de même le 30 juin 2017, également sous réserve de modifications.

[14]        Suivant le plan d’action R-15, le délai demandé comprend « le temps requis pour rédiger des modifications supplémentaires et mener à terme le processus législatif, à compter du début du printemps 2017, afin d’adopter formellement le projet de loi d’ici la fin de la session parlementaire, le 23 juin 2017, et d’adopter un décret immédiatement après l’entrée en vigueur du projet de loi. »[11]

[15]        Les chefs des Abénakis d’Odanak et des Abénakis de Wôlinak, intervenants au présent dossier, ont critiqué, par l’entremise de leur procureur, qui représente également les demandeurs, la position du gouvernement qui a limité à la discrimination fondée sur le sexe les situations pouvant être examinées et faire l’objet de correctifs dans le cadre du projet de loi S-3.

[16]        Ceux-ci affirment avoir identifié des situations qu’ils soutiennent être discriminatoires en fonction d’autres motifs prohibés, et, plus particulièrement, le statut familial. Ils soutiennent également que des situations jugées discriminatoires mais justifiées sur la base de la préservation de droits acquis dans l’affaire McIvor devraient faire l’objet de discussions. Ils soutiennent aussi qu’ils s’adresseront immédiatement aux tribunaux advenant que le projet de loi S-3 soit adopté dans sa version actuelle.

[17]        Dans la pièce I-7, une lettre du chef des Abénakis d’Odanak adressée au ministère des Affaires Indiennes et du Nord Canada en date du 19 janvier 2017, on peut lire ce qui suit :

«INTRODUCTION

This is further to your email of January 16, 2017, concerning Bill S-3, and to the «Action Plan» forwarded to our lawyers by counsel for the Government of Canada in the Descheneaux litigation.

Your email requested my «views on hosting a community engagement session for interested individuals from Odanak,» for «impacted individuals to share their views on how to address systemic issues in Indian registration, and provide [them] with an opportunity to consider various perspectives and to determine whether Bill S-3 addresses all known sex-based inequities in registration. »

The view of my council, as well as that of the Grand Conseil de la Nation Waban-aki tribal council, which I chair, is that such a meeting would be a poor use of  my community’s time and resources.  However, if you wish to organize your own meeting in Odanak, then Council or another community organization could rent the required facilities to your Department for a reasonable fee.  This is an administrative matter about which you could call my Council office.

I will briefly set out the problems with your proposal, before recalling the Abenaki position on the steps required to improve Bill S-3 and our own suggestion on how to do so quickly and efficiently.

Problems with INAC’s proposed approach

The first problem in your proposal is that it refers to «a community engagement session.»  If by «engagement» you mean the same as the process your Department has imposed up till now, then it is clear to us that would not be consultation, which we assume if why you refrain from using that term.  However, the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples directed you to «consult with Indigenous organizations.» It will be up to you to explain to the Senate why you chose not to follow its clear instructions.

The second and more practical problem we have with your proposal is that we are not confident you would be able to provide any meaningful response after hearing from affected individuals, if they shared their views on «known sex-based inequities in registration.»

The clear inequity that we are aware of consists of the differential treatment of those descended from a woman who lost status due to marriage to a non-Indian man if they were born before September 4, 1951, compared to those in the same situation but who are descended from a man who married a non-Indian woman and gave her status.  The British Columbia Court of Appeal held in McIvor that this discrimination violated the equality right guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but that the violation was justified on the grounds of acquired rights.  Your Assistant Deputy Minister told us and the Senate committee that your Department remains satisfied with that conclusion.

Unless your Department is willing to reconsider its position on this point, you are effectively asking our members to describe discrimination about which you plan to do nothing.  If there are other sex-based inequities in the registration rules that your Department has identified, we would be surprised that you did not address them already in Bill S-3, but we would obviously be interested in reviewing them.

Finally, the fundamental problem we have with your proposal is that you wish to limit your «engagement» to determining «whether Bill S-3 addresses all known sex-based inequities in registration.»

We made our position clear when the Québec chiefs met with you in September, when you and I spoke by phone in October, when we appeared before the House of Commons and Senate committees in November and when we met with your Assistant Deputy Minister in December:  we want to address at least four specific instances of discrimination based on family status.

As I pointed out to you at the September 8^th meeting with the Québec chiefs, Justice Masse wrote that her decision «does not, however, exempt Parliament from taking the appropriate measures to identify and settle all other discriminatory situations that may arise from the issue identified, whether they are based on sex or another prohibited ground, in accordance with its constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws respect the rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter.»

At that meeting, you personally told me in front of the other chiefs that you would be open to discussing other instances of discrimination.  We heard nothing further from you until the following month, when you asked me and my council to speak to you by conference call and told us that Bill S-3 was tabled and that only sex-based discrimination would be addressed. I hope you understand that this experience has affected our willingness to devote our time and energy to the processes that your Department puts forward.

Steps required to improve Bill S-3

The Action Plan your Department has sent to our lawyers states that Bill S-3 will not address distinctions in Indian registration based on family status because of «Canada’s commitment to reconciliation and a renewed nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples.»  Obviously, we look forward to a nation-to-nation relationship between the Abenaki and the Government of Canada, but that future goal is not an acceptable reason for tolerating unconstitutional discrimination against our members in the present.

As I told your Assistant Deputy Minister at our December 1^st meeting, the issue is your Department’s status rules under the Indian Act, which is a separate matter from our community’s power to determine who its members are, as we do already.  You created these status rules and are now amending them:  you therefore must ensure that they do not violate our members’ right to equality under the Charter.

We believe that your Department should take advantage of any extension given to the government by the Court and meet Justice Masse’s challenge to address all other discriminatory situations that may arise under the registration rules, including those based on grounds other than gender.

