Décision

[NDLE : La traduction française non-officielle de l’arrêt de la Cour se trouve à la fin des motifs.]

WARNING: An order restricting publication in this proceeding was made in first instance and continues to be in effect.

[1]                The appellant appeal from a guilty verdict rendered on 19 October 2019 by a jury of the Superior Court, District of Terrebonne (the Honourable Myriam Lachance), convicting him on two counts of first-degree murder.

[2]                For the reasons of Healy, J.A., with which Vauclair and Hamilton JJ.A., concur, THE COURT:

[3]                DISMISSES the appeal.

[4]                The appellant was found guilty by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder. He appeals on the ground that the trial judge erred in her instructions to the jury concerning the unanimity of their verdict on each count by directing them in accordance with the principles stated in Thatcher[1] and failing to direct them that all members of the jury had to be unanimous in finding beyond reasonable doubt the same constituent elements of first-degree murder.

[5]                With respect to the first count, the trial judge instructed the jury that they could not find the appellant guilty unless they were unanimous in their verdict but they did not have to be unanimous whether the predicate offence of the murder was section 231(5) or 231(6) of the Criminal Code.[2] With respect to the second count, the trial judge gave the same instructions but specified that the jury did not have to be unanimous in concluding whether the predicate offence of murder was planned and deliberate under section 231(2) or whether a predicate offence under section 231(5) had been committed.

[6]                The appellant does not claim that the instructions failed to observe the requirement of a single transaction or that they raised an issue concerning the mode of participation in each of the killings. The appellant does not claim that the particulars of the counts were in any way problematic. The appellant does not claim that the instructions raised an issue of duplicity. The appellant does not claim that the judge’s instructions allowed, or even invited, inconsistent verdicts.

[7]                The appellant claims only that the principles in Thatcher do not apply where a single offence can be proved before a jury that is unanimous in its verdict but not unanimous with respect to alternative constituent elements in the substantive definition of the offence.

[8]                The underlying logic of the principles in Thatcher was to reinforce the requirement of unanimity in a jury’s verdict. In no way did that case determine or suggest that a jury must be unanimous in finding proof beyond reasonable doubt of the factual foundations or the theory for that conclusion. The specific basis of the decision was that the jury need not be unanimous in determining whether the accused was a principal or a party in the commission of the offence because in either case the accused would be equally culpable (or not) of the offence. This conclusion was stated as follows:

....if there is evidence before a jury that points to an accused either committing a crime personally or, alternatively, aiding and abetting another to commit the offence, provided the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did one or the other, it is "a matter of indifference" which alternative actually occurred: Chow Bew [1955 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 124].[3]

[9]                But this principle is plainly capable of a formulation that extends beyond questions of participation. If the law validly provides alternative definitions of a single offence, and the evidence is consistent with more than one valid alternative in law, the principles in Thatcher would affirm that a unanimous verdict does not require unanimity with regard to applicable alternatives because they are considered equal definitions of a single offence. If the evidence is otherwise sufficient, and the counts are sufficient, the law is effectively “indifferent” to the alternative definitions that might be accepted by members of the jury.

[10]           The force of Thatcher was augmented by Stinchcombe[4], which reinforced the ability of the defence in criminal cases to have notice of the case to meet by requiring the prosecution to make early disclosure of its case.

[11]           The conceptual difficulty with Thatcher was that if members of a jury need not be unanimous with respect to alternative definitions of a single offence, there can be no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the offence actually committed.[5] There is by definition a measure of doubt. Thatcher rejected this difficulty on the basis that unanimity in the verdict demonstrates “indifference” as to its components and by affirming that alternative elements of equal validity can support a single verdict on a single offence. It incidentally excludes any suggestion of inconsistent verdicts. By reinforcing the requirement of unanimity in the verdict, Thatcher also averted any erosion of the principle that the jury need not be unanimous with regard to specific facts or individual items of evidence that support its verdict.

[12]           The position advanced by the respondent is consistent not only with Thatcher but also with the jurisprudence of this court. While the Supreme Court specifically decided that the requirement of unanimity in a verdict does not extend to alternative modes of participation in an offence, there is no reason of principle that would support a restriction of the Supreme Court’s decision to that issue.

