Dépelteau c. Commission des lésions professionnelles				2008 QCCS 391
JP 1900   SUPERIOR COURT
CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF			MONTREAL
No:		500-17-024990-056
DATE:	February 4, 2008
______________________________________________________________________
IN THE PRESENCE OF:      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MARK G. PEACOCK, J.S.C.
______________________________________________________________________
PIERRE DÉPELTEAU                  Applicant
v.
LA COMMISSION DES LÉSIONS PROFESSIONNELLES                 Respondent
-AND-
LA COMMISSION DE LA SANTÉ ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ DU TRAVAIL -and- M.A. RENÉ PELCHAT (1988) LTÉE                 Mis En Cause
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________

Introduction and Issues

 

[1]          In 1989, Mr. Dépelteau was a bricklayer-mason who incurred an employment injury to his elbow: a “épicondylite du coude gauche” (the "original employment injury").  His claim was accepted by La Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail ("CSST").  He went through re-adaptation and in 1994, the original employment injury was judged "consolidated". Thereafter, Mr. Dépelteau was diagnosed by his treating physician in 1995 with “névrose post-traumatique”, a diagnosis subsequently confirmed by a psychiatrist.  He had no employer at this time.  The CSST paid for certain treatment and medication.  Although asked by a CSST official if he wished to submit a claim for this, Mr. Dépelteau never submitted a second claim for the “névrose post-traumatique” to the CSST until after the 6-month delay for making such a claim had expired.

 

[2]          This judicial review application now made by Mr. Dépelteau raises as its main issue whether a medical certificate of December 7, 1995 (the “medical certificate”) providing the first diagnosis of “névrose post-traumatique” - and the CSST's knowledge of this condition and its treatment - waived[1] the statutory requirement for a “claim” to the CSST for a "rechute, récidive ou aggravation" (“relapse, recurrence or aggravation”)[2] of the original employment injury.

 

[3]          In fact, on February 13, 1997, Mr. Dépelteau did file a claim with the CSST on the approved form for this "névrose post-traumatique" as a "rechute, récidive ou aggravation" (“relapse, recurrence or aggravation”) of the original employment injury.

 

[4]          The CSST[3] and the subsequent two decisions of the C.L.P.[4] found that the necessary “claim” as required by the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases (“L.A.T.M.P.”) had not been filed within the statutory time limit of six months and that, accordingly, the CSST had no jurisdiction to consider the claim.  CLP-1 found specifically that there were no “reasonable grounds” to extend the 6 month time period.

 

[5]          Mr. Dépelteau asks for judicial review of the two decisions of C.L.P.:

 

a)                  decision of July 16, 2004 by Me. Francine Juteau et al. (“CLP-1”); and

 

b)                  decision of February 22, 2005 by Me. Lucie Nadeau et al. (“CLP-2”).

 

[6]          This judgement will proceed under the following headings:

					Paragraph
A-	Position of Counsel				7
	i-	Applicant			7
	ii-	Respondent and Mis En Cause C.L.P.			8
B-	Legal Context				9
C-	Analysis				14
	Issue 1:	Standard of Review by the Superior Court			14
		a.	Legal Test and Analysis		14
	Issue 2:	Was the CLP-1 Manifestly Unreasonable in Finding that  - the Medical Certificate of December  7, 1995 and the State of Mr. Dépelteau’s File with the CSST Relating to His “Névrose Post- Traumatique” - did not Replace the Requirement for a “Claim” Filed under Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P.?			18
		a.	Alleged Grounds in Support of Judicial Review		18
		b.	Legal Test		20
		c.	Analysis		22
			i)	Reasonableness of CLP-1	22
	Issue 3:	Did CLP-1 Commit a Manifest Error in Relying on Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P. instead of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P.?			45
	Issue 4:	Was CLP-1 Manifestly Unreasonable in Failing to Find that the CSST Had a Positive Obligation either: (a) to Ensure that Mr. Dépelteau Made a Claim or (b) to Consider that the State of the File Constituted a "Claim", in accordance with the Loi sur la justice administrative (“L.J.A.”)?			46
		a.	Alleged Grounds		46
		b.	Legal Test		49
		c.	Analysis		52
	Issue 5:	Was CLP-2 Unreasonable in Failing to Overturn CLP-1?			56
D-	Conclusions				63

