[1]       The Court is seized with two motions, the first being a Motion by Petitioner S. B. dated January 16^th, 2015, asking for the homologation of a notarial mandate given in anticipation of incapacity by his mother Respondent J. S. (the “Motion to homologate”) and the second, an Amended application for the institution of protective supervision of Mrs. S., presented by Mr. B.’s sister Ja. M. and dated June 6^th, 2015 (the “Motion for curatorship”).

[2]       The Mandate in anticipation of her incapacity forming the basis of the Motion to homologate was signed by Mrs. S. before Notary Amélie Tremblay on February 18^th, 2011 (Exhibit P-3, the “Mandate”). It names Mr. B. as mandatary and Ms. M. as substitute mandatary. In her Motion for curatorship, Ms. M. asks the Court to ignore the Mandate, to put into place a regime of protective supervision and to order the holding of a Family Council which would name Ms. M. as Curator for her mother.

[3]       The Court heard several witnesses over the last two days and the facts can be summarized as follows, beginning with the incapacity of the Respondent Mrs. S..

Incapacity of Respondent

[4]       Mrs. S., presently 89 years old, was born in Poland. The proof has established that she is presently incapable of taking care of herself, and that her incapacity is total and permanent, stemming from a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease first documented by her family doctor from 1997 until 2013, Bernard Gauthier, in December 2012, as appears from his consultation note, Exhibit D - 4, dated December 7^th, 2012, which relates to a consultation he had with her on December 5^th, 2012.

[5]       According to Dr. Gauthier, who testified before the undersigned, Mrs. S. had previously shown signs of failing memory. However, he did not diagnose the Alzheimer’s disease until her visit of December 2012.

[6]       Dr. Gauthier testified that Mrs. S. had complained of memory problems as early as November 2010, however “ce n’était pas un cas de démence, à l’époque”. As a result, Dr. Gauthier referred the patient to a neurologist Dr. Louis E. Roy, who reported that she had only a “minimal cognitive impairment” at that time (in 2011), as appears from Dr. Roy’s report dated April 5^th, 2013, produced as Exhibit  P-4:

LOUIS-É. ROY, F.R.C.P.(C)

NEUROLOGUE

DATE: 2013-04-05                                           N.A.M.   J. S.

                                                                         […]

DOCTEUR:      B. GAUTHIER

Docteur: Gauthier                                            Vue avec TS Émilie Gauthier-Paré

       Je vous remercie de m'avoir référé le ou la patiente en titre.

HISTOIRE:

Atteinte cognitive légère (MCI) x 2011 - demeure seule, résidence personnes autonomes - s’organise par elle-même pour l’ensemble des AVQ et des AVD - sort seule - dit avoir égaré quelques objets récemment (vg: foulard) - lit le journal à tous les matins - pas de problème de langage - pas de sommeil agité - finances prises en charge par son fils (… elle se demande s’il fait ça correctement) … elle se sent dépassée par les transactions financières plus complexes (…placements, etc…)

EXAMEN:

TA = 120/80 RCR = 80 Droitière 5’2" 149 lbs

MMSE = 26∕30 (20-3-2013) Horloge "N"

Conversation cohérente et appropriée. Examen neurologique dans les limites "N" pour l’âge - limitation modérée des mouvements du cou

IMPRESSION DIAGNOSTIQUE:

Atteinte cognitive légère (MCI)

? État dépressif (… perte d’intérêt pour sortie avec amie, se dit sans énergie)

Idem

Rassurance

BILAN COMPLÉMENTAIRE:

Aucun - formulaire de "Rapport du directeur général … volet médical" complété - établissement une incapacité partielle pour administrer ses biens … ambivalente à propos de transférer la gestion de ses biens au curateur public…

RV sur demande

(s) signature

[7]       According to Dr. Gauthier, Dr. Roy would have prescribed medications for memory loss at that time, had he judged that it was necessary, however no medications were prescribed. Dr. Gauthier further testified that elderly patients with memory loss do not always degenerate further: “il y a des gens qui vont rester comme ça pour des années, et d’autres qui vont dégrader vers l’Alzheimer”, as Mrs. S. did in December 2012.