[13]           Apart from the possibility of alternative modes of participation, there are other contexts in which the principles stated by the Supreme Court are applicable. Four other examples may be given.

[14]           One is that the jury is not required to be unanimous with regard to the factual basis for its verdict and particular items of evidence.[6] To reach their verdict some members of the jury may rely on particular facts or items of evidence while other members rely on other facts or items of evidence. This principle has been settled for many years.

[15]           Another occurs where the evidence presented at trial to support a single charge discloses a repetition of the same conduct on several occasions between two dates.[7] Repeated incidents of assault are typical of this occurrence. Again, the principle in Thatcher does not require members of the jury to be unanimous in their conclusions with respect to each incident, provided that all members of the jury are unanimous that at least one incident occurred. This principle is also settled.

[16]           A third example occurs when the provision that defines the offence includes alternative modes of commission. The alternatives might concern the actus reus of the offence or the mens rea. This form of drafting is commonplace, as in the actus reus of assault,[8] robbery,[9] uttering threats[10] and many (if not most) other offences, but it also includes unspecified alternatives as in offences of criminal negligence. With respect to elements of mens rea, illustrations are found in offences such as second-degree murder, which can be proved either by intent or by recklessness as to causing death. It applies to first-degree murder, which can proved by intent and premeditation of causing death or when death occurs in the commission of a predicate offence. It applies as well to any offence in which intent, knowledge or recklessness would be valid as alternative forms of fault. Again, the jury is not required to be unanimous with regard to alternative modes of commission because they are by definition equivalent.

[17]           A fourth example relates to offences of constructive liability that require proof of a predicate offence as a necessary condition for proof of the offence charged in the indictment. In this sense the predicate offence is by definition an included offence. Some of these offences of constructive liability enumerate in the alternative specific predicate offences that can support a single offence. Other offences of this type, notably unlawful-act manslaughter, do not enumerate specific predicate offences. Assuming that an offence of constructive liability is constitutionally valid, there is no established requirement of unanimity except to the extent that all members of the jury must be satisfied unanimously that at least one predicate offence was committed.[11] The present appeal is an illustration of this and first-degree murder is only one offence that demonstrates the point.

[18]           These various examples illustrate that the principles in Thatcher have a broad scope that is not limited to alternative modes of participation. There is a common theme in these examples, which is that alternative approaches to liability allow for the application of Thatcher on the premise that the verdict is normatively indifferent to the alternatives.

[19]           In Pearson[12] this court followed Thatcher and concluded, in a case of trafficking, that the prosecution is not bound to specify which of the alternative forms of trafficking was committed. Accordingly, the jury was not required to be unanimous in its conclusion on this issue. The Court explained the significance of Thatcher at some length and concluded that its scope extended beyond alternative modes of participation:

The Crown submits that, just as section 21 of the Code makes the distinction between principal and accomplice a matter of legal indifference with regard to jury unanimity, so sections 4(1) and 2 make the distinction between types of trafficking a matter of legal indifference.

[…]

Though Thatcher dealt with the unanimity rule in the context of principals and accomplices — or modes of participation in an offence — I believe the result in that case is founded on the broad proposition that a jury presented with alternative Crown theories need not unanimously agree how the offence was committed provided all jurors agree that every essential element of the offence has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

[20]           Several courts have repeated Fish J.A.’s conclusion that Thatcher should not be given a narrow interpretation but a more liberal view with a broader scope[13]. Fish J.A. wrote:

Some have argued, it is true, that where the offence charged involves the doing of any one of a number of different acts, it is not sufficient for the jury to find that the offence has been committed without also determining which act constitutes the offence.

[…]

Others, like Glanville Williams, are of a different opinion. Williams argues that when a jury is faced with "jurors' alternatives", that is, "different paths by which they may collectively arrive at a single verdict, ... [t]here is then a single offence, X, which gives the jurors a choice between Y and Z in their interpretation of the evidence". In such a case, "the law forbids the doing of X, and then defines X as being Y or Z". The task of the jury is to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the offence has been committed; the further question of what specific act was accomplished in the commission of the offence need not be decided unanimously.