 

A-        Position of Counsel

 

            i-          Applicant

 

[7]          Mr. Dépelteau advances two principal arguments:[5]

 

a)                  CLP-1 is manifestly unreasonable since it failed to follow the school of jurisprudence which supports an interpretation of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. to the effect that a medical report and a properly documented CSST file could satisfy the statutory requirement to file the necessary claim for a related employment injury. This argument is succinctly put at paragraphs 24 and 34 of the “Requête en révision judiciaire amendée (2^ième)"[6] as follows:

 

“24-  La CSST était, depuis décembre 1995, au courant de la condition psychique du requérant, et elle avait l’obligation et le devoir suivant la réception de l’attestation médicale datée du 7 décembre 1995 de rendre une décision sur l’admissibilité de la réclamation du requérant;

.

.

.

34-  Dans les faits, le requérant n’avait pas à produire une réclamation écrite de sa réclamation; s’il l’a fait, avec l’aide d’un représentant, c’est par dépit devant l’inertie d’une instance administrative bien plus occupée à vouloir fermer le dossier du requérant qu'à rencontrer ses obligations et l’objet de la loi sur les accidents du travail et les maladies professionnelles (sic);" and

 

b)                  CLP-1 is manifestly unreasonable on its face since it decided the issues before it on the basis of Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P. instead of the proper Art. 271, L.A.T.M.P.

 

ii-         Respondent and Mis En Cause C.L.P.

 

[8]          Opposing counsel for the CSST and C.L.P. make the following submissions in reply:

 

a)                  there are two schools of jurisprudence on the issue of whether a medical report and the contents of the CSST file for a worker may waive the requirement for a “claim”.  The fact that CLP-1 chose the second school that requires a claim be filed does not make their decision manifestly unreasonable;

 

b)                  the words “shall file his claim …, where applicable” (“s’il y a lieu”) in Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. does not eliminate the requirement for Mr. Dépelteau to file a claim in accordance with Art. 271:

 

i-          firstly, since the CSST re-adaptation counsellor dealing with Mr. Dépelteau asked him specifically whether he would be making a specific claim for “névrose post-traumatique” as an “employment injury”.  The CSST had a right to require and did require he file a claim.  He failed to follow-up and make a timely claim;

 

ii-         secondly, Mr. Dépelteau was very much aware of the “claim” form and process having had previous experience with such C.S.S.T. forms.  The CSST was entitled to rely on this knowledge to assume that when he did not file a second claim within the statutory 6-month time limit, he did not intend to make such a claim and the C.S.S.T. was entitled to consider the file closed; and

 

c)                  as for the improper reference in both C.L.P. decisions to Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P. instead of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P., this argument was not pleaded previously by Mr. Dépelteau.  In any event, even if CLP-1 and CLP-2 did rely on the wrong article, no injustice was caused since no different result would have been achieved if the proper article had been used.

 

B-        Legal Context 

 

[9]          What are the articles of the L.A.T.M.P. in issue?

 

[10]            The starting point is Art. 2 , L.A.T.M.P. which defines "rechute, récidive ou aggravation" (“relapse, recurrence or aggravation”) as an “employment injury”.

 

[11]            Art. 270 and 271, L.A.T.M.P. require an injured worker to make a claim within 6 months of an employment injury.  Each of these articles applies to different circumstances involving the worker.

 

[12]            One of the clear differences between the two articles is that:

 

a)                  Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P. applies where there is an employer involved.  In such a case, the employer has a positive obligation to assist the worker in completing the claim on the form required by the CSST; and

 

b)                  Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. applies where there is no employer.  Hence, the onus is on the worker themselves to complete the claim on the form required by the CSST.