[8]       Following his consultation with Mrs. S. on December 5^th, 2012, and his diagnosis of Alzheimer’s, Dr. Gauthier applied to the CLSC Rosemont for an evaluation of Mrs. S., as appears from extracts of his letter dated December 7^th, 2012 (Exhibit D-4), in which he also raises the possibility of financial problems with respect to the administration of her finances by her son, as appears from the first lines of his letter, testifying that this came from comments made to him by Mrs. S.:

Consultation avec Soins à domicile CLSC Rosemont

Re : URGENT! Évaluation et soutien psychosocial SVP. Démence de type Alzheimer. Dégradation récente importante. Possible abus $$ du fils.

[9]       Six months later, on July 17^th, 2013 (Exhibit P-6), the Curator’s office wrote directly to Mrs. S. indicating their refusal to intervene:

We have received the report of the Executive Director sent by the director of Medical Affairs of the CLSC Rosemont concerning the institution of protective supervision on your behalf.

Based on the analysis of your file, we have concluded that it would not be in your best interest to institute protective supervision on your behalf.

Considering that you were declared capable of making decisions, considering that you declared to trust your son to help you in the management of your finances, considering that you disagree with the opening of a private or public of protective supervision, we consider that we have to respect your decision.

Accordingly, we feel that it is inappropriate at this time to begin the process of instituting protective supervision.

[10]    In sum, Dr. Gauthier testified that at his last visit with the patient in 2013, Mrs. S. was indeed suffering from mild Alzheimer’s, although this had not been the case in 2010 and 2011.

[11]    A more recent report was also filed with respect to Mrs. S.’s medical condition; the report, produced as Exhibit P-1, is signed by Dr. Sanda Popescu-Crainic and dated November 24^th, 2014. Dr. Popescu-Crainic declares that as of that date, Mrs. S. is incapable of caring for her person and her property, as appears from the following extracts of P-1:

Inability to retain and use new information 2^o memory deficits
Difficulty doing calculations
Partially disoriented to time, place
Inability to organize herself.
[…]
poor insight into her own deficits
paranoid delusions, occasionally uncooperative with care. […]

[…]

À mon avis, la personne est inapte à assurer la protection de sa personne et à exercer ses droits civils.
Le degré de l’inaptitude est:

       […]
total, parce qu’elle ne peut pas prendre de décisions éclairées pour elle-même ni exercer ses droits civils.

[12]    Finally, social worker Francine Saucier, who testified before the undersigned, filed a psychosocial report dated January 8^th, 2015 (Exhibit P-2), in which she declares that Mrs. S. is unable to care for her person and her property without assistance. Mrs. Saucier notes that her son, Mr. B., currently administers her finances pursuant to a “procuration bancaire” and that Mrs. S. wishes that the notarial Mandate (Exhibit P-3) which she signed naming her son as mandatary in the event of her incapacity be homologated (page 9, P-2).

[13]    The Court therefore concludes on the basis of all of the evidence offered that Mrs. S. is indeed totally incapacitated and requires a regime of protection with respect to her property and her person. In fact, this conclusion is not contested by either party.

[14]    However, the question remains as to which regime should be put into place, that which was set out in the Mandate signed by Mrs. S. naming Mr. B. as primary mandatary (P-3), or the regime of protective supervision requested by his sister Ms. M., naming her as Curator.

The legal regime applicable to the Motion to homologate

[15]    As noted above, Mrs. S. signed the Mandate P-3 on February 18^th, 2011 before Notary Amélie Tremblay. It has been established that this is the latest if not the only Mandate that she signed, as appears from Exhibit P-7 en liasse, which are searches at the Bar and at the Chamber of Notaries. Indeed, the fact of the Mandate’s existence as the only Mandate of that sort is not contested by either party. Also as noted, the Mandate P-3 appoints Petitioner B. as her Mandatary, and his sister M. as the substitute Mandatary.

[16]    In his Motion to homologate, Petitioner is asking this Court to homologate the Mandate and appoint him as Mandatary with respect to the regime of protection to be put into place, whereas his sister Ms. M. is asking that the Mandate be overlooked and that instead, a Family council be held which would appoint her as Curator. On this point, the Court did hear all of the family members who were convocated by Ms. M. to a Family Council if such a council were to be held. According to their testimony, some would appoint M. and others B.. However, before such a Family council can be held, the Court must conclude that the Mandate should be overlooked and that Mrs. S.’s wishes in that Mandate ignored.

[17]    As such, Ms. M. is contesting the validity of the Mandate, even though she acknowledges its existence and the fact that it was signed by her mother.

