Décision

Tanisma c. Montréal (Ville de)								2013 QCCS 2479
SUPERIOR COURT
CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF					MONTREAL
No:			500-17-030648-060
DATE:		JUNE 4, 2013
______________________________________________________________________
BY	THE HONOURABLE						MR. JUSTICE MARK G. PEACOCK, J.S.C.
______________________________________________________________________
OLTHÈNE TANISMA,
Plaintiff
v.
VILLE DE MONTRÉAL,
Defendant
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________

Introduction

 

[1]           "Concorida salus" is the Latin motto of the City of Montreal. It means "salvation through harmony".

 

[2]           According to the Haitian-born Plaintiff ("Mr. Tanisma"), an experienced urban planner for the City of Montreal (the "City"), this harmony has been broken by racial discrimination in the City’s employment practices and policies, which deprived him of promotion to a management position.

 

[3]           In 2001, Mr. Tanisma had worked for the City for 13 years. As a result of municipal mergers, new management positions were created in the new boroughs and he applied. He was disappointed when he was not even asked to an interview. He was frustrated when he subsequently found out that he was not even eligible to apply since he was not already in a management function. Later, he was shocked to find that four urban planning colleagues were in fact promoted to management positions - albeit on a temporary basis - without those temporary positions being either posted or applications requested.

 

[4]           Mr. Tanisma is a member of a visible minority. He asserts in this lawsuit that he was subjected to systemic discrimination in these circumstances. In these proceedings, he claims to be entitled to integration into a management position, moral and material damages, as well as punitive damages for what he asserts was an intentional infringement by the City - based on race - to his right to promotion.

 

[5]           According to Mr. Tanisma, the City’s policies and procedures surrounding this promotion intentionally ignored the City’s own equal access employment program which recognized the under-representation of visible minorities, amongst other groups, in management positions within the City.

 

[6]           In its defence, the City denies there has been any discrimination. It asserts that its eligibility criteria were bona fide job requirements, were "race neutral" and that job postings and applications were not required for the subsequently-created "temporary" positions.[1]

 

[7]           Mr. Tanisma first took his complaint to the Human Rights Commission ("HRC") in 2002 before initiating these proceedings in 2006.

 

[8]           Following an Interlocutory motion taken by the City, the Court of Appeal decided that certain of Mr. Tanisma’s allegations in this action were not within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court since they were governed by the arbitration process of the collective agreement.

 

[9]           As a result, the subject matter of these proceedings is restricted to the cause of action related to Mr. Tanisma’s application in 2002 for these management positions, including the subsequent related facts surrounding the hiring of his colleagues - who are not from visible minorities - into equivalent management positions.

 

[10]        The findings of fact by this Court are based upon its evaluation of the evidence.

 

[11]        This judgement will proceed under the following headings:

 

A-       Factual and Human Rights Overview

1-            The Inception of the City’s Access to Employment Equality Program

B-       Analysis

1-         Objection to Exhibit P-12, "Exposé factuel" Prepared for the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse by HRC Investigator Cécile Bouvrette on July 28, 2005 for Mr. Tanisma’s May 15, 2002 Complaint Against the City

2-         What is Systemic or Institutionalized Discrimination?

3-         How is Discrimination Established According to the Quebec Charter?

4-         Are the "Mécanismes d’intégration" of the Transition Committee - Discriminatory on the Basis of Race?

(a)          Does the "Managers Only Need Apply" Eligibility Criterion Constitute Prima Facia Discrimination?

(i)           Existing Under-Representation of Visible Minorities in Management Positions

(ii)          Objectives of City’s Own Equality Program

 (b)      Whether a Defence Exists Under Art. 20 , Quebec Charter

5-         Whether the "Fonction supérieure" Process is Discriminatory Under the Quebec Charter

            (a)        Contrary to the "Mécanismes"?

            (b)        Contrary to the Program and the Quebec Charter?

6-         Basis of Legal Liability

7-         Recourses

(a)       Demand to Be Integrated Into Management

(b)        Material Damages

(c)         Moral Damages

(i)                        Applicable Law

(d)       Punitive Damages: Whether the Plaintiff Has Proven Intentional Harm Under Art. 49 para. 2, Quebec Charter

 

A-        Factual and Human Rights Overview

 

[12]        Mr. Tanisma came from Haïti to Montreal in 1979, where he obtained a Bachelor's degree in environmental design and a Master's degree in urban studies.

 

[13]        He began work with the City in 1988 as a "conseiller en aménagement - Groupe 2" at which time, he also became a member of the union.

 

[14]        He acquired fulltime status in this position in 1991.

 

[15]        The City did not perform written performance reviews. However, from 1991 to 2001, the City had Mr. Tanisma work on "projets d'envergures".

 

[16]        On December 20, 2000, a "Comité de transition" was established to oversee the merger of 29 regional communities into an amalgamated City of Montreal.