Justice Masse’s judgment clearly explains why our approach is preferable:  leaving other forms of discrimination untouched would compel litigants «to argue their constitutional rights in the judicial arena in many closely related cases and at great cost, instead of benefiting from the broader effects of a policy decision and counting on those who exercise legislative power to ensure that their rights are respected when statutes concerning them are enacted and revised.  What is more, limited judicial resources used on disputes that a well-interpreted prior judgment should have settled are squandered instead of being used efficiently, with unfortunate effects for all litigants.»

During our conference call in October, I told you that if other Charter issues were not addressed, the Abenaki would have to be back in court with your Department as soon as the bill was passed.  It was disturbing to me that your only answer was that that is my prerogative.  In effect, you were telling me that the Department is content to see my community’s resources, along with those of the court and the government, be squandered on litigation closely related to the Descheneaux case.

We are suggesting a better way.  We suggest that your Department’s lawyers and ours meet as soon as possible with representatives of other affected organizations, such as the Assembly of First Nations, the Native Women’s Association of Canada, and the Indigenous Bar Association, in order to review issues of continuing unconstitutional discrimination in your Indian Act registration rules.

Obviously, the scope of such a discussion would be narrower than the ambitious goals set out for your Department’s proposed «Stage II» to its response to the Descheneaux judgment, but broader than your narrow focus in bill S-3.  The goal would be to identify the scenarios likely to be ruled unconstitutional by the courts and the amendments needed to correct the problems immediately.  We are confident that both Senators and Members of Parliament would welcome the results of such an approach since it would avoid further litigation, as the Court suggested.

We are prepared to make ourselves and our team available for such a process rapidly and in ample time to meet any new deadline set by the Court.  We look forward to your positive response.» 

(L’emphase en caractère foncé est de la soussignée et les soulignements sont dans le texte.)

[18]        Dans un article publié en 2002, l’auteur Kent Roach faisait certaines observations qu’il est utile de rappeler quant à la complexité particulière qui s’attache aux discussions larges et englobantes concernant les Premières Nations, telles que celles qui sont envisagées ici, et que l’on avait tenté de tenir à la suite de la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada rendue en 1999 dans l’affaire Corbiere c. Canada (Ministre des Affaires Indiennes et du Nord Canadien)[12] :

55.  The second phase was intended to start in early 2001 and deal with «integrated and sustainable electoral reform to establish a system that is both consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and respects the interests of all Band members, whether they live on or off reserve.»  In addition, «consideration will be given to broader discussions on Indian Act governance, accountability and authorities in the Stage Two consultation process.»  This second phase appears to have been caught up in ongoing controversy over reforms to the Indian Act.  It does, however, appear to be connected with the broader band governance issues implicated by the Court’s ruling.  It is significant, however, that this more comprehensive approach will take longer than even the longest period of delay sanctioned by the Court in Corbiere.  Even the most generous periods of delay allowed by the Court may be too short for genuine structural reform to occur.

56.  Even the more limited first stage process was not without controversy.  Shortly after the Minister of Indian Affairs announced the two-stage process on December 9, 1999, then Assembly of First Nations (AFN) National Chief, Phil Fontaine, complained that the federal announcement:

took 7 months out of what is already a tight time-frame to implement a national decision with far-reaching implications.  This is unfortunate, given the AFN presented an action plan less than a month after the decision came down.  After this long delay, we see the resources are minimal both in terms of time and funding.

In a letter of September 25, 2000, to all First Nations, present National Chief Mathew Coon Come objected that First Nations, «have not been given sufficient time to assess the impacts of the regulations and respond to them.  It also appears that First Nations will not be properly funded to analyse the impacts or administer the regulations.  In fact, concerns have been raised that First Nations could be forced to defend themselves against law suits arising from their inability to meet the obligations imposed by the regulations.»  The AFN also attempted to intervene to support a request by an intervenor in Corbiere, the Lesser Slave Lake Regional Council, to request a rehearing to extend the 18 month period of delay, a request that was denied by the Court on November 11, 2000, without written reasons.  Although there was some consultation with the affected groups, it is not clear whether the consultation process, which led to the enactment of regulations allowing off-reserve residents to vote in band elections and referenda, was entirely successful in taking into account the complex views and sometimes conflicting interests of those affected by Corbiere, including the off-reserve residents that the decision was intended to benefit.  For example, the options of mail-in ballots or voting on reserve may not be effective for transient off-reserve Band members living in cities.  A more creative response would have involved polling stations for multiple bands at Aboriginal friendship and other cultural centres located in cities where many band members live.[13]

(Les soulignements sont de la soussignée.)

[19]        L’absence de suites concrètes, avant que le Tribunal se prononce dans la présente affaire, à la suite de la décision rendue dans l’affaire McIvor, en 2009, afin de corriger d’autres situations dénoncées à ce moment et dont il est fait mention dans l’une des décisions de la CACB sur la prorogation de la suspension de la déclaration d’invalidité, en 2010,[14] a également alimenté le scepticisme des Intervenants vis-à-vis le report de certaines questions en phase II, suivant ce que leur procureur a plaidé.

[20]        Le plan d’action R-15 fait état d’un délai d’au moins 24 mois pour réaliser la seconde phase.  Le procureur des Intervenants en questionne le réalisme.

[21]         Le procureur des demandeurs et des Intervenants a toutefois confirmé que ses clients, bien qu’en désaccord avec l’approche du gouvernement, sont d’avis que la demande de la PGC doit être accordée afin de permettre des discussions additionnelles qu’ils espèrent fructueuses, bien que sans trop y croire.  Ils sont en fait surtout soucieux, et c’est tout à leur honneur, des impacts potentiels de l’absence de prorogation sur le droit à l’inscription d’autres personnes. Les demandeurs n’ont par ailleurs pas sollicité de remède particulier ne s’appliquant qu’à eux.

