Imperial Tobacco Ltd. c. Conseil québécois sur le tabac et la santé |
2012 QCCA 1847 |
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COURT OF APPEAL |
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CANADA |
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PROVINCE OF QUEBEC |
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REGISTRY OF |
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No: |
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(500-06-000070-983 and 500-06-000076-980) |
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DATE: |
October 15, 2012 |
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PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. |
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IMPERIAL TOBACCO LIMITED |
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PETITIONER - Defendant |
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v. |
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CONSEIL QUÉBÉCOIS SUR LE TABAC ET LA SANTÉ JEAN-YVES BLAIS CÉCILIA LÉTOURNEAU |
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RESPONDENTS - Plaintiffs |
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and |
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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IMPLEADED PARTY - Defendant in warranty |
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1621. Lorsque la loi prévoit l'attribution de dommages-intérêts punitifs, ceux-ci ne peuvent excéder, en valeur, ce qui est suffisant pour assurer leur fonction préventive.
Ils s'apprécient en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances appropriées, notamment de la gravité de la faute du débiteur, de sa situation patrimoniale ou de l'étendue de la réparation à laquelle il est déjà tenu envers le créancier, ainsi que, le cas échéant, du fait que la prise en charge du paiement réparateur est, en tout ou en partie, assumée par un tiers. |
1621. Where the awarding of punitive damages is provided for by law, the amount of such damages may not exceed what is sufficient to fulfil their preventive purpose.
Punitive damages are assessed in the light of all the appropriate circumstances, in particular the gravity of the debtor's fault, his patrimonial situation, the extent of the reparation for which he is already liable to the creditor and, where such is the case, the fact that the payment of the damages is wholly or partly assumed by a third person. |
[2] Before assessing whether leave should be granted, a brief review of the context in which the judgment against which leave is sought was rendered is necessary. The plaintiffs' class actions claim compensatory and punitive damages arising out of their use of tobacco products manufactured by the petitioner and two other tobacco companies. The trial of the action began in March this year, and is expected to last at least into 2013 and quite possibly well beyond.
[3] The subject of the applicant's disclosure of its financial statements apparently first arose during the examination on discovery of a representative of one of the defendants, but it emerged more clearly during several days in June of this year as the trial was proceeding. The trial judge determined that he would not require the plaintiffs before him to present written motions requiring the production of the requested information, and fixed argument to be held on June 21.
[4] Essentially, the plaintiffs sought to have the complete financial statements of the three defendant manufacturers, all of which are privately held companies, from 2007 forward until the conclusion of the trial, subject to a confidentiality undertaking that is not a subject of dispute. As for Imperial Tobacco, it was prepared to furnish the plaintiffs their income statements for the three years preceding the end of the trial.
[5] After hearing counsel for the parties, the trial judge rendered a reasoned judgment that contains the following conclusions:
[10] REJETTE les objections des Compagnies à la production de leurs états financiers complets pour les années financières 2007 et suivantes, jusqu'à et incluant ceux de l'année du jugement en première instance dans ces dossiers;
[11] ORDONNE à chacune des Compagnies de communiquer immédiatement aux demandeurs une copie certifiée conforme de ses états financiers complets pour les années financières 2007 et suivantes, jusqu'à et incluant ceux de l'année du jugement en première instance dans ces dossiers et pour les années futures, dans les quarante-cinq (45) jours de leur signature par le conseil d'administration de la Compagnie;
[12] ORDONNE que le contenu des états financiers communiqués ne soit divulgué qu'aux procureurs des demandeurs et du Canada, ainsi qu'à leurs experts à la condition que ces derniers signent préalablement un engagement de confidentialité, tel que mentionné ci-dessus.
[6]
The first question that requires a response is
whether the impugned interlocutory judgment is susceptible of being appealed
pursuant to article
29. Est également sujet à appel, conformément à l'article 511, le jugement interlocutoire de la Cour supérieure ou celui de la Cour du Québec mais, s'il s'agit de sa compétence dans les matières relatives à la jeunesse, uniquement en matière d'adoption:
1. lorsqu'il décide en partie du litige;
2. lorsqu'il ordonne que soit faite une chose à laquelle le jugement final ne pourra remédier; ou
3. lorsqu'il a pour effet de retarder inutilement l'instruction du procès.
Toutefois, l'interlocutoire rendu au cours de l'instruction n'est pas sujet à appel immédiat et ne peut être mis en question que sur appel du jugement final, à moins qu'il ne rejette une objection à la preuve fondée sur l'article 308 de ce code ou sur l'article 9 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (chapitre C-12) ou à moins qu'il ne maintienne une objection à la preuve.
Est interlocutoire le jugement rendu en cours d'instance avant le jugement final. |
29. An appeal also lies, in accordance with article 511, from an interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court or the Court of Québec but, as regards youth matters, only in a matter of adoption:
(1) when it in part decides the issues;
(2) when it orders the doing of anything which cannot be remedied by the final judgment; or
(3) when it unnecessarily delays the trial of the suit.