 

[13]            At the heart of this debate is another distinction: the allegation that the latter article would not always require the filing of a claim on the required form.  A careful reading of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. notes that the Legislator has added the words “where applicable” (“s’il y a lieu”), which are not found in Art. 270, L.A.T.M.P. The Court will determine what legal effect this will have, if any, based on the facts of this case.

 

C-        Analysis

 

      Issue 1:          Standard of Review by the Superior Court

 

                                     a.         Legal Test and Analysis

 

[14]            In judicial review applications, the Superior Court is first required to undertake a pragmatic and functional analysis to establish the standard of review to be applied to the administrative decision(s) in issue.

 

[15]            The standard of review for the Superior Court to follow in the judicial review of CLP-1 and CLP-2 has been established by the Court of Appeal in the 2007 judgment in Gagné v. Pratt & Whitney Canada.[7]

 

[16]            Accordingly and consistent with its own pragmatic and functional analysis in this case, the Court adopts as its own the reasoning in this judgment so as to establish the standard of review required in the present case.  The operative excerpts from Gagné are:

 

“30- Dans C.S.S.T. c. Fontaine, [2005] R.J.Q. 2203 (C.A.), le juge Morissette écrit, pour la Cour, que la norme de contrôle à l’endroit de CLP 2, lorsque celle-ci révise CLP 1, est celle de la décision raisonnable simpliciter plutôt que celle de la décision manifestement déraisonnable. En effet, les objectifs de la justice administrative (efficacité, célérité, régime peu onéreux et stabilité des décisions) favorisent une plus grande intervention judiciaire lorsque le régime administratif intervient et modifie une décision rendue par un décideur dont l’expertise est tout aussi grande que la sienne.  Si le législateur a voulu que les décisions de la CLP soient à l’abri des interventions, encore faut-il s’assurer que celles de CLP 2 sont elles-mêmes justifiées.

31-  Qu’en est-il lorsque CLP 2 refuse d’invalider CLP 1? Dans de telles circonstances, les objectifs de la justice administrative, précédemment identifiés, auront été atteints. Par conséquent, ce n’est pas tant la décision CLP 2 qui est alors en cause, puisqu’elle ne modifie en rien la situation, mais bien la décision CLP 1, qui demeure le fondement décisionnel dont on demande la révision judiciaire.

32-  Si l’appelant avait demandé immédiatement la révision judiciaire de CLP 1 sans demander à la CLP de procéder à une révision administrative, la norme aurait été celle de la décision manifestement déraisonnable. Puisque, en l’espèce, la décision CLP 2 n’a pas changé quoi que ce soit à la situation qui prévaut, la décision qui est au cœur de la contestation demeure CLP 1. Il est donc préférable, pour respecter l’intention du législateur, d’envisager la demande de révision judiciaire sous l’angle de la révision de CLP 1 et d’appliquer, à son égard, la norme de la décision manifestement déraisonnable.

33- Évidemment, la décision CLP 2 doit également être prise en considération, mais force est de constater que, si la décision CLP 1 était manifestement déraisonnable, la décision CLP 2, qui aurait refusé de l’invalider, serait nécessairement elle-même déraisonnable. Par ailleurs, si CLP 1 n’est pas manifestement déraisonnable, la décision CLP 2 de ne pas l’invalider sera raisonnable. J’estime, pour cette raison, qu’il n’est pas utile d’appliquer une norme d’intervention différente à l’égard de CLP 2 selon qu’elle révise ou non CLP 1. La norme retenue par la Cour dans C.S.S.T. c. Fontaine, précité, soit celle de la décision raisonnable simpliciter, est tout à fait appropriée lorsque CLP 2 ne révise pas CLP 1 à la condition que, comme je le suggère, on applique à cette dernière, dans le cadre d’une analyse portant sur les deux décisions, la norme de la décision manifestement déraisonnable. L’intention du législateur et les objectifs de la justice administrative seront alors respectés."

.

.

.

38-  En conséquence, un simple désaccord avec la décision CLP 1 ne saurait suffire pour autoriser l’intervention d’un tribunal. Encore faut-il que cette décision ne puisse s’appuyer sur les dispositions pertinentes, qu’elle soit clairement irrationnelle ou non conforme à la raison ou encore qu’elle frise l’absurde." (emphasis added)

 

[17]            At the hearing, the submissions of all counsel supported this standard of review.