[22]        La procureure de la PGC, soumet quant à elle que le plan d’action R-15, même s’il a été approuvé, n’est pas définitif et est susceptible d’être adapté en fonction de commentaires reçus.[15]  Elle confirme de plus une ouverture quant à la rencontre entre avocats suggérée dans la lettre I-7.

[23]        Toutes les parties sont donc d’avis qu’il y a lieu de préserver les dispositions pendant ces discussions et jusqu’à l’adoption d’une législation apportant un correctif.

[24]        La détermination de la nature et de la portée de la réponse législative à la décision rendue relève entièrement du gouvernement et du législateur. Le Tribunal ne se permettra aucune ingérence dans le rôle et les responsabilités qui appartiennent à ceux-ci. La décision rendue le 3 août 2015 exprime déjà, de façon générale, quels sont les rôles respectifs des tribunaux et du législateur et ce qu’impliquent ceux-ci. En l’occurrence, le rôle spécifique du Tribunal est strictement celui de décider du mérite de la demande de prorogation.

[25]        La Cour suprême du Canada, dans l’affaire Carter c. Canada[16] a accordé un délai additionnel de 4 mois en raison des délais occasionnés par la tenue de la dernière élection fédérale, faisant ainsi passer de 12 à 16 mois le délai pendant lequel l’ordonnance de suspension a eu pour effet de maintenir en vigueur les dispositions inconstitutionnelles prohibant qu’une aide à mourir soit apportée par un médecin à une personne adulte capable, consentant clairement à mettre fin à sa vie, dans le contexte où cette personne souffre de problèmes de santé graves et irrémédiables lui causant des souffrances persistantes lui étant intolérables.

[26]        À cette occasion, la Cour suprême a souligné que la suspension de la prise d’effet de la déclaration d’invalidité constitutionnelle est, au départ, une mesure extraordinaire car « elle a pour effet de maintenir en vigueur une loi inconstitutionnelle, en violation des droits constitutionnels des membres de  la société canadienne »[17] et que proroger une telle suspension pose encore plus problèmes. Suivant la Cour suprême, le procureur général sollicitant une telle prorogation doit démontrer l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles, un lourd fardeau.

[27]        Une élection est une telle circonstance. Toutefois, le Tribunal en avait déjà tenu compte, tel que vu plus haut, de même que de la complexité de la Loi et des questions liées à la consultation des peuples autochtones et autres intéressés. Tous ces facteurs l’avaient amené, dès le départ et avant même l’élection, à suspendre la déclaration d’invalidité pour 18 mois, une durée dépassant de 6 mois le délai de 12 mois habituellement accordé en pareille situation.

[28]           Les circonstances exceptionnelles qui n’ont pas pu être considérées dans un premier temps, découlent tant de difficultés sérieuses quant à la détermination du processus précis à adopter pour déterminer les correctifs et leur suffisance que de difficultés à cerner toutes les situations que le gouvernement et le législateur souhaitent considérer aux fins d’un correctif immédiat. Il est clair, quel que soit le résultat auquel les intéressés parviendront, qu’un délai additionnel s’impose dans ce contexte.

[29]        Le fait que les parties consentent à la prorogation est un élément qui fait partie de l’équation mais ne saurait se voir accorder un poids important considérant que le droit à l’égalité de nombreuses personnes qui ne sont pas partie au dossier est mis en suspens.[18]  

[30]        Par contre, il faut aussi considérer, dans l’intérêt général, les effets d’une prise d’effet de la déclaration d’invalidité.  De nombreuses personnes seraient privées de leur droit à l’inscription sans qu’il en résulte un avantage pour les personnes victimes de discrimination.  Tous et toutes seraient traités également, mais tous et toutes seraient sans droit à l’inscription.

[31]        Il ne faut pas négliger, notamment, les impacts[19] que pourraient subir toutes les personnes ayant actuellement droit à l’inscription au registre des Indiens sans y être encore inscrites ou qui y auront droit dès leur naissance, particulièrement les nouveaux nés auxquels l’alinéa 6(1) f) et le paragraphe 6(2) de la Loi sont susceptibles de s’appliquer et dont les parents vivent dans les réserves. Si la conclusion déclarant les dispositions inopérantes prenait effet, ces personnes sont susceptibles d’en souffrir, pouvant notamment être privées du programme de bénéfices de santé non-assurés, de même que les communautés auxquelles elles appartiennent, lesquelles sont financées par le gouvernement en fonction du nombre de personnes inscrites vivant sur les réserves, et ce, sans pour autant que cela puisse bénéficier aux demandeurs et aux autres personnes dans leur situation, tel que déjà mentionné.

[32]        Si certaines des personnes actuellement victimes de discrimination vivent peut-être déjà dans les réserves, on peut, sans trop de risque de se tromper, affirmer que ce n’est sans doute pas le cas pour la très grande majorité d’entre elles[20].  

[33]        De plus, en raison du délai additionnel accordé, des modifications au projet de loi S-3 ou encore le remaniement de celui-ci pour lui accorder une portée plus large, suivant l’option qui sera finalement retenue, sont susceptibles de reconnaître le droit à l’égalité d’encore davantage de personnes, et ce, à court terme et sans nécessité pour celles-ci de recourir aux tribunaux.

[34]        Tenant compte de l’ensemble des circonstances, la PGC s’est déchargée de son fardeau et la prorogation de la suspension de la prise d’effet de la conclusion déclarant inopérants les alinéas 6(1)a), c) et f) ainsi que le paragraphe 6(2) de la Loi est accordée, mais seulement jusqu’au 3 juillet 2017.

[35]        Ceci portera le délai total dont aura disposé le législateur à 23 mois, 19 mois si l’on exclue les 4 mois d’arrêt des travaux pendant les élections. La date du 3 juillet est retenue en lien avec la fin des travaux de la chambre des communes, prévue pour le 23 juin sous réserve d’une modification, et implique un délai additionnel de quelques jours, advenant que la réponse législative soit adoptée à la dernière minute, pour l’adoption d’un décret.  Il va sans dire qu’il n’est pas interdit de procéder plus rapidement.          