[18]    What legal regime applies to this question of the validity of the Mandate?

[19]    The Motion to homologate, dated January 16^th, 2015, was filed pursuant to articles 884.1 to 884.8 of the old Code of civil procedure (“Old Code”), which set out the applicable procedure and conditions for homologation. In particular, article 884.1 of the Old Code, replaced by articles 393, 394 and 404 of the new Code of Civil Procedure (“New Code” or “C.C.P. 2016”[1]), sets out the conditions for presentation and service of motions to homologate.

[20]    All of the conditions found in these procedural articles were followed in the present case. Article 884.2 of the Old Code required that motions to homologate be accompanied by medical and psychosocial assessments concerning the inability of the mandatory. This was done, and the new provisions, found at articles 309 and 315 of the C.C.P. 2016, were respected as well, even though they were not in force at the time the Motion to homologate was filed. As noted above, Exhibit P-1 is a medical report setting out the total incapacity of Mrs. S., and it is in conformity with the testimony of Dr. Gauthier, and P-2 is the psychosocial assessment. Once again, the Court repeats that it is satisfied by the evidence that Mrs. S. is incapacitated and requires protective supervision.

[21]    The criteria applicable to the homologation of protection mandates by the Superior Court under the New Code, however, is less clear than it was under the Old Code.

[22]    Article 884.3 of the Old Code required that the judge seized with a motion to homologate the mandate ascertain the inability of the mandator, the existence of the mandate and the validity of the mandate (when it has been made in the presence of witnesses). This article was often cited in the jurisprudence and it reads as follows:

884.3 The judge or clerk seized of the application for homologation shall ascertain the inability of the mandator, the existence of the mandate and the validity of the mandate where it has been made in the presence of witnesses.

[23]    As noted above, the Court is satisfied with the proof presented concerning the incapacity of the mandatory, as well as with the existence of the Mandate. However, should the undersigned proceed to verify the validity of the Mandate pursuant to the terms of article 884.3 of the Old Code, even though this article is no longer in force and even though it was a Mandate entered into before a notary, and not in the presence of witnesses?

[24]    It is my opinion that this Court must indeed verify the validity of the Mandate, for the reasons which follow.

[25]    In the Table of Concordance found in the C.C.P. 2016, the legislator indicates that article 884.3 of the Old Code has been replaced by article 315 C.C.P. 2016, which is found in Title III, entitled “Rules applicable before Notary”. The new article reads as follows and it clearly does not deal with motions to homologate presented to the Superior Court:

315. If the application relates to the institution or review of protective supervision or the homologation of a protection mandate, the notary is required to verify that the person concerned is incapable, but cannot determine conclusions without having in hand the assessments required by the Civil Code and a transcript of the person's examination. The notary gives an account of the assessments and the examination to all present at the meeting or conference and informs them of any other relevant exhibits.

If the application relates to a protection mandate given in the presence of witnesses, a holograph will or a will made in the presence of witnesses, the notary notes the existence of the document and determines whether it is valid.

[26]    Nevertheless, the « Commentaires de la ministre de la Justice » concerning the C.C.P. 2016 state categorically that article 315 of the New Code “reprend essentiellement le droit antérieur”, even though this article deals only with proceedings before notaries:

Cet article reprend essentiellement le droit antérieur. Le premier alinéa vise les demandes qui concernent la protection des majeurs inaptes. Il rappelle que le notaire est tenu de vérifier l’inaptitude de la personne concernée par la demande et qu’il ne peut établir aucune conclusion s’il n’a pas obtenu, au préalable, l’évaluation médicale et psychosociale de celle-ci, de même que la transcription de son interrogatoire. Les règles relatives à l’interrogatoire de la personne visée sont prévues aux articles 391 et 392 du Livre V[2].

[27]    The only clear intervention of the Court with respect to the homologation of protection mandates is found at article 320 C.C.P. 2016, which deals with an application to “the Court” to grant the minutes of the notary seized with the initial application to homologate a protection mandate:

320. In matters relating to […] the protective supervision of or a protection mandate for a person of full age, the notary notifies the minutes to […] the person of full age concerned. The notary also notifies the minutes to the tutor or curator, the mandatary, the applicant, the spouse of the person concerned […] The notary informs them, on the same occasion, of their right to file their opposition with the court in the 10 days preceding the date specified by the notary for the filing of the minutes with the court office.