 

Issue 2:          Was the CLP-1 Manifestly Unreasonable in Finding that - the Medical Certificate of December 7, 1995 and the State of Mr. Dépelteau’s File with the CSST Relating to His “Névrose Post- Traumatique” - did not Replace the Requirement for a “Claim” Filed under Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P.?

 

      a.           Alleged Grounds in Support of Judicial Review

 

[18]            Mr. Dépelteau has taken different positions before CLP-1 and before the Superior Court, seeking to bring himself within the 6-month time limit of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P.:

 

a)                  before CLP-1, Mr. Dépelteau alleged that his knowledge of his “névrose post-traumatique” began with the medical certificate of Dr. Payne dated October 17, 1996 and hence, his claim - filed in 1997 - was within the 6 months;[8] and

 

b)                  before the Superior Court, Mr. Dépelteau now alleges that:

 

i.                     the medical certificate of Dr. Payne dated December 7, 1995, the medical follow-up of Mr. Dépelteau’s “névrose post-traumatique”  to the CSST and the evolving status of Mr. Dépelteau’s file before the CSST from 1989 to July 30, 1997, all combined to render unnecessary the filing of any further “claim” by Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P.[9]

 

[19]            Hence, in the first instance, Mr. Dépelteau relies on his actual claim of February, 1996 as being his claim under Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. and in the second, he says no such claim is even required because the CSST is fully aware of the claim by virtue of its own file.

 

 

 

 

b.         Legal Test

 

[20]            Mr. Dépelteau relies on the only Superior Court case on this subject, the 1991 decision of Galipeau v. Bureau de révision paritaire des Laurentides[10] as well as a series of administrative decisions[11] which he says support the proposition that Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. does not require that a claim be filed on the approved form in all circumstances and that the state of the CSST’s file may, in the appropriate circumstances as here, constitute the claim, without further formality.

 

[21]            Opposing counsel have brought to the Court’s attention the second school of administrative decisions, which decide that a duly completed claim must be filed.[12]

 

            c.         Analysis

 

i)          Reasonableness of CLP-1

 

[22]            The Court finds that CLP-1 based its decision on:

 

a)                  the proper starting point for the six month delay;

 

b)                  the ability of Mr. Dépelteau to make a decision to claim within this delay and his unjustifiable failure to do so; and

 

c)                   the lack of any reasonable grounds to extend the delay,

 

on a reasoned analysis of the facts before it, for which the Court finds nothing manifestly unreasonable.

 

[23]            Firstly, it must be remembered that CLP-1 found as a fact:

 

a)                  that the psychological component of the CSST file re: “névrose post-traumatique” was first identified and the worker made aware of this condition in 1995; and

 

b)                  that the first diagnosis of the psychological condition by the treating physician was in February, 1996.[13]

 

[24]            Hence, the starting point determined for the beginning of the 6-month delay by the CLP-1 was reasonable.

 

[25]            Secondly, CLP-1 carefully analyzed the evolution of the psychological aspect of Mr. Dépelteau’s file with the CSST[14] and then found that on December 14,1995, his CSST re-adaptation counsellor asked him directly whether he wished to file a claim for a “recurrence, relapse or aggravation” for his “névrose post-traumatique” to which he replied that he was not sure since he had similar episodes each winter for the past 10 years (i.e. even pre-dating the original employment injury).[15]

 

[26]            The Court determines these findings are critical.  Here, we not only have the CSST clearly requesting of the worker that a claim be filed but we have the reaction of Mr. Dépelteau: he is not sure because the second medical condition may well pre-date his original employment injury.