PAR CES MOTIFS, LE TRIBUNAL :

[36]        ACCUEILLE la demande subsidiaire;

[37]        PROROGE jusqu’au 3 juillet 2017 la suspension de la prise d’effet de la conclusion du jugement du 3 août 2015 déclarant inopérants les alinéas 6(1)a), c) et f) et le paragraphe 6(2) de la Loi sur les Indiens;

[38]        SANS FRAIS.

		__________________________________ CHANTAL MASSE, j.c.s.
Me David Schulze Dionne Schulze
Procureur des demandeurs et Intervenants
Me Nancy Bonsaint Ministère de la justice Canada
Procureure du défendeur
Dates d’audience :	Les 6 janvier 2017 et 20 janvier 2017

Descheneaux c. Le Procureur général du Canada

2017 QCCS 153

SUPERIOR COURT

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC

DISTRICT OF MONTRÉAL

No.:                  500-17-048861-093

 

DATE:             20 JANUARY 2017[******]

 

PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE CHANTAL MASSE, J.S.C.

 

 

STÉPHANE DESCHENEAUX

and

SUSAN YANTHA

and

TAMMY YANTHA

Plaintiffs

v.

 

 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Defendant

and

CHIEF RICK O'BOMSAWI N, NICOLE O'BOMSAWI N, CLÉMENT SADOQUES, ALAIN

O'BOMSAWIN AND JACQUES THÉRIAULT WATSO, on their own behalf and in their capacity as the elected council representing the ABENAKI OF ODANAK

and

CHIEF RAYMOND BERNARD, CHRISTIAN TROTTIER, KEVEN BERNARD, LUCIEN

MILLETTE AND NAYAN BERNARD, on their own behalf and in their capacity as the elected council representing the ABENAKI OF WÔLINAK

Intervenors

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

JM 2158

[1] The Attorney General of Canada (the “AGC”) is seeking the extension until August 3, 2017, of the suspension of the effect of the declaration granted in a judgment rendered on August 3, 2015, which declared certain provisions of the Indian Act[22] (“the Act”) inoperative with respect to registration as an Indian. In the alternative, the Attorney General’s relief sought would allow for the possibility that the Court determine any other period it deems appropriate.

 

[2] Without being able to describe all of the nuances and details of the decision rendered on August 3, 2015, which is 247 paragraphs long, it is important to describe the gist of it.

 

[3] In its decision, the Court concluded that the plaintiff Descheneaux was the victim of discrimination based on sex, since he did not have a status as advantageous in respect of his right to registration as others in the same situation as him with respect to ancestry, other than the sex of their Indian grandparents, namely, a man instead of a woman. The decision also noted that with respect to the right to registration, the Act is discriminatory in its treatment of the plaintiff Susan Yantha because she is the illegitimate daughter of an Indian man, as compared to certain illegitimate sons, as well as in its treatment of her daughter Tammy Yantha, as a result of the sex of her Indian parent born out of wedlock. These violations of the right to equality were held not to be justified and, as a result, the provisions of the Act that caused the discrimination were declared inoperative and unconstitutional due to their violation of the right to equality provided for in s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[23]

 

[4] The relevant orders made in the judgment of August 3, 2015, are as follows:

 

[245] DECLARES that paragraphs 6(1)(a),(c) and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the Indian Act unjustifiably infringe section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and are inoperative;

 

[246] SUSPENDS this declaration of invalidity for a period of eighteen months;

 

[5] The elements specifically considered by the undersigned when I decided to suspend for 18 months the effect of the declaration that the provisions of the Act are inoperative are set out at paragraphs 232 and 233 of the judgment and were relied upon notwithstanding the conclusions as to the complexity of the Act, particularly at paragraphs 226 and 227:

 

[226] Although the Court considers it highly unlikely that Parliament will choose to cancel the benefits conferred on persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied, the lawmakers must nevertheless have sufficient room to maneuver when drafting the details of the provisions to remedy the discrimination.

[227] Indeed, it is in a better position than the Court to determine what these details should be and how consistent they are with the new regime in place, especially given the highly technical and complex nature of the Act. For example, there must be a connection between what is stated in this judgment and sections 8 and following of the Act with regard to Band Lists and the membership rules that may be established by a Band that has assumed control of its List, as was the case when paragraph 6(1)(c.1) was added in 2010.

[ ...]

 

[232] A year and a half to decide which measures to take seems reasonable, in light of the current pre-election context and the fact that this is not the first time that Parliament has been asked to analyze the issue and that consultations on this subject are held. It should be reiterated that the situation has persisted for a little more than 30 years now without a complete solution. And the Court is not taking into consideration discussions on the discrimination arising from the 1951 Act, which took place long before there were even plans for the enactment of the Canadian Charter.^[60] The time period takes into account the fact that the issues raised here have been known for several years. Although new consultations are in the works, they must take place promptly.

 

[233] In determining this suspension, the Court is well aware that the plaintiffs and other persons in their situation will continue to suffer discrimination during the eighteen-month period granted, unless Parliament acts more quickly. This is nevertheless the price that must be paid to respect the fundamental role of the legislative power in our society, a role that the Court cannot usurp.

 

____________________

 

60. In her additional reasons on the remedy, the trial judge refers to discussions on this subject in the early 1970s: McIvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, supra note 8.

 

(Citations omitted, other than note 60.)