I feel bound to adopt the approach advocated by Williams.

[…]

It is now generally accepted in this country that jurors are not required to agree unanimously on every piece of evidence relied on to reach their verdict. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently reiterated that the notion of a reasonable doubt with respect to each "issue" refers to the elements of the offence charged rather than to each matter or question raised by the evidence. It has been held as well that "[t]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not ... apply to each individual item of evidence that makes up the Crown's case"; and that "[t]he standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to the individual items of evidence, or the separate pieces of evidence upon which the Crown relies to prove guilt ...".

[…]

In Thatcher, Dickson C.J. states:

[T]here were doubtless three alternatives in the minds of each of the jurors:

(a) Thatcher personally killed his ex-wife;

(b) he aided and abetted someone else to do so;

(c) he is innocent of the crime.

The jurors were told that if any of them had a reasonable doubt regarding (c), Thatcher should be acquitted. Every single juror was, evidently, solidly convinced that (c) was simply not what occurred. Each one was certain that the true state of affairs was (a) or (b). Even if we suppose ... that the jurors individually went beyond thinking in terms of (a) or (b) and specifically opted for one theory, and that some jurors thought only (a) could have occurred and others thought only (b) could have occurred, I am far from convinced that there would have been any injustice from convicting Thatcher.[14]

[21]           When Pearson was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court the remarks of Fish J.A. were approved as follows:

22 The appellant also raised several other grounds of appeal before this Court. Most of these grounds relate to violations of his Charter rights or to the trial judge’s instructions to the jury. Fish J.A.’s analysis of these issues is sound and we do not wish to add to it.[15]

[22]           A broad and liberal approach to the application of Thatcher leads to significant conclusions. There is no question that the jury need not be unanimous with respect to facts, repeated instances of the same conduct or particular items of evidence in the determination of its verdict. As discussed previously, this approach implies that the jury need not be unanimous with respect alternative legal routes to a verdict on a single offence. These include offences that provide for alternative modes of participation or commission, and offences of constructive liability that can be committed by reason of the commission of one of two or more predicate offences. A broad approach to the application of Thatcher, as proposed in Pearson and supported in subsequent cases, implies the recognition of a functional equivalence among various alternative elements – any of which is sufficient for a verdict on a single offence.

[23]           In short, the requirement of unanimity does not apply in any instance where the evidence discloses a functional equivalence among facts or the applicable law recognizes a functional equivalence among alternative elements of an offence.

[24]           There is nothing in the instructions of the trial judge that contradicts this view of Thatcher and nothing that could be described as error in the circumstances of this case.

[25]           I propose to dismiss the appeal.

MISE EN GARDE : Une ordonnance de non-publication a été rendue en première instance et demeure en vigueur.

[1]                L’appelant se pourvoit contre des verdicts de culpabilité rendus par un jury, le 19 octobre 2019, au terme d’un procès présidé par l’honorable Myriam Lachance de la Cour supérieure, district de Terrebonne, lesquels l’ont déclaré coupable de deux chefs de meurtres au premier degré.

[2]                Pour les motifs du juge Healy, auxquels souscrivent les juges Vauclair et Hamilton, LA COUR :

[3]                REJETTE l’appel.

[4]                L’appelant a été déclaré coupable de deux chefs de meurtres au premier degré par un jury. En appel, il reproche à la juge du procès d’avoir erré dans ses directives au jury portant sur l’unanimité requise pour leur verdict sur chacun des chefs en s’inspirant des principes de l’arrêt Thatcher[16] et en omettant ainsi de lui indiquer qu’il devait être unanime, hors de tout doute raisonnable, à propos des mêmes éléments constitutifs de l’infraction de meurtre au premier degré.