 

[27]            CLP-1 found no evidence that Mr. Dépelteau was medically incapable of making the decision to file a second claim at the relevant times:

 

a)                 CLP-1 describes:

 

i-           the original diagnosis (paragraph 94), and

 

ii-                  Mr. Dépelteau's failure to raise the issue of a claim in his numerous discussions afterward with the CSST concerning his psychological condition (paragraphs 95, 96, 97 and 99) nor when he was contesting related matters (paragraph 101).  Based on this context, CLP-1 decided that Mr. Dépelteau’s allegations in the letter of February 3, 1997 on his behalf - asserting he was psychologically incapable of appreciating the necessity for filing the claim - were not founded (paragraph 98).

 

[28]            CLP-1 found that Mr. Dépelteau was fully aware of the need to file the necessary claim form for a "rechute, récidive ou aggravation" (“relapse, recurrence or aggravation”) since he had followed this exact procedure in the past (paragraph 102).

 

[29]            Finally, CLP-1 dismissed the argument that the CSST’s understanding of the psychological aspect of Mr. Dépelteau’s file was sufficient to put it on notice without an actual claim being filed. The basis for CLP-1’s reasoning was that there was a “consolidation” of the original employment injury in 1994. Hence, there was a new diagnosis with a new injury i.e. “névrose post-traumatique”, which, according to CLP-1, required a new claim be filed.[16]

 

[30]            The questions of when the 6-month delay started and the interpretation of the L.A.T.M.P. as to whether it imposed a requirement for a claim to be filed were both clearly within the jurisdiction of CLP-1.  These questions were to be decided based on its specialized competence. 

 

[31]            The Court finds that the analysis undertaken by CLP-1 was based on a reasonable appreciation of the facts, that the interpretation given to the L.A.T.M.P. was not "manifestly unreasonable" and hence, there is no reason for the Court to intervene.[17]

 

[32]            But what of the fact that CLP-1 did not rely on those other decisions of the C.L.P. - the second school of jurisprudence - which would imply that a claim was not required?

 

[33]            The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that:

 

a)                  the mere fact of conflicting decisions within administrative tribunals does not give rise to judicial review;

 

b)                  curial deference requires that Superior Courts defer to permit administrative tribunals to resolve such conflicts themselves; and

 

c)                  Superior Courts have jurisdiction to judicially review where, on its face, an administrative decision is manifestly unreasonable.[18]

 

[34]            Accordingly, this argument by Mr. Dépelteau that it was manifestly unreasonable for CLP-1 not to have relied on the first school of jurisprudence - that a claim need not be filed in particular circumstances - must fail.

 

[35]            Finally, what effect on the present case does the Galipeau decision have?  In that case, it was decided that because of the addition of the words “s’il y a lieu” in the French version of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. that the Legislator intended that a claim is not always necessary.

 

[36]            The Court finds that the Galipeau judgment has no effect on the present case because:

 

a)                  it is distinguishable on the facts; and

 

b)                  with due respect to the contrary view, the Court does not agree with the interpretation given in Galipeau to the words “s’il y a lieu”.

 

[37]            Firstly, the present case involves the CSST specifically advising the worker that a claim was required and in this case, the new psychological claim was not of the same nature as the physical ailment of the original employment injury (“épicondylite du coude gauche”). On the contrary, Galipeau involved a situation where the CSST did not specifically require that a claim be filed[19] and the "aggravation” in question was of the same type as the original employment injury and not of an entirely different nature altogether, as in the present case.

 

[38]            Secondly, the Court in Galipeau found that the Legislator would not have inserted the words “s’il y a lieu” if a new claim was required to be filed every time:

 

“… Il est plus logique de conclure que ces mots veulent dire que si un tel formulaire est déjà au dossier du travailleur, point n’est besoin d’en remplir un nouveau, sauf exception.”[20]

 

[39]            With respect, the Court does not agree and believes that the intent of the Legislator is more clearly expressed by analyzing the English version of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. in the context of Art. 268 and 271, L.A.T.M.P.

 

[40]            The original difficulty is created by the use of commas before and after “s’il y a lieu” in the French version of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. which, at first reading, would appear to support two possible interpretations: (a) that of Galipeau that an actual claim is not always required and (b) that when a worker decides to file a claim it must be filed on the prescribed form.