 

[6] Finally, the Court suggested that a broader approach should be envisaged by Parliament than the one favoured after the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (“BCCA”) in Mclvor v. Canada (Registrar of lndian and Northern Affairs) (“Mclvor”), [24] even while quickly taking sufficiently broad remedial measures to cure the discrimination identified in the judgment, discrimination that flows from the advantageous treatment given to a group identified in the Mclvor case. At paragraphs 3 to 5, 8 to 10, 46, 47, 223 and 234 to 243, the judgment explains in more detail why the Court allowed itself to make this suggestion:

 

[3] [...] [T]he judgment of the BCCA in McIvor, which the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear in appeal, gave rise to a legislative amendment in 2010. The purpose of the 2010 Act was to respond to that judgment by correcting sex discrimination arising from certain transitional provisions of the 1985 Act.

 

[4] In that case, the BCCA found that the discriminatory treatment was justified because it existed to preserve rights that were vested under the former legislation.

 

[5] The unjustified discrimination identified by the BCCA in McIvor arose from an additional benefit conferred by the 1985 Act on a particular group, not from a vested right. Parliament could have chosen to identify the persons suffering from discrimination on the basis of a prohibited ground in comparison to this advantaged group and try to remedy this discrimination. Instead, however, it chose to restrict the remedy solely to the parties to the dispute and persons in situations strictly identical to theirs.

 

[ ...]

 

[8] All three of the plaintiffs have met their burdens and proved discriminatory infringement of their equality rights. The discriminatory treatment they have suffered is clear from a comparison with a sub-group that is part of the advantaged group identified by the BCCA in McIvor. As in that case, the AGC has failed to demonstrate that these infringements arising from sex discrimination can be justified in a free and democratic society.

 

[9] Thus, discrimination of the same nature as that which historically prevailed against Indian women and their descendants with respect to their being entered in the Register still exists today, despite Parliament’s attempts to eradicate it in 1985 and 2010. In fact, by benefiting a group that was already advantaged under the former statute, the 1985 Act exacerbated the discriminatory treatment of certain persons, including the plaintiffs and other persons in their situation. The 2010 Act did not remedy the situation, at the very least, not fully. 

 

[10] Sex discrimination, though more subtle than before, persists.

 

[ ...]

 

[46] It should be noted that the comments of the BCCA certainly do not exempt Parliament from continuing its efforts to enact a statute free of unjustified discrimination, as it is constitutionally bound to do. On the contrary, the BCCA recognized that many issues required the attention of Parliament.

 

[47] The 2010 Act, however, did not seek to remedy all potential discrimination arising from the advantageous treatment under the 1985 Act of persons to whom the Double Mother Rule applied before that Act came into force. Instead, Parliament chose measures that applied only to persons who were in situations strictly identical to Grismer‘s.

 

[...]

[223] The year now is 2015. The 1985 Act from which the discrimination arises has been in force for a little more than 30 years. The general finding of discrimination in the 2009 judgment of the BCCA in McIvor could have enabled Parliament to make more sweeping corrections than what was accomplished by the measures in the 2010 Act. The discrimination suffered by the plaintiffs arises from the same source as the one identified in that case.

 

[ ...]

 

[234] This judgment aims to dispose of the plaintiffs’ action.

 

[235] It does not, however, exempt Parliament from taking the appropriate measures to identify and settle all other discriminatory situations that may arise from the issue identified, whether they are based on sex or another prohibited ground, in accordance with its constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws respect the rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter.

 

[236] This task incumbent on Parliament is complex and commensurate with the general impact of the statutes it enacts. It must take into account the effects of a statute in all the situations to which it will likely apply, and do so in light of the reports, studies and factual situations discussed and raised during the enactment process, and in light of the applicable law, including the principles set out in judicial decisions.

 

[237] Judges hear only one specific dispute and are privy only to what is adduced and argued before them. They are not in the best position to grasp all of the implications of the laws and their potentially discriminatory effects.

 

[238] In the 2010 Act, Parliament chose to limit the remedy to the parties in McIvor and those in situations strictly identical to theirs. It did not attempt to identify the full measure of the advantages given the privileged group identified in that case.

 

[239] When Parliament chooses not to consider the broader implications of judicial decisions by limiting their scope to the bare minimum, a certain abdication of legislative power in favour of the judiciary will likely take place. In such cases, it appears that the holders of legislative power prefer to wait for the courts to rule on a case-by-case basis before acting, and for their judgments to gradually force statutory amendments to finally bring them in line with the Constitution.

 

[240] From the perspective of Canadian citizens, all of whom are potential litigants, the failure to perform this legislative duty and the abdication of power that may result are obviously not desirable.

 

[241] First, it would compel them to argue their constitutional rights in the judicial arena in many closely related cases and at great cost, instead of benefiting from the broader effects of a policy decision and counting on those who exercise legislative power to ensure that their rights are respected when statutes concerning them are enacted and revised. What is more, limited judicial resources used on disputes that a well-interpreted prior judgment should have settled are squandered instead of being used efficiently, with unfortunate effects for all litigants.

 

[242] It is clear that, because of the technical nature of the Act, its evolution over time, and its multi-generational effects, the task of ensuring that it has no unjustifiable discriminatory effects is a significant challenge. These are not, however, reasons that justify not taking on that challenge once again.

 

[243] Parliament should not interpret this judgment as strictly as it did the BCCA’s judgment in McIvor. If it wishes to fully play its role instead of giving free reign to legal disputes, it must act differently this time, while also quickly making sufficiently significant corrections to remedy the discrimination identified in this case. One approach does not exclude the other.

 

[244] Given the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to equality, paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c) and (f) and subsection 6(2) of the Act must be declared inoperative. The effect of this judgment will be suspended, however, for a period of eighteen months.

 

[7] In its application for an extension, the AGC relied on several arguments that had already been considered by the undersigned when I decided on the exceptional period of 18 months during which the effect of the declaration of inoperability of the provisions of the Act would be suspended, in particular, the election, the consultations that would be necessary, as well as the complex and technical nature of the Act.