If no opposition is received, the appointment of a tutor to a minor or of a tutorship council becomes effective on the filing of the notary’s minutes.

In any other matter, the court seized by the filing of the notary’s minutes may, if no opposition is received, grant, amend or reject the conclusions set out in the minutes. […]

(emphasis added)

[28]    Several other articles of the C.C.P. 2016 also relate to motions for homologation of a protection mandate but none deal specifically with the criteria set out at article 884.3 of the Old Code nor with motions filed with the Court rather than before a notary. For instance, article 394 of the New Code provides for notification of such motions to the Public Curator. Article 404, 2^nd paragraph, deals with notification to the persons designated by the mandatory to act as mandatary or substitute mandatary, as well as to “at least two other persons from the mandator’s family or who show a special interest in the mandator”. Article 405 deals with the calling of a “meeting of relatives”, formerly known as a family council. Finally, article 406 gives the Public Curator the right to apply to “the court” for the institution of protective supervision, but does not mention protection mandates.

[29]    It is the opinion of the undersigned that the Superior Court retains jurisdiction over motions to homologate protection mandates pursuant to article 49 of the C.C.P. 2016, which stipulates that “The courts and judges have all the powers necessary to exercise their jurisdiction both in first instance and in appeal”.

[30]    This is substantiated by the following extract of the debate at the National Assembly on the issue:

Dans cette fonction non contentieuse, il est demandé au tribunal parfois de contrôler la validité de l'acte qui lui est soumis, comme par exemple la validité du mandat de protection […][3]

(emphasis added)

[31]    As such, the criteria set out at article 884.3 of the Old Code must continue to apply to contested Motions to homologate such as this one, in the event that such a motion is presented to the Court rather than before a notary.

[32]    This conclusion is supported by authorities which state that the criteria set out at article 884.3 of the Old Code, namely the obligation to verify the validity of a protection mandate, is not limited to mandates made before witnesses but also includes mandates before a notary, such as the Mandate signed by Mrs. S..

[33]    Justice Granosik of this Court stated the following in 2015, with respect to a mandate signed before a notary:

[…] le rôle du Tribunal est tripartite: vérifier la validité du mandat, confirmer l’inaptitude du mandant et s'assurer de la capacité du mandataire. Ces trois conditions sont cumulatives et incontournables[4].

[34]    This conclusion is confirmed by author Goubau[5], who underlines that the Court must verify the validity of mandates signed before notaries, as well as the consent given and the aptitude of the person at the moment of signature:

L’article 884.3 C.p.c. prévoit que la validité du mandate doit être vérifiée s’il est fait devant témoins (art. 315, al 2 C.p.c.) […] Cela ne signifie évidemment pas que le mandat notarié ne pourrait pas être déclaré invalide. Au contraire, le tribunal peut en refuser l’homologation, par exemple, s’il est affecté d’un vice de consentement […], si le tribunal constate que le mandant n’avait pas l’aptitude requise au moment de l’acte, même s’il s’agit d’un acte notarié […][6]

[35]    No court has yet pronounced itself on motions to homologate incapacity mandates under the New Code, which has been in force only for the last few weeks. Nevertheless, and given the foregoing, the undersigned will apply the provisions set out at article 884.3 of the Old Code, and will verify the existence of the Mandate, the incapacity of the mandatory and also the validity of the Mandate, in accordance with jurisprudence under the Old Code, even though the C.C.P. 2016 contains no analogous provision to article 884.3 other than article 315, relating to proceedings before a notary.

[36]    Moreover, when the contesting party, Ms. M., was asked by the undersigned if the Court should proceed to verify the validity of the Mandate pursuant to article 884.3 of the Old Code, her attorney responded that indeed, article 884.3 should be deemed to apply to the present proceedings, especially as they were instituted before the New Code came into force on January 1^st, 2016.

The validity of the Mandate

[37]    The doctrine on this issue underlines that the Mandate should be homologated unless a “serious doubt” has been established with respect to its validity, underlining that the decision must be taken in the interests of the person in question and with a view to respecting her rights and her autonomy:

ii.      Les éléments de vérification du mandat

       Avec comme ligne de conduite l’obligation d’agir dans l’intérêt du majeur, le juge ou le greffier, tout comme le notaire, doit vérifier la présence de l’inaptitude du mandant ainsi que l’existence et la validité du mandat, s’il est fait devant témoins. Tout autre élément ou argument montrant qu’il ne serait pas dans l’intérêt du majeur d’homologuer le mandat, notamment la conduite antérieure du mandataire, l’existence de conflits familiaux, sera également examiné attentivement, même si le législateur ne le mentionne pas expressément.