 

[41]            However, in the English version of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P., it reads: "…shall file his claim with the Commission, where applicable on the form it prescribes, within six months …" This punctuation makes clear what the Legislator is referring to is "where" on the claim form the claim is to be filled in and not "whether" the claim form is to be submitted.  Reference to an actual claim form[21] shows that there are fewer boxes of the claim form to be filled in where, for example, the worker has no employer as in the case of Art. 271, L.A.T.M.P.

 

[42]            This interpretation is supported by the English versions of Art. 268 and 270, L.A.T.M.P. both of which discuss the claim being filed "on the form prescribed (…) by the Commission" (Art. 268 , L.A.T.M.P.) or "on the form prescribed by it" (Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P.).[22]  There is no expressed or logical reason why the CSST is to be given specific notice of a claim in the circumstances of these articles but not in the case of Art. 271, L.A.T.M.P. Given the detailed series of obligations that arise for the C.S.S.T. any time a claim is filed, it is essential that the CSST has clear confirmation that the worker intends that the claim be processed by the CSST.  This confirmation is constituted by the filing of a claim by the worker.

 

[43]            Accordingly, the Court finds that the words “s’il y a lieu” ("where applicable on the form it prescribes") do not create any relevant difference on the facts of this case whether Art. 270 or 271, L.A.T.M.P. were to be applied.

 

[44]            That said it is clear that the relevant article for the facts of this case - where there was no longer an employer in the picture at the time of the diagnosis of the "névrose post-traumatique” - is Art. 271 and not Art. 270, L.A.T.M.P.  How does this effect the outcome of the present proceeding?

 

Issue 3:         Did CLP-1 Commit a Manifest Error in Relying on Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P. instead of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P.?

 

[45]            For the reasons given under Issue 2, the Court finds that the incorrect use by CLP-1 of Art. 270 , L.A.T.M.P. instead of Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. did not create any material difference in the outcome of the case.  Although an apparent error in law, there was no “manifestly unreasonable” result in view of the Court’s finding that the wording in both articles creates no material difference for the issues of this case.  Hence, no injustice has occurred.

 

Issue 4:         Was CLP-1 Manifestly Unreasonable in Failing to Find that the CSST Had a Positive Obligation either: (a) to Ensure that Mr. Dépelteau Made a Claim or (b) to Consider that the State of the File Constituted a "Claim", in accordance with the Loi sur la justice administrative (“L.J.A.”)?

 

a.          Alleged Grounds

 

[46]            It does not appear that this argument was raised with reference to the L.J.A. before CLP-1.

 

[47]            However, the argument was raised orally before the Court which deems it in the interest of justice and particularly consistent with the objectives of Art. 4.1 and 4.2, Civil Code of Procedure to decide this argument here.[23]

 

[48]            The Court will now consider this argument even though the matter was not pleaded in any detailed fashion before it.  No reference was made to this argument in Mr. Dépelteau’s written Plan of Argument submitted before the hearing.

 

b.          Legal Test

 

[49]            The Court is satisfied that the CSST is governed by the L.J.A.

 

[50]            The relevant statutory dispositions appear to be Art. 4 (1) and (2), L.J.A.:

 

4.  L'Administration gouvernementale prend les mesures appropriées pour s'assurer:    1° que les procédures sont conduites dans le respect des normes législatives et administratives, ainsi que des autres règles de droit applicables, suivant des règles simples, souples et sans formalisme et avec respect, prudence et célérité, conformément aux normes d'éthique et de discipline qui régissent ses agents, et selon les exigences de la bonne foi;    2° que l'administré a eu l'occasion de fournir les renseignements utiles à la prise de la décision et, le cas échéant, de compléter son dossier;

4.  The Administration shall take appropriate measures to ensure        1) that procedures are conducted in accordance with legislative and administrative norms or standards and with other applicable rules of law, according to simple and flexible rules devoid of formalism, with respect, prudence and promptness, in accordance with the norms and standards of ethics and discipline governing its agents and with the requirements of good faith;     2)  that the citizen is given the opportunity to provide any information useful for the making of the decision and, where necessary, to complete his file;

 

[51]            Professor D. Lemieux in the text Justice administrative - Loi Annotée[24] states as follows regarding Art. 4 (2), L.J.A.:

 

"   Quant au 2^e alinéa:

    Les mots «a eu l'occasion» supposent un geste positif de la part de l'Administration.