 

[8] The AGC produced several affidavits and exhibits describing an approach in two steps, which the government has chosen.

 

[9] As a first step, it favours adopting amendments to the Act that address known discrimination based on sex. The discrimination based on sex identified in the judgment, as well as other similar situations identified by the government or raised during the consultations or meetings could be the subject of remedial measures. A bill to this effect is currently under study, namely, Bill S-3 entitled An Act to amend the Indian Act (elimination of sex-based inequities in registration),[25] and it has been the subject of consultations or information sessions.[26]

 

[10] Secondly, the government “committed to launching a collaborative process with First Nations and other Indigenous groups to address broader issues relating to Indian registration, Band membership and citizenship with a view to future reform.”[27] According to the action plan produced as Exhibit R- 15, the issues relating to discrimination based on prohibited grounds other than sex will be addressed in this second step.

 

[11] The application for an extension followed, in particular, a letter from the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples dated December 13, 2016, indicating that the committee had “heard evidence to suggest that gender-based discrimination would persist even if this bill were passed,”[28] as well as “evidence that the Crown may have failed to fulfill its duty to consult under s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”[29] The Committee specifically asked for an application to be made to the Québec Superior Court for an extension to “allow the department to continue their consultation process on the issue of gender-based discrimination in registration.”[30]

 

[12] The action plan in Exhibit R-15 describes the possibility of holding continuing discussions on the proposed amendments to Bill S-3 in order to address residual sex-based inequities related to the right to registration as an Indian. Thus, according to the action plan, “a six-month extension would allow the Government to further engage on Bill S-3 to confirm that the proposed amendments provide the appropriate remedy for situations found in Descheneaux and to ensure that the Bill addresses other known situations of sex-based inequities.”[31]

 

[13] The evidence produced also describes the parliamentary process while underlining the impossibility of predicting precisely the time required for the process. The House will adjourn for the summer on June 23, 2017, subject to any changes, and the Senate will do the same on June 30, 2017, also subject to any changes.

 

[14] According to the action plan, which is Exhibit R-15, the time requested includes “the time required to draft any additional amendments as well as to complete the legislative process, beginning in early spring 2017, to pass Bill S-3 into law by the end of the parliamentary session on June 23, 2017 and have an order-in-council passed immediately following for the coming into force of the bill.”[32]

 

[15] Through their lawyer who also represented the plaintiffs, the Chiefs of the Abenaki of Odanak and of the Abenaki of Wôlinak, intervenors in this case, criticized the government’s position that limited to discrimination based on sex, the situations that could be considered under Bill S-3 and could be the subject of remedial measures.

 

[16] They stated they had identified situations they maintain are discrimination based on other prohibited grounds and, more particularly, family status. They also maintain that situations ruled to be discriminatory but justified on the basis of preserving acquired rights in the McIvor case should be the subject of discussions. They also maintain that they will immediately turn to the courts if Bill S-3 is adopted in its current form.

 

[17] Exhibit I-7, a letter from the Chief of the Abenaki of Odanak addressed to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada dated January 19, 2017, reads as follows:

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This is further to your email of January 16, 2017, concerning Bill S-3, and to the

“Action Plan” forwarded to our lawyers by counsel for the Government of Canada in the Descheneaux litigation.

 

Your email requested my “views on hosting a community engagement session for interested individuals from Odanak,” for “impacted individuals to share their views on how to address systemic issues in lndian registration, and provide [them] with an opportunity to consider various perspectives and to determine whether Bill S-3 addresses ail known sex-based inequities in registration.”

 

The view of my council, as well as that of the Grand Conseil de la Nation Waban­aki tribal council, which I chair, is that such a meeting would be a poor use of my community's time and resources. However, if you wish to organize your own meeting in Odanak, then Council or another community organization could rent the required facilities to your Department for a reasonable fee. This is an administrative matter about which you could call my Council office.

 

I will briefly set out the problems with your proposal, before recalling the Abenaki position on the steps required to improve Bill S-3 and our own suggestion on how to do so quickly and efficiently.

 

Problems with INAC's proposed approach

 

The first problem in your proposal is that it refers to “a community engagement session.” If by “engagement” you mean the same as the process your Department has imposed up till now, then it is clear to us that would not be consultation, which we assume if why you refrain from using that term. However, the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples directed you to “consult with lndigenous organizations.” lt will be up to you to explain to the Senate why you chose not to follow its clear instructions.

 

The second and more practical problem we have with your proposal is that we are not confident you would be able to provide any meaningful response after hearing from affected individuals, if they shared their views on “known sex-based inequities in registration.”

 

The clear inequity that we are aware of consists of the differential treatment of those descended from a woman who lost status due to marriage to a non-lndian man if they were born before September 4, 1951, compared to those in the same situation but who are descended from a man who married a non-lndian woman and gave her status. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held in Mclvor that this discrimination violated the equality right guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but that the violation was justified on the grounds of acquired rights. Your Assistant Deputy Minister told us and the Senate committee that your Department remains satisfied with that conclusion.

 

Unless your Department is willing to reconsider its position on this point, you are effectively asking our members to describe discrimination about which you plan to do nothing. If there are other sex-based inequities in the registration rules that your Department has identified, we would be surprised that you did not address them already in Bill S-3, but we would obviously be interested in reviewing them.

 

Finally, the fundamental problem we have with your proposal is that you wish to limit your “engagement” to determining “whether Bill S-3 addresses all known sex-based inequities in registration.”

 

We made our position clear when the Québec chiefs met with you in September, when you and I spoke by phone in October, when we appeared before the House of Commons and Senate committees in November and when we met with your Assistant Deputy Minister in December: we want to address at least four specific instances of discrimination based on family status.