       Le tout premier élément réside donc dans la réalité de l’inaptitude du mandant lors de la demande. Pour se prononcer sur ce point, l’autorité judiciaire dispose des évaluations médicale et psychosociale qui ont été produites au soutien de la demande, (…).

[…]

       Quelle que soit la procédure choisie, le tribunal n’est pas lié par les preuves fournies et/ou les témoignages entendus. Sa décision s’appuie sur l’intérêt du majeur, le respect de ses droits et la sauvegarde de son autonomie. (…) Seule l’autorité judiciaire possède ce pouvoir et en cas de doute sérieux, l’homologation sera refusée. Ainsi, malgré le fait que le mandat donné en prévision de l’inaptitude ne soit pas en lui-même un régime de protection, il y a bel et bien protection de facto et c’est l’autorité judiciaire qui l’exerce[7].

(emphasis added)

[38]    In the present case, Petitioner B. pleads that the Mandate is valid, that his mother had the capacity to sign it on February 18^th, 2011 and that it is her wish today that the Mandate be homologated and respected, as appears from the evidence.

[39]    On this point, the Court has noted that the social worker, Ms. Saucier, inquired as to whether Mrs. S. still wished that her Mandate be respected and homologated and that her son be her mandatary, and that she responded in the affirmative.

[40]    Moreover, the undersigned also heard the testimony of Mrs. S. who, although she complained of memory difficulties, had no problem sitting through the entire hearing and who testified clearly and well. When asked by Petitioner’s attorney who should take care of her, she responded immediately that it should be her son, who she says has been taking care of her for many years.

[41]    In fact, Mr. B. has been doing her banking since at least 2014, pursuant to a Power of Attorney at the Bank of Montreal, which appears from a letter from the Bank produced as Exhibit P-8. He visits her 2-3 times per week at her present residence in Rosemont, and brings her to stay with him, his spouse and two young children at their home on the South shore during holidays and frequently on weekends.

[42]    Nevertheless, Ms. M., who lives 3 ½ hours away in New Hampshire, believes that she would be a better curator, even though she would be obliged to hire an accountant to do her mother’s banking. She testified that she would try to come up to Montreal at least once per month to see her mother, even though she runs a large consignment business in New Hampshire.

[43]    In fact, Ms. M. has only visited her mother twice in the last two years, since Mrs. S. has been living at her present residence. Ms. M. testified that she does not like to do the driving alone, especially as she has had several serious medical issues in recent years, including stomach surgery and diabetes.

[44]    The Court points out that both parties are of a similar age: Ms. M. is 58 years old and Mr. B. is 56 years old.

[45]    It is clear from all of the evidence that it is in Mrs. S.’s interests that the mandate be homologated and that Mr. B. be named Mandatary.

[46]    It should be true that Ms. M. raised several complaints as to Mr. B.’s administration of his mother’s accounts over the last few years. She also testified that she believes that Mr. B. and his spouse have alienated their mother from her and her daughters, who live in Abitibi.

[47]    However, none of these complaints were substantiated by the evidence. On the contrary, it is clear from all of the evidence that Mr. B.’s administration of his mother’s accounts has been impeccable (see, for instance, Exhibit D-3, the banking records for Mrs. S.’s accounts). It is also clear that he has done nothing whatsoever to prevent Ms. M. and/or her daughters from visiting Mrs. S. - on the contrary, the evidence shows that he has reached out to his sister by email (Exhibit P-5) and by telephone, with no success.

[48]    Ms. M.’s attorney also raised questions with respect to Mrs. S.’s mental state at the time she signed the Mandate in February 2011, pointing to memory problems which began in 2010, and to the testimony of A., one of Mrs. S.’s granddaughters, who visited with her grandmother after the signing of the Mandate. According to A., Mrs. S. told her that she thought she was going to the notary to sign documents concerning the transfer of some property belonging to her late husband and was surprised when she was called upon to sign the Mandate. A. testified that she told her grandmother that the Mandate could be changed, but said that her grandmother told her that she didn’t want to do that.

