Décision

OVERVIEW

[1]           A.B. is seeking the authorization to amend his originating application in damages to include an order of permanent injunction against Google.

[2]           In a decision rendered on December 30, 2019, the Special Clerk, Mtre Patrick Gosselin, refused A.B. permission to amend his proceedings to seek injunctive relief but allowed modifications in other respects (the Decision).[1]

[3]           A.B. seeks the review of the Decision.

1.            CONTEXT

[4]           Around March 31, 2016, A.B. filed his originating application in damages against Google, based on the defendant’s alleged failure to act reasonably in ensuring that false and defamatory information concerning A.B., hosted on the "Rip-Off Report" website (the Defamatory Material), be removed from its search results pages within a reasonable delay.

[5]           On March 1, 2019, A.B. completed his Request for setting down for trial and judgment.[2] He confirmed the nature of the dispute as being a civil liability, economic, psychological, and moral and punitive damages case.

[6]           On March 15, 2019, Google filed its Request for setting down for trial and judgment.  The attestation that the record is complete was signed on July 3, 2019. The date for trial has not yet been fixed.

[7]           On September 6, 2019, A.B. notified his Amended Originating Application[3] by which he clarified and updated existing allegations, modified the quantum of damages and added a request for permanent injunctive relief. Google contested the amendments. Hence, on October 3, 2019, A.B. filed an application for permission to amend.[4]

[8]           On December 30, 2019, the Decision was rendered. The Special Clerk allowed A.B. to file the first two sets of amendments but refused to accept the new injunctive conclusions sought. He held that the injunction amendments would cause delay, were contrary to the interests of justice and introduced an entirely new application. All additional allegations of fact contained in the amended proceedings were accepted by the Special Clerk.

[9]           A.B. pleads that the Decision should be quashed. He asks the Court to authorize him to produce the injunctive relief amendments to his originating application.

[10]        Google replies that the Decision was a proper application of the rules governing amendments and was justified.

2.            ANALYSIS

[11]        Decisions of the special clerk may be reviewed by the Court in accordance with article 74 of the Code of civil procedure.

[12]        While there is controversy as to the applicable standard of review, the Court should intervene where determinative errors or injudicious exercise of discretion are ascertained.[5]

[13]        Article 206 of the Code of civil procedure provides that any time before judgment, a pleading may be modified so long as (a) it does not delay the proceeding, (b) it is not contrary to the interests of justice, and (c) the amendment does not result in an entirely new application having no connection with the original one.

[14]        The interests of justice are measured in light of the guiding principle of proportionality, the proper case management and the duty of cooperation and information, enacted by the Code of civil procedure (articles 9, 18-20).[6]

[15]        A party’s right to amend a procedure is the rule, not an exception. It must be given a generous and liberal interpretation.^[7]

[16]        In it analysis, the Court must take into consideration all the circumstances and proceed to a balancing exercise :

[27]  Divers éléments doivent alors être considérés, amenant le juge saisi de la question à procéder à un exercice de pondération qui ne neutralise pas le droit de modifier tout en étant respectueux des règles de la proportionnalité, d’une saine gestion d’instance et de l’équilibre entre les parties. Sur ce dernier point, on considérera que si l’on ne doit pas causer préjudice à la partie intimée en rompant le contrat judiciaire  (outil, certes, mais pas camisole de force), l’on ne doit pas non plus priver une partie de faire valoir ses droits.[8]

(Reference omitted)

1.    The delay and the interests of justice

[17]        The Special Clerk held that the amendments would cause delay and were contrary to the interests of justice. He believed that the parties would need to adduce additional evidence in light of the requirements for a permanent mandatory injunction, more specifically the balance of hardship rule, and that the delay that would result was a sufficient reason to refuse the amendments :[9]

[23] Si le tribunal autorise les modifications décrites au paragraphe [14] du présent jugement, Google devra à nouveau interroger A.B. au préalable et devra modifier sa défense. Il y a fort à parier, en regard de la balance of hardship, que les parties voudront soumettre à la cour des expertises quant à la capacité technologique de Google de respecter ou pas les injonctions recherchées par A.B. et quant à l’importance des impacts commerciaux ou économiques que cela aura pour elle de le faire.

[24] Pour le tribunal, il ne fait aucun doute que les modifications décrites au paragraphe [14] du présent jugement rompent le contrat judiciaire intervenu entre les parties. La cause étant inscrite pour instruction et jugement, l’équilibre entre les parties s’en trouve beaucoup plus affecté que si le changement de stratégie d’A.B. était intervenu plus tôt durant l’instance. Dans ce contexte, le tribunal ne peut que conclure que ces modifications sont contraires aux intérêts de la justice et retarderont le déroulement de l’instance.

[18]        Delay in itself will not normally be a sufficient basis to refuse amendment, so long as delaying is not the goal of the amendment:[10]

[23]   Certes, la modification recherchée par l’appelante a pour effet de retarder l’audition. Ce critère semble d’ailleurs le principal critère retenu par le juge en l’espèce. Cela dit, « les effets dilatoires d'une demande d'amendement ne font normalement pas obstacle à sa réception dans la mesure où le but recherché n'est pas le délai ». D’ailleurs, les tribunaux sont généralement conciliants même si la demande est tardive puisque l’article 206 C.p.c. permet la modification « at any time before judgment », (« avant le jugement », suivant la version française).