 

As I pointed out to you at the September 9th meeting with the Québec chiefs, Justice Masse wrote that her decision “does not, however, exempt Parliament from taking the appropriate measures to identify and settle all other discriminatory situations that may arise from the issue identified, whether they are based on sex or another prohibited ground, in accordance with its constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws respect the rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter.”

 

At that meeting, you personally told me in front of the other chiefs that you would be open to discussing other instances of discrimination. We heard nothing further from you until the following month, when you asked me and my council to speak to you by conference call and told us that Bill S-3 was tabled and that only sex-based discrimination would be addressed. I hope you understand that this experience has affected our willingness to devote our time and energy to the processes that your Department puts forward.

 

Steps required to improve Bill S-3

 

The Action Plan your Department has sent to our lawyers states that Bill S-3 will not address distinctions in lndian registration based on family status because of “Canada's commitment to reconciliation and a renewed nation-to-nation relationship with lndigenous Peoples.” Obviously, we look forward to a nation­ to-nation relationship between the Abenaki and the Government of Canada, but that future goal is not an acceptable reason for tolerating unconstitutional discrimination against our members in the present.

 

As I told your Assistant Deputy Minister at our December 1st meeting, the issue is your Department's status rules under the lndian Act, which is a separate matter from our community's power to determine who its members are, as we do already. You created these status rules and are now amending them: you therefore must ensure that they do not violate our members' right to equality under the Charter.

 

We believe that your Department should take advantage of any extension given to the government by the Court and meet Justice Masse's challenge to address all other discriminatory situations that may arise under the registration rules, including those based on grounds other than gender.

 

Justice Masse's judgment clearly explains why our approach is preferable: leaving other forms of discrimination untouched would compel litigants “to argue their constitutional rights in the judicial arena in many closely related cases and at great cost, instead of benefiting from the broader effects of a policy decision and counting on those who exercise legislative power to ensure that their rights are respected when statutes concerning them are enacted and revised. What is more, limited judicial resources used on disputes that a well-interpreted prior judgment should have settled are squandered instead of being used efficiently, with unfortunate effects for all litigants.”

 

During our conference call in October, I told you that if other Charter issues were not addressed, the Abenaki would have to be back in court with your Department as soon as the bill was passed. lt was disturbing to me that your only answer was that that is my prerogative. ln effect, you were telling me that the Department is content to see my community's resources, along with those of the court and the government, be squandered on litigation closely related to the Descheneaux case.

 

We are suggesting a better way. We suggest that your Department's lawyers and ours meet as soon as possible with representatives of other affected organizations, such as the Assembly of First Nations, the Native Women's Association of Canada, and the lndigenous Bar Association, in order to review issues of continuing unconstitutional discrimination in your lndian Act registration rules.

 

Obviously, the scope of such a discussion would be narrower than the ambitious goals set out for your Department's proposed “Stage II” to its response to the Descheneaux judgment, but broader than your narrow focus in bill S-3. The goal would be to identify the scenarios likely to be ruled unconstitutional by the courts and the amendments needed to correct the problems immediately. We are confident that both Senators and Members of Parliament would welcome the results of such an approach since it would avoid further litigation, as the Court suggested.

 

We are prepared to make ourselves and our team available for such a process rapidly and in ample time to meet any new deadline set by the Court. We look forward to your positive response.

 

(Bold emphasis added; underlining in the original.)

 

[18] In an article published in 2002, Professor Kent Roach made the following comments that are worth recalling in relation to the particular complexity attached to broad and inclusive discussions concerning First Nations, such as those envisaged here, and that were attempted after the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1999 in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada):[33]

 

55. The second phase was intended to start in early 2001 and deal with “integrated and sustainable electoral reform to establish a system that is both consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and respects the interests of all Band members, whether they live on or off reserve.” ln addition, “consideration will be given to broader discussions on lndian Act governance, accountability and authorities in the Stage Two consultation process.” This second phase appears to have been caught up in ongoing controversy over reforms to the lndian Act. lt does, however, appear to be connected with the broader band governance issues implicated by the Court's ruling. lt is significant, however, that this more comprehensive approach will take longer than even the longest period of delay sanctioned by the Court in Corbiere. Even the most generous periods of delay allowed by the Court may be too short for genuine structural reform to occur.

 

56. Even the more limited first stage process was not without controversy. Shortly after the Minister of lndian Affairs announced the two-stage process on December 9, 1999, then Assembly of First Nations (AFN) National Chief, Phil Fontaine, complained that the federal announcement:

 

took 7 months out of what is already a tight time-frame to implement a national decision with far-reaching implications. This is unfortunate, given the AFN presented an action plan less than a month after the decision came down. After this long delay, we see the resources are minimal both in terms of time and funding.

 

57. ln a letter of September 25, 2000, to all First Nations, present National Chief Mathew Coon Come objected that First Nations, “have not been given sufficient time to assess the impacts of the regulations and respond to them. lt also appears that First Nations will not be properly funded to analyse the impacts or administer the regulations. ln fact, concerns have been raised that First Nations could be forced to defend themselves against law suits arising from their inability to meet the obligations imposed by the regulations.” The AFN also attempted to intervene to support a request by an intervenor in Corbiere, the Lesser Slave Lake Regional Council, to request a rehearing to extend the 18 month period of delay, a request that was denied by the Court on November 11, 2000, without written reasons. Although there was some consultation with the affected groups. it is not clear whether the consultation process, which led to the enactment of regulations allowing off-reserve residents to vote in band elections and referenda, was entirely successful in takinq into account the complex views and sometimes conflicting interests of those affected by Corbiere, includinq the off­ reserve residents that the decision was intended to benefit. For example, the options of mail-in ballots or voting on reserve may not be effective for transient off-reserve Band members living in cities. A more creative response would have involved polling stations for multiple bands at Aboriginal friendship and other cultural centres located in cities where many band members live.[34]

 

(Underlining added.)