    «fournir des renseignements» signifie tout document y compris les déclarations qui pourraient être déposées sous forme d'affidavit.

    L'expression «utiles» signifie que ces documents sont pertinents pour la prise de décisions.

    Enfin, l'expression «compléter son dossier» suppose que l'on fournisse dans les délais des informations sur tout ce qui est au dossier. Le principe de transparence implique un changement de mentalité dans nombre de secteurs où la tradition du secret est plutôt la règle."

 

c.         Analysis

 

[52]            In the L.A.T.M.P., the Legislator has placed a positive obligation on an employer to assist an injured worker in the completion of the necessary claim in Art. 270 (2), L.A.T.M.P.

 

[53]            On the contrary, Art. 271 , L.A.T.M.P. contains no such obligation to assist the worker by anyone, least of all by the CSST.

 

[54]            CLP-1 has found that the CSST re-adaptation counsellor already explained to Mr. Dépelteau that he could file a claim and that there were numerous opportunities for him to do so.[25]

 

[55]            Accordingly, the Court determines that the CSST has not breached either the L.A.T.M.P. nor the L.J.A.  Moreover, on the findings of fact of CLP-1 just mentioned, the obligations imposed by Art. 4 (1) and (2), L.J.A. have been met through the actions of the CSST’s re-adaptation counsellor in asking Mr. Dépelteau whether he wished to file a claim.

 

Issue 5:         Was CLP-2 Unreasonable in Failing to Overturn CLP-1?

 

[56]            In applying the proper standard of review to CLP-2, the Court finds nothing unreasonable that would merit judicial review of CLP-2.

 

[57]            CLP-2 applied the proper standard for its review of CLP-1.[26]

 

[58]            While making reference to the two differing schools of C.L.P. jurisprudence regarding the requirement for a claim (or not) under the L.A.T.M.P., CLP-2 notes that the issue is to be decided by an appreciation of the evidence.[27]

 

[59]            It then reviews this analysis made by CLP-1 which found that the offer to file a claim had been made by the re-adaptation counsellor but not taken up by Mr. Dépelteau and that, in these circumstances, a claim was required to be filed in time and had not been filed in time.[28]

 

[60]            Accordingly and in applying the parameters established by the Court of Appeal in Gagné, supra, the Court finds that Mr. Dépelteau cannot succeed in his attack on CLP-2 either.

 

[61]            Finally, Me. Asselin, on behalf of CATTAM (Centre d’Aide aux Travailleurs et Travailleuses Accidentés de Montréal Inc.) which represented Mr. Dépelteau at the hearing before the Court requested that should the Court not grant Mr. Dépelteau’s Motion for Judicial Review that it not award costs given the “not-for-profit” and benevolent mission of CATTAM in assisting injured workers.

 

[62]            In view of these submissions, the particular facts of this case[29] and the overall socially-progressive mandate of the L.A.T.M.P., exemplified, amongst others, by its Art. 1, the Court agrees and will not award costs.

 

D-        Conclusions

 

[63]            FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, THIS COURT:

 

[64]            DISMISSES the "Requête en révision judiciaire amendée (2^ième)", as further amended at the hearing;

 

[65]            WITHOUT COSTS.

			(S) MARK G. PEACOCK __________________________________ MARK G. PEACOCK, J.S.C.
Me. Dominic Asselin C.A.T.T.A.M. Attorneys for Applicant
Me. Virginie Brisebois Me. Marie-France Bernier LEVASSEUR VERGE  Attorneys for Respondent   Me. Lucille Giard PANNETON, LESSARD Attorneys for Mis En Cause CSST   M.A. RENÉ PELCHAT (1988) LTÉE Mis En Cause (not represented)
Date of hearing:		September 26, 2007