[5]                Pour le premier chef d’accusation, la juge du procès a indiqué aux jurés qu’ils pouvaient déclarer l’appelant coupable uniquement s’ils étaient unanimes sur le verdict, mais qu’ils n’avaient pas à être unanimes sur laquelle des infractions sous-jacentes du meurtre énoncées aux paragraphes 231(5) ou 231(6) du Code criminel[17] s’appliquaient. Quant au second chef d’accusation, la juge du procès a donné une directive identique, mais elle a spécifié aux jurés qu’ils n’avaient pas à conclure de façon unanime si le meurtre avait été commis avec préméditation et de propos délibéré sous le paragraphe 231(2) ou si une infraction sous-jacente énoncée au paragraphe 231(5) avait été commise.

[6]                L’appelant ne prétend pas que les directives sont fautives lorsqu’elles abordent les règles de la transaction unique ou les modes de participation au crime pour chacun des meurtres. L’appelant ne prétend pas, non plus, que les détails relatifs aux chefs d’accusation posaient un problème. L'appelant ne prétend pas que les directives impliquent une question d’infraction double ou multiple. L’appelant ne prétend pas que les directives de la juge ont permis, ou même entraîné, des verdicts incompatibles.

[7]                Le seul reproche de l’appelant est que les principes de l’arrêt Thatcher ne s’appliquent pas lorsque le jury peut être unanime à l’égard de l’infraction reprochée sans être unanime à propos des éléments constitutifs alternatifs qui composent l’infraction substantielle.

[8]                La logique qui sous-tend les principes de l’arrêt Thatcher est de renforcer la nécessité de l’unanimité du verdict du jury. L’arrêt n’a jamais déterminé ou suggéré que le jury devait être unanime hors de tout doute raisonnable sur les conclusions de fait ou la théorie qui le supportent. Plus spécifiquement, le fondement de l’arrêt est de dire que le jury n’a pas besoin de conclure unanimement que l’accusé est l’auteur principal ou un participant dans la perpétration du crime parce que, dans les deux cas, l’accusé est coupable (ou non) de la même infraction. Cette conclusion ressort du texte de l’arrêt :

si un jury est saisi d'éléments de preuve qui indiquent qu'un accusé a commis un crime personnellement ou qu'il a aidé ou encouragé une autre personne à le commettre, pourvu que le jury soit convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable que l'accusé a agi d'une manière ou de l'autre, il n'est [TRADUCTION] "pas important" de savoir ce qui s'est réellement produit: Chow Bew [1955 CanLII 47 (CSC), [1956] S.C.R. 124].[18]

[9]                Ces principes s’appliquent aisément aux situations qui vont au-delà du mode de participation. Si la loi a prévu des définitions alternatives pour définir une infraction et que la preuve soutient plus d’une de ses définitions en droit, les principes de l’arrêt Thatcher impliquent que l’unanimité ne concerne pas ces alternatives puisqu’elles définissent toutes la même infraction. Dans la mesure où la preuve est suffisante et que les chefs d’accusation le sont aussi, le droit demeure « indifférent » à propos de quelle définition alternative a été retenue par les membres du jury.

[10]           L’arrêt Stinchcombe[19] a renforcé le principe de l'arrêt Thatcher en imposant à la poursuite une obligation de divulgation de la preuve au début du processus qui permet désormais à l’accusé de savoir ce qu'elle entend prouver et d'y répondre.

[11]           La difficulté conceptuelle de l’arrêt Thatcher semble être que si les membres du jury ne sont pas unanimes à propos de l’une des définitions alternatives applicables au crime reproché, il ne peut y avoir une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable de l’infraction réellement commise[20]. Par définition, il demeure un doute. L’arrêt Thatcher repousse cette difficulté en concluant que les éléments alternatifs et équivalents en fait qui sous-tendent le verdict unanime ne sont « pas importants » et en affirmant qu’ils peuvent fonder un verdict sur une infraction particulière. Cela écarte implicitement les verdicts incompatibles. En renforçant la nécessité d’un verdict unanime, l’arrêt Thatcher évite ainsi l’érosion du principe voulant que le jury ne doive pas être unanime sur les faits particuliers ou sur les différents éléments de preuve qui peuvent soutenir le verdict.