 

[19] The intervenors’ scepticism about postponing certain issues until Phase Il, according to their lawyers’ submissions, is also based on the absence of concrete follow-up to the decision in the Mclvor case in 2009 in order to correct other situations described at that time, until the Court ruled in this case, which had been mentioned in one of the BCCA’s decisions in 2010 concerning the extension of the suspension of the declaration of invalidity[35].

 

[20] The action plan in Exhibit R-15 describes a period of at least 24 months to complete the second phase. The intervenors’ attorney questions whether this is realistic.

 

[21] The attorney for the plaintiffs and the intervenors however confirmed that his clients, though in disagreement with the government’s approach, believe that the AGC’s motion must be granted in order to allow for further discussions they hope will bear fruit, even though they do not have too much faith in them. They are above all concerned, which is entirely to their credit, about the potential impacts of a failure to grant an extension on other individuals’ right to registration. The plaintiffs have also not sought a particular remedy that would apply only to them.

 

[22] The attorney for the AGC, for her part, argues that the action plan in Exhibit R-15, even though it has been approved, is not final and could still be adapted based on the comments received.[36] She also confirmed openness to holding a meeting between lawyers, as suggested in the letter produced as Exhibit I-7.

 

[23] All parties therefore took the view that the provisions of the Act should be kept in force during these discussions and until remedial measures are adopted through legislation.

 

[24] Determining the nature and scope of the legislative response to the decision rendered is a matter entirely for the government and Parliament. The Court will not allow itself to interfere with their roles and responsibilities. The decision rendered on August 3, 2015, already expresses, in a general manner, the respective roles of the courts and the legislature and what they involve. In this case, the specific role of the Court is strictly to decide on the merits of the application for an extension.

 

[25] In the case of Carter v. Canada,[37] the Supreme Court of Canada granted an additional period of four months due to the delay caused by the preceding federal election, thereby increasing from 12 to 16 months the delay during which the suspension order effectively kept in force unconstitutional provisions that prohibited physician-assisted death for competent adult persons who clearly consent to the termination of life and under circumstances where they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to them.

 

[26] On that occasion, the Supreme Court emphasized that suspending the effect of a declaration of constitutional invalidity is, to begin with, an extraordinary measure “since its effect is to maintain an unconstitutional law in breach of the constitutional rights of members of Canadian society”[38] and extending such a suspension poses even more problems. According to the Supreme Court, an Attorney General seeking such an extension must show exceptional circumstances, which is a heavy burden.

 

[27] An election is one such circumstance. However, the Court had already taken this into account, as set out above, as well as the complexity of the Act and the issues related to consulting Aboriginal peoples and other interested parties. All these factors had, from the start and even before the election, led the Court to suspend the declaration of invalidity for 18 months, a period six months longer than the 12-month delay usually granted in similar situations.

 

[28] The exceptional circumstances that could not be considered at first arise as much from the serious difficulties in determining the exact process to be adopted to determine remedial measures and their sufficiency, as from the difficulties in identifying all the situations that the government and Parliament wish to consider for the purposes of adopting immediate remedial measures. It is clear, no matter what result the interested parties arrive at, that an additional delay is necessary under the circumstances.

 

[29] The fact that the parties agree to the extension is an element that is part of the equation, but not one that is given considerable weight, considering that the equality rights of numerous individuals who are not parties are being suspended.[39]

 

[30] What must also be considered, however, in the general interest, are the effects once a declaration of invalidity comes into effect. Numerous individuals will be deprived of their right to registration, without any resulting benefit for those who are victims of discrimination. Everyone would be treated equally but everyone would be without the right to registration.

 

[31] What cannot be ignored are the impacts[40] that could be felt by all those who currently have the right to be registered as Indians but are not yet registered or who will have the right as of birth, especially newborns to whom paragraph 6(2) of the Act is likely to apply and whose parents live on reserve. If the declaration that the provisions are inoperative took effect, these individuals would be likely to suffer the consequences, such as being deprived of the non-insured health benefits program, as would the communities to whom they belong, which are financed by the government on the basis of the number of registered individuals living on the reserves - and all this, without any benefit to the plaintiffs or others in their situation, as previously mentioned.

 

[32] While some of those who are victims of this discrimination currently live on reserve, it can be asserted, without much fear of error, that this is not the case for a very large majority of them.[41]

 

[33] Moreover, as a result of the additional delay granted, depending on the option ultimately chosen, amendments to Bill S-3 or its redesign in order to give it a broader scope, could recognize the equality rights of more individuals, in the short term and without their being obliged to resort to litigation.

 

[34] Taking into account all of the circumstances, the AGC has discharged its burden and the extension of the suspension of the effect of the declaration that sub-paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c) and (f), as well as paragraph 6(2) of the Act are inoperative is granted, but only until July 3, 2017.

 

[35] This brings the total period that Parliament will have had to 23 months, 19 months excluding the four months it stood adjourned during the election. The July 3^rd date was chosen based on the end of parliamentary business for the House of Commons, which will be on June 23, 2017, subject to any changes, and it includes a delay of a few days, in case the legislative response is adopted at the last minute, to allow for an order-in-council to be adopted. It goes without saying that nothing would prohibit proceeding more quickly.

 

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

 

[36]      GRANTS the application made in the alternative;

 

[37]      EXTENDS until July 3, 2017, the suspension of the effect of the declaration in the judgment of August 3, 2015, that sub-paragraphs 6(1)(a), (c) and (f) and paragraph 6(2) of the Indian Act are inoperative;

 

[38]      WITHOUT COSTS.

 

 

CHANTAL MASSE, j.s.c.

 

Maître David Schulze

Dionne Schulze

Attorney for the Plaintiff and the Intervenors

 

__________________

 

 

Maître Nancy Bonsaint

Department of Justice Canada

Attorney for the Defendant

 

 

Hearing dates: January 6 and 20, 2017