(References omitted; emphasis added)

[19]        According to the allegations of the Application to review the Decision[11], A.B., represented by new attorneys, filed his amendments seeking injunctive relief after having seen, on September 4, 2019, a new google.ca search that promoted the Defamatory Material.[12]

[20]        The reasons why A.B. waited until September 2019 before he added injunctive conclusions to his judicial demand, other than his recent change of attorneys, remain unclear. However, although the addition of injunctive conclusions at this stage certainly delays the proceedings and their readiness for trial, there is no suggestion that A.B. is intentionally seeking, by this amendment, to delay the case, nor would it be in his interest to do so.

[21]        Moreover, the judicial contract between the parties is a working tool and not an inalterable straightjacket. Where the circumstances of the case require adjustments to enable a party to fully assert his rights, the judicial contract should not be viewed as an insurmountable impediment.

[22]        To compel A.B. to institute new and distinct injunctive proceedings against Google, on the same factual basis, would be contrary to the principle of proportionality and to proper case management and administration of justice. The Court considers that authorizing the amendment would better serve the interests of justice and allow a complete and final debate on all issues raised by this matter.

2.    The new cause of action

[23]        According to Google, the new injunctive claim raises entirely new factual and legal issues. By its very nature, injunctive relief invites a different set of considerations than those for claims in damages.

[24]        The Special Clerk retained that the analysis of Google’s past conduct for the determination of its liability is distinct from the analysis of the claim for a prospective mandatory injunctive relief, including its technological feasibility. He concludes that there is basically no risk of contradictory judgments and that the link between the two recourses is tenuous.[13]

[25]        While the debate over the injunctive relief sought is of a different nature from Google’s liability and A.B.’s damages and may raise additional means of defence and evidence, it essentially stems from the same factual ground and the same legal foundation. The cause of action raised by the injunctive relief is directly connected to the existing application in damages.

[26]        In fact, the removal by Google of the Defamatory Material from its search results pages has always been and remains a cardinal issue in the debate. The original damages action alleged Google’s ongoing conduct through the repeated publication of search results over time. Hence, A.B. made a claim for compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged continual violation of his reputation and constitutional rights.

[27]        The question as to whether Google should ensure and is capable of ensuring that extracts or links to the Defamatory Material be removed from its search results is already at the heart of the debate between the parties. In that regard, Google alleges in its defence, inter alia, that :

-       It plays an entirely passive role in respect of the content of web sites appearing in its search results;

-       Google is unable to monitor the content of any particular website;

-       It would be impossible for Google to verify the truth and accuracy of the trillions of URLs[14] that Googlebot[15] finds on the internet, considering that the content of the vast number of web sites is constantly changing on a daily, hourly and even minute-to-minute basis;

-       Its practice has been to only remove material following a request originating within Canada, from its Canadian platform, Google.ca.

[28]        These arguments may apply to an injunctive claim. Google also named specific witnesses in its Request for setting down for trial and judgment to testify on its removal process from a technical perspective.

[29]        As raised by A.B., it is not a new cause of action for a plaintiff to plead an evolution of the factual situation over time, and it is not a new cause of action to attach juridical consequences to this evolution:

[34]  En somme, il ne s'agit pas de faire valoir une nouvelle cause d'action ou une nouvelle demande, mais bien simplement de faire valoir une nouvelle façon de considérer, sur le plan purement juridique, les faits déjà allégués et qui seront maintenant précisés. Ce n'est donc pas la cause d'action ni la demande qui sont différentes, c'est l'angle d'analyse juridique qui l'est. Il s'agit plutôt d'accorder les faits, tels qu'ils se révèlent au fur et à mesure de l'instance, et le traitement juridique de ces faits. Or, ces faits ne sont pas statiques et ont évolué depuis l'introduction même de l'action : il convient donc de les arrimer au droit. C'est ce que cherche à faire l'appelante.

 [35]  De toute façon, même s'il fallait y voir une nouvelle demande au sens de l'article 206 C.p.c., elle ne serait pas «sans rapport avec la demande initiale», au contraire de ce que décide le jugement de première instance.[16]

            (Emphasis added)

[30]        Finally, the nature of the debate and the proceedings as contemplated to date are not substantially changed by the amendment and even though the injunctive conclusions may be considered a new application, the amended application can hardly be qualified as an entirely new demand having no connection with the original one within the meaning of article 206 C.C.P. :

[25] Par ailleurs, comme l’admettent les intimés, il ne suffit pas de conclure que les modifications visent une demande entièrement nouvelle pour refuser de les autoriser, puisque l’article 206 C.p.c. n’interdit la modification que si elle n’a aucun rapport avec la demande initiale. Or, ceci ne vise que la demande additionnelle qui est « porteuse d’une cause d’action nouvelle, sans rapport avec la demande originelle ».[17]

(References omitted)

[31]        In the Court’s view and with respect, the Special Clerk was mistaken in characterizing the amendment sought as an entirely new cause of action.

[32]        For these reasons, the Special Clerk failed in his exercise of discretionary power in a manner that requires the Decision to be revised.

WHEREFORE, THE COURT:

[33]        GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Review the Decision of the Special Clerk;

[34]        REVISES the decision of the Special Clerk rendered on December 30, 2019;

[35]        AUTHORIZES Plaintiff to produce into the court record the Amended Originating Application, dated September 6, 2019;

[36]        THE WHOLE with costs to follow.