[12]           La position de l’intimée est non seulement conforme à l’arrêt Thatcher, mais aussi avec la jurisprudence de la Cour. Bien que la Cour suprême ait décidé que le caractère unanime du verdict s’étend aux différents modes de participation des infractions, aucune raison de principe ne permet d’affirmer qu’elle entendait limiter ce raisonnement à cette seule question.

[13]           Mis à part les différents modes de participation, ces principes semblent s’appliquer dans beaucoup d’autres situations. Quatre exemples peuvent l’illustrer.

[14]           Le premier est que le jury n’a pas à être unanime sur tous les faits et sur chaque élément de la preuve[21]. Pour parvenir à son verdict, certains membres du jury peuvent s’appuyer sur certains faits ou éléments de preuve alors que d’autres membres s’appuient sur d’autres faits ou éléments de preuve. Ce principe est établi depuis longtemps.

[15]           Un autre exemple survient lorsque la preuve au procès pour démontrer l’infraction dévoile la répétition d’un comportement entre deux dates[22]. Des voies de fait répétées en forment un exemple typique. Le principe de l’arrêt Thatcher n’exige pas que les membres du jury soient unanimes sur l’occurrence de chacun des incidents dans la mesure où ils sont unanimes qu’au moins un incident s’est produit. Ce principe est également bien établi.

[16]           Le troisième exemple est l’infraction pour laquelle il est prévu plusieurs modes de perpétration. Les modes alternatifs peuvent toucher l’actus reus ou la mens rea de l’infraction. Les infractions sont fréquemment rédigées ainsi, comme dans le cas de l’actus reus des voies de fait[23], du vol qualifié[24], des menaces[25] et plusieurs autres (sinon la plupart), mais il y a aussi des modes alternatifs de perpétration qui ne sont pas spécifiquement prévus, comme pour la négligence criminelle. Quant aux éléments de mens rea, l’infraction de meurtre au second degré en est un exemple, puisqu’elle peut être démontrée en prouvant l’intention ou l’insouciance de causer la mort. Le meurtre au premier degré peut également être prouvé en démontrant l’intention et la préméditation de causer la mort ou lorsque cette dernière survient lors de la perpétration d’une infraction sous-jacente. Cela s’applique aussi à toute infraction où l’intention, la connaissance ou l’insouciance sont des modes alternatifs de la faute. Encore une fois, le jury n’a pas à conclure unanimement à l’égard d’un mode alternatif puisque les définitions sont équivalentes.

[17]           Le quatrième exemple concerne les infractions où la responsabilité est imputée en raison de la commission d’une infraction sous-jacente qui devient une condition à la culpabilité de l’infraction reprochée. En ce sens, l’infraction sous-jacente est alors une infraction incluse. Parfois, l’infraction dite de responsabilité imputée peut reposer sur plusieurs infractions sous-jacentes qui peuvent fonder la culpabilité d’une même infraction spécifique. Comme c’est le cas de l’homicide involontaire coupable, certaines infractions ne font pas la nomenclature des infractions sous-jacentes précises. Présumant alors que l’infraction imputée est constitutionnellement valide, il n’y a aucune exigence d’unanimité sauf que tous les membres du jury doivent être unanimement convaincus qu’au moins une des infractions sous-jacentes a été perpétrée[26]. Le présent appel en est un exemple et l’infraction de meurtre au premier degré n’est qu’une des infractions qui le démontrent.

[18]           Ces exemples témoignent de la portée large des principes énoncés dans l’arrêt Thatcher et que ceux-ci ne sont pas limités aux modes de participation. Le point commun de tous ces exemples repose sur le fait que les approches alternatives de la faute criminelle autorisent l’application des principes de l’arrêt Thatcher puisque cela n’est « pas important » aux fins des verdicts.