[49]    It is the opinion of the undersigned that this testimony of A. reinforces rather than puts into question the capacity of Mrs. S. to sign the Mandate in February 2011. Instead of establishing that she did not know what she was doing or that she had forgotten what she had done, A.’s testimony indicates that she was fully able to tell her granddaughter precisely what she had signed - a Mandate . This is also reinforced by the testimony of Dr. Gauthier, who is of the medical opinion that Mrs. S. was not suffering from “demence” in 2011.

[50]    As for Dr. Gauthier’s request to the CLSC in December 2012, referring to the possibility that Mr. B. might have been “stealing” money from his mother (D-4), the Court underlines the doctor’s own testimony, namely that patients with memory loss and with Alzheimer’s often imagine that their money, belongings or even teeth have been “stolen” when that is not at all the case.

[51]    In sum, the Court finds that Mr. B. is an appropriate mandatary and that no “serious doubt” has been raised either with his administration of his mother’s property or with respect to the validity of the Mandate.

[52]    Thus, the Court holds that the Mandate is valid, and that it was signed by Mrs. S. when she had the capacity to do so, in accordance with all of the evidence.

[53]    The Court will therefore dismiss the Motion for another regime of protection, presented by Ms. M.. On the facts, it appears obvious that the better curator for Mrs. S. would be Mr. B., named as such in the Mandate and who has been carrying out these tasks for some years. He lives in the Montreal area and has been taking care of his mother as opposed to Ms. M. who, while certainly fond of her mother, lives some distance away and suffers from medical issues which would prevent her from being as present as her brother has been these past years.

[54]    Without citing all of the jurisprudence submitted, the Court once again underlines that in the absence of serious doubt, the wishes of the mandatory, as set out in the Mandate, must be respected:

[39]   Les mises en cause se devaient de démontrer par une preuve convaincante leurs « motifs sérieux » de s’opposer à l’homologation du mandat et de ne pas honorer la volonté exprimée par leur mère à son mandat en prévision de l’inaptitude[8].

[55]    These words apply in the present case. No doubt whatsoever has been raised by the evidence which would permit the Court to refuse to homologate the Mandate signed by Mrs. S. when she had her full capacity to do so and in which she gave instructions that her son would take care of her and her property in the event of her incapacity.

[56]    Moreover, the jurisprudence underlines that absent such a doubt, the Mandate must take precedence:

14  Le Tribunal partage l’opinion des auteurs Deleury et Goubau que le législateur a voulu consacrer le principe de la primauté du mandate sur le régime de protection puisqu’il permettait à un individu de designer lui-même la personne qu’il désirait pour s’occuper de lui et de ses biens et de la façon qu’il le désire, et non pas de laisser ce choix à autrui, au tribunal ou à l’assemblée de parents.[9]

(emphasis added)

[57]    The Amended Application for the institution of protective supervision of a person of full age and the request to hold a Family council will therefore be dismissed.

[58]    Finally, on the issue of costs, it was established that Mr. B. has been paying his attorney’s fees with respect to the homologation of his mother’s Mandate from his mother’s assets. The Court feels that this is appropriate, as the Motion to homologate was necessary in order to put Mrs. S.’s wishes into effect, namely to name her son as her mandatary. However, the Motion to homologate will be granted without costs, as it would not be appropriate to allow Mr. B. to claim additional costs from his sister with respect to the homologation despite her contestation.

[59]    Similarly, the Motion for curatorship should be dismissed without costs.

[60]    In my opinion, an award of costs here would negatively affect the already strained relations between the siblings, which the Court hopes will now improve given that this matter has been resolved.

[61]    FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COURT:

[62]    GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion for the Homologation of a Mandate (P-3) given in anticipation of incapacity by a person of the age of majority, Mrs. S..

[63]    DECLARES that Respondent J. S. is totally and permanently incapable of administering her property and of taking care of her person.

[64]    HOMOLOGATES the Mandate in Anticipation of incapacity, Exhibit P-3, signed by Mrs. S. on February 18^th, 2011, before notary Amélie Tremblay and DECLARES the said Mandate to be executory.

[65]    CONFIRMS the nomination of Petitioner S. B. as the mandatary to the Respondent J. S. with respect to her person and with respect to the administration of her property in accordance with the terms of the Mandate in anticipation of her incapacity, Exhibit P-3.

[66]    DISMISSES the Amended Application by Ja. M. for the institution of Protective Supervision of a Person of Full Age and her request to hold a Family council.

[67]    THE WHOLE, without costs.