However, an interlocutory
judgment rendered during the trial cannot be appealed immediately and it
cannot be put in question except on appeal from the final judgment, unless it
disallows an objection to evidence based upon article 308 of this Code or on
section
Any judgment is interlocutory which is rendered during the suit before the final judgment. |
[7] A threshold question is whether the judgment was one that should be considered to have been rendered "during the trial" ("au cours de l'instruction"), since the rights to obtain access to the Court of Appeal differ depending on the answer to the question.
[8] In this respect, it is interesting to note that the operative parts of the conclusions of the judgment of Riordan, J. are those contained in its paragraphs [11] and [12], namely, to order the production of the financial statements in accordance with the terms so provided. To that extent, the conclusion in paragraph [10] of the judgment dismissing Imperial Tobacco's objection is superfluous. The effect of the order should therefore not be seen as dismissing an objection to evidence, but rather, granting a motion ordering Imperial Tobacco to disclose the requested documents to the plaintiffs.
[9]
Thus, Imperial Tobacco argues that the judgment
should be viewed as one contemplated by paragraph (2) of article 29,
in that it orders the doing of something that cannot be remedied by the final
judgment. Obviously, the financial statements, once disclosed, can never be
retroactively undisclosed, although the confidentiality undertaking does
provide some protection to Imperial Tobacco. To succeed on this submission,
however, Imperial Tobacco must establish that the judgment was not rendered
during the trial, since none of the conditions that would give rise to the
application of the second to last paragraph of article
[10]
In that respect, Imperial Tobacco runs headlong
into the reasons of St-Pierre, J.A. in this very case in which my
colleague dismissed an application for leave to appeal a judgment of
Riordan, J. that imposed sanctions on Imperial Tobacco for unjustifiably
refusing to acknowledge the genuineness or correctness of certain exhibits
pursuant to article
[5] Suivant le principe établi à l'arrêt Perrault c. Société hypothécaire Québec Ltée de cette Cour, le jugement rendu le 2 mai 2012 par le juge Riordan est un jugement interlocutoire en cours d'instruction.
La
disposition pertinente de l'article 29 C.P. me paraît en effet marquée au coin
de la volonté législative que dès le juge installé sur le siège pour
instruire le fond d'un litige, il ne soit plus permis de se pourvoir contre
les interlocutoires qu'il prononcera, ceux-ci ne pouvant être mis en
question que sur appel du jugement final (art.
[6] En cours d'instruction, le premier alinéa de l'article 29 C.p.c. ne s'applique pas.
[7] Quant au 2e al. de l'article 29 C.p.c. il énonce le principe voulant qu'un jugement interlocutoire rendu en cours d'instruction ne puisse faire l'objet d'un appel que dans le cadre d'un jugement final2, sujet à deux cas d'exception seulement: le jugement qui accueille une objection à la preuve ou celui qui met en jeu l'article 308 C.p.c. (secret d'état) ou l'article 9 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec (secret professionnel).
[References omitted.]
[11]
I agree with the reasoning of St-Pierre, J.A.
Once a trial has begun, the various and multiple interlocutory judgments that a
judge renders cannot properly be distinguished on the basis that some of them
relate to the trial while others do not. In one way or another, to a greater or
lesser extent, all such judgments have some impact on the conduct of the trial
for which the judge is responsible and the judgment to be rendered on the
merits. That is surely enough. Moreover, the apparent purpose of the second to
last paragraph of article
[12]
I appreciate that the judgment of
Riordan, J. ordering the production of Imperial Tobacco's financial
statements from 2007 onward cannot be put in issue effectively by an appeal of
the judgment he will render on the merits, even if the two class action claims
are dismissed. That is nevertheless the inevitable consequence of the wording
of article
[13] I am therefore obliged to dismiss Imperial Tobacco's motion for leave to appeal, with costs. In doing so, however, I am not to be taken as concluding that I would have refused to grant leave had I been free to do so, nor that any appeal I might have authorized would have been dismissed. Indeed, the proposed questions I mentioned in paragraph [1] are ones that, sooner or later, ought to be considered by this Court, albeit in a different procedural context.
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ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. |
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Mtre Suzanne Côté Mtre George R. Hendy |
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OSLER HOSKIN & HARCOURT |
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For the petitioner IMPERIAL TOBACCO LIMITED |
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Mtre Marc Beauchemin |
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DE GRANDPRÉ CHAIT |
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For the respondents CONSEIL QUÉBÉCOIS SUR LE TABAC ET LA SANTÉ and JEAN-YVES BLAIS |
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Mtre Gordon Kugler |
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KUGLER KANDESTIN |
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For the respondent CÉCILIA LÉTOURNEAU |
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Mtre Jean M. Leclerc |
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JOYAL LEBLANC (Justice Canada) |
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Mtre Donald Béchard |
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LES AVOCATS DEBLOIS ET ASSOCIÉS |
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For the impleaded party ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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Date of hearing: |
August 31, 2012 |
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AVIS :
Le lecteur doit s'assurer que les décisions consultées sont finales et sans
appel; la consultation
du plumitif s'avère une précaution utile.