[19]           Dans l’arrêt Pearson[27], notre Cour a suivi l’arrêt Thatcher en concluant, dans une affaire de trafic de stupéfiants, que la poursuite n’était pas obligée de préciser par quel mode alternatif le trafic avait eu lieu. Par conséquent, le jury ne devait pas être unanime sur cette question. La Cour a expliqué la portée de l’arrêt Thatcher et elle a conclu qu’elle s’étendait au-delà des modes de participation :

The Crown submits that, just as section 21 of the Code makes the distinction between principal and accomplice a matter of legal indifference with regard to jury unanimity, so sections 4(1) and 2 make the distinction between types of trafficking a matter of legal indifference.

[…]

Though Thatcher dealt with the unanimity rule in the context of principals and accomplices – or modes of participation in an offence –  I believe the result in that case is founded on the broad proposition that a jury presented with alternative Crown theories need not unanimously agree how the offence was committed provided all jurors agree that every essential element of the offence has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

[20]           Plusieurs cours ont repris ces propos du juge Fish qui concluent que les principes de l’arrêt Thatcher ne doivent pas être interprétés restrictivement, mais libéralement en leur donnant une portée plus vaste[28]. Le juge Fish écrivait :

Some have argued, it is true, that where the offence charged involves the doing of any one of a number of different acts, it is not sufficient for the jury to find that the offence has been committed without also determining which act constitutes the offence.

[…]

Others, like Glanville Williams, are of a different opinion. Williams argues that when a jury is faced with "jurors' alternatives", that is, "different paths by which they may collectively arrive at a single verdict, ... [t]here is then a single offence, X, which gives the jurors a choice between Y and Z in their interpretation of the evidence". In such a case, "the law forbids the doing of X, and then defines X as being Y or Z". The task of the jury is to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the offence has been committed; the further question of what specific act was accomplished in the commission of the offence need not be decided unanimously.

I feel bound to adopt the approach advocated by Williams.

[…]

It is now generally accepted in this country that jurors are not required to agree unanimously on every piece of evidence relied on to reach their verdict. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently reiterated that the notion of a reasonable doubt with respect to each "issue" refers to the elements of the offence charged rather than to each matter or question raised by the evidence. It has been held as well that "[t]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not ... apply to each individual item of evidence that makes up the Crown's case"; and that "[t]he standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to the individual items of evidence, or the separate pieces of evidence upon which the Crown relies to prove guilt ...".

[…]

In Thatcher, Dickson C.J. states:

[T]here were doubtless three alternatives in the minds of each of the jurors:

(a) Thatcher personally killed his ex-wife;

(b) he aided and abetted someone else to do so;

(c) he is innocent of the crime.

The jurors were told that if any of them had a reasonable doubt regarding (c), Thatcher should be acquitted. Every single juror was, evidently, solidly convinced that (c) was simply not what occurred. Each one was certain that the true state of affairs was (a) or (b). Even if we suppose ... that the jurors individually went beyond thinking in terms of (a) or (b) and specifically opted for one theory, and that some jurors thought only (a) could have occurred and others thought only (b) could have occurred, I am far from convinced that there would have been any injustice from convicting Thatcher.[29]

[21]           La Cour suprême a approuvé les propos du juge Fish lorsque saisie de l'appel de l’arrêt Pearson :

22 L’appelant a également invoqué plusieurs autres moyens d’appel devant notre Cour. La plupart de ces moyens concernent la violation des droits que lui garantit la Charte ou les directives du juge du procès au jury. L’analyse que le juge Fish a faite de la question est juste et nous ne souhaitons rien y ajouter.[30]

[22]           Une interprétation large et libérale des principes de l’arrêt Thatcher permet d’énoncer des conclusions importantes. Il est incontesté que le jury n’a pas à être unanime sur les faits, les comportements répétés ou les éléments particuliers de la preuve qu’il retient pour arriver à son verdict. Comme il a été mentionné, cette approche suppose que le jury n’a pas à être unanime sur les chemins alternatifs que propose le droit pour arriver à un verdict de culpabilité. Cela inclut les infractions qui proposent différents modes de participation ou de perpétration, et celles dont la responsabilité est imputée en raison de la perpétration d’une ou plusieurs infractions sous-jacentes. Une interprétation large des principes de l’arrêt Thatcher, comme le proposent Pearson et la jurisprudence subséquente, implique de reconnaître l’équivalent fonctionnel des éléments alternatifs qui sont tous suffisants en soi pour fonder le verdict d’une infraction spécifique.