 

1-         The Inception of the City’s Access to Employment Equality Program ("Equality Program")

 

[17]        In June 1985, the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (the "Quebec Charter")[2] permitted an organization established by the Quebec Legislator to initiate its own access to employment equality program ("equality program") on a voluntary basis.

 

[18]        The City noted the objective of such an equality program[3]:

 

"… Ces programmes ont pour principal objectif de corriger le traitement inégal qui se fonde sur des systèmes de pratiques, de valeurs, ou de règles dont l’interaction complexe a pour effet de maintenir les membres de ces groupes [Ed. note: women, visible minorities, aboriginal persons, allophones] dans une situation d’inégalité qui n’est pas nécessairement reliée à des comportements individuels intentionnels."[4] (this Court’s emphasis)

 

[19]        In the same document which was dated April 2001, the City went on to explain the purpose of the Equality Program:

 

"Un tel programme vise donc à :

 

·         assurer une représentation équitable des membres des groupes victimes de discrimination dans tous les emplois de l’organisation;

 

·         identifier et supprimer les règles et pratiques du système d’emploi susceptibles d’être discrimi-natoires;

 

·        promouvoir l’apport des membres de groupes-cibles au sein de l’administration municipale."

 

[20]        The Equality Program was to promote equality in employment for women, visible minorities, aboriginal persons, and allophones.

 

[21]        It is important to note that the Commission des droits de la personne published "Lignes directrices concernant la validité des programmes d’accès à l’égalité établi volontairement dans le secteur de l’emploi", dated October 1986.[5]

 

[22]        The "Lignes directrices" required that before any such equal equality program be established, there first had to be an assessment regarding:

 

a)            the under-representation of members of a disadvantaged group; and

 

b)            the discriminatory effect of the employment system.

 

[23]        A group was considered to be under-represented where "…, dans un secteur donné de l’organisation, il n’est pas représenté conformément à sa disponibilité". Moreover:

 

"Un programme volontaire doit donc tenir compte de la représentation des membres du groupe-cible dans l’organisation par rapport à leur disponibilité pour le type d’emploi en cause. À cette fin, il doit être fait usage de données précises et calculées par catégories d’emploi plutôt que pour l’ensemble des postes de l’organisation globalement, ainsi que fiables au plan statistique."[6]

 

[24]        Finally to conform with the Quebec Charter, the voluntary equality program had to:

 

a)            "se  fonder sur un diagnostic de la situation";

b)            "prévoir des objectifs numériques appropriés";

c)            "prévoir les mesures nécessaires pour corriger la situation". 

 

[25]        The front page of the "Programme d’accès et d’égalité dans l’emploi a l’intention des femmes et des communautés culturelles - Bilan 2000", published by the "Service du personnel, Division de la gestion des effectifs - avril 2001" was a seminal letter from then Mayor Pierre Bourque (Exhibit P-5A).

 

[26]        Under his signature, the Mayor commits the City as follows:

 

"Consciente de la diversification croissante de la population montréalaise au plan ethnoculturel et de la place grandissante des femmes sur le marché du travail, l’administration municipale a mis-sur-pied, sur une base volontaire, un programme d’accès a l’égalité dans l’emploi à l’intention des ces deux groupes.

 

Ce programme correspond aussi à la volonté de notre administration de prendre ces responsabilités en tant qu’entreprise de service public et à s’engager à respecter la Chartre québécoise et droits et libertés de la personne, en ce qui trait à la portée économique des femmes et des membres de communautés culturelles au développement social et économique de la Métropole.

 

Le programme d’accès à l’égalité dans l’emploi à l’intention des femmes et des membres des communautés culturelles a été adopté conformément à la Chartre québécoise  des droits et libertés de la personne et comprend des mesures d’égalité des chances et des mesures en redressement. Toutes ces mesures sont contenues dans le plan d’action du programme que je vous invite à consulter.

 

La participation des femmes et des membres des communautés culturelles à la fonction publique montréalaise la rend plus diversifiée donc plus riche et contribue à faire d’elle le reflet de la société qu’elle dessert." (this Court's emphasis)

 

[27]        Years after the City implemented the Equality Program on its own initiative, the Quebec Legislator enacted An Act Respecting Equal Access to Employment in Public Bodies in 2001, which obliged municipalities, amongst others, to legislate such equal opportunity programs.[7]

 

[28]        As of April, 2001, it was obligatory for municipalities to have equal access to opportunity programs, such as the one that the City had instituted years earlier.

 

[29]        Before merger - on December 31, 2001 - the City had approximately 12,813 permanent and temporary employees. As of January 1, 2002, the mandate of the Comité de transition ended and the new amalgamated City took over.

 

[30]        After merger - on January 26, 2002 - then new City now had 24,407 employees, including firemen but not policemen.

 

[31]        In February 2002, Mr. Tanisma applied for several "Group Three" management positions, which were not governed by any collective agreement. The positions were all titled "chef de division". In one instance, the "chef de division" was in "urbanisme et Service aux entreprises" in several boroughs:

 

a)          Côte-des-Neiges/Notre-Dame-de-Grâce;

b)          Mercier/Hochelaga-Maisonneuve;

c)          Plateau Mont-Royal/Centre-Sud; and

d)          Ville-Marie.

 

[32]        On March 14, 2002, Mr. Tanisma received e-mail correspondence from the "Comité de transition" to advise him that he would not be given an interview for any of the management positions he had applied for.[8]

 

[33]        In the weeks following, he wanted to know why and telephoned the Human Resources Department of the City. They advised him of the reason: eligibility was restricted to those individuals who were already in management positions or those union members who were in temporary management positions for at least twelve months i.e. in "fonction supérieure".

 

[34]        The matter might have been left there was it not for the fact that Mr. Tanisma learned subsequently that two men and two women, urban planners with similar qualifications to himself and who were "conseiller(ère) en aménagement", had been temporarily named to positions as "chef de division, niveau 3".

 

[35]        One of the women[9], Ms. ABC, was appointed "chef de division" in the Côte-des-Neiges/Notre-Dame-de-Grâce borough on a temporary or "fonction supérieure" basis. Not only had she never applied for this position, this was in fact the same position for which Mr. Tanisma had specifically applied weeks earlier when it had been posted as a full-time job and for which he was told he was not eligible for an interview.

 

[36]        The other female "conseillère en aménagement" was urban planner Ms. DEF.  She had been temporarily named as "chef de division, Niveau 3" in the Petite Patrie-Rosemont borough.

 

[37]        These two individuals complained of by Mr. Tanisma both provided statements to the HRC’s investigator, as well as testifying before this Court. Their evidence demonstrated similar hiring practices in relation to "fonction supérieure".

 

[38]        In both instances, the Court understands that following the original job posting for the permanent position, selection committees of three persons (which included the immediate supervisor for the posted position), decided against hiring any of the applicants for the posted full-time positions in these two boroughs.

 

[39]        Ms. ABC had sent her curriculum vitae to apply as "chef de division" for the following boroughs: Ville-Marie / Plateau Mont-Royal / Centre-Sud and Rivière-des-Prairies. Subsequently, she herself was told that she was not eligible because she was not presently in a management position - a criteria she herself said was unfair.[10]

 

[40]        In fact, when hiring for permanent management positions in the new City, a hiring policy had been established by the "Comité de transition" in a document called "Mécanismes d’intégration des Employés Cadres dans la Nouvelle Ville de Montréal".[11]

 

[41]        The "Mécanismes" required that upon failure to fill the positions internally, an external competition was to be held.[12]

 

[42]        However, in the case of both women, the immediate superiors for the temporary positions the women ultimately received were two managers for whom each had previously worked.  No competition was held.

 

[43]        These managers were Ms. C. Paquette in the case of Ms. DEF and Mr. G. Rainville in the case of Ms. ABC. When no candidates were chosen for these fulltime posted positions, they were converted into "temporary positions" or "fonctions supérieures". For these temporary positions, there was no posting nor any competition, although Mr. Rainville, in his statement to the HRC, believed that he knew there were other City employees interested in these positions. Despite that, both managers simply ensured that their own individually chosen nominees were appointed to these temporary positions.

 

[44]         The evidence discloses that both women were competent urban planners but the Court has no way of determining that they were any more competent or suitable for these positions than, for example, Mr. Tanisma (or for that matter any of the other applicants that had applied for these positions when they were posted as full-time). For example, Ms. ABC’s qualifications - a Bachelors' degree in urban studies and a Master's degree in urban planning - were equivalent to those of Mr. Tanisma.

 

[45]        In June 2002, Ms. ABC was offered the temporary position of "chef de division", Côte-des-Neiges/Notre-Dame-de-Grâce[13] as a "fonction supérieure" by her former superior, Mr. G. Rainville who by now was the "Directeur d’arrondissement" in this borough and the immediate superior for this particular "chef de division" position. She had not applied for the position. Also, the position had not been posted and there was no competition.

 

[46]        Subsequently, in or about December, 2002, Mr. Rainville was promoted to a higher position and he in turn chose Ms. ABC to take his former position, again on a temporary basis as a "fonction supérieure".

 

[47]        As for the temporary position of "chef de division", Côte-des-Neiges/Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, Ms. ABC - for this position which continued to be a "fonction supérieure" - unilaterally named an employee who had been working for her, a Mr. GHI, again without any job posting or any competition.

 

[48]        As Ms. ABC herself testified, the advantage of this "fonction supérieure