[23]           En définitive, l’exigence d’unanimité ne s’applique pas dans les cas où la preuve révèle un équivalent fonctionnel des faits ou si la loi reconnaît un équivalent fonctionnel parmi les différents éléments de l’infraction.

[24]           Il n’y a rien dans les directives de la juge du procès qui contredit cette compréhension de Thatcher et aucune erreur n’est démontrée dans les circonstances.

[25]           Je propose de rejeter l’appel.

[1]  R. v. Thatcher, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 652 [Thatcher].

[2]  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (as amended).

[3]  Supra, note 1, 694. 

[4]  R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.

[5]  See Mark A. Gelowitz, ‘‘Jury Unanimity on Questions of Material Fact: When Six and Six Do Not Equal Twelve’’ (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 66, 100; Mark A. Gelowitz, ‘‘The Thatcher Appeal: A Question of Unanimity’’ (1986) 49 C.R. (3d) 129.

[6]  See, e.g., R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345, para. 38; R. v. M.(G.L.), 1999 BCCA 467.

[7]  See, e.g., R. v. Sharpe, 2007 BCCA 191, para. 26; R. v. M.(G.L.), id., note 6; R. v. Robinson, 2004 CanLII 31916 (ON CA).

[8]  Criminal Code, s. 265.

[9]  Id., s. 343.

[10]  Id., s. 264.1.

[11]  The argument has been raised but not answered in appellate jurisprudence. See, e.g., R. v. Tremblay, 2019 QCCA 1749, para. 69; Latortue v. R., 2014 QCCA 198; R. v. Dool, [1987] O.J. No. 564, leave refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 83.

[12]  R. v. Pearson, (1994) 89 C.C.C. (3d) 535 (QC CA) [Pearson CA], aff’d [1998] 3 S.C.R. 620 [Pearson SCC].

[13]  See, e.g., R. v. Reyat, 2012 BCAC 311, paras. 13-14, 27-30.

[14]  Pearson CA, supra, note 12, 566-568.

[15]  Pearson SCC, supra, note 12, 629.

[16]  R. c. Thatcher, [1987] 1 R.C.S. 652.

[17]  L.R.C. (1985), ch. C -46 (telle que modifiée).

[18]  Supra, note 1, p. 694.

[19]  R. c. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 R.C.S. 326.

[20]  Voir Mark A. Gelowitz, « Jury Unanimity on Questions of Material Fact: When Six and Six Do Not Equal Twelve », (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 66, p. 100; Mark A. Gelowitz, « The Thatcher Appeal: A Question of Unanimity », (1986) 49 C.R. (3d) 129.

[21]  Voir, par exemple : R. c. Morin, [1988] 2 R.C.S. 345, paragr. 38; R. v. M.(G.L.), 1999 BCCA 467.

[22]  Voir, par exemple : R. v. Sharpe, 2007 BCCA 191, paragr. 26; R. v. M.(G.L.), id.; R. v. Robinson, 2004 CanLII 31916 (ON CA).

[23]  C.cr., art. 265.

[24]  Id., art. 343.

[25]  Id., art. 264.1.

[26]  Cette proposition a été évoquée en jurisprudence sans qu’on lui apporte de réponse. Voir, par exemple : R. c. Tremblay, 2019 QCCA 1749, paragr. 69; Latortue c. R., 2014 QCCA 198; R. v. Dool, [1987] O.J. No. 564, permission d'appel refusée dans [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 83.

[27]  R. v. Pearson, (1994) 89 C.C.C. (3d) 535 (QC CA) [Pearson CA], confirmé dans [1998] 3 R.C.S. 620 [Pearson CSC].

[28]  Voir, par exemple : R. v. Reyat, 2012 BCAC 311, paragr. 13-14, 27-30.

[29]  Pearson CA, supra, note 12, p. 566-568.

[30]  Pearson CSC, supra, note 12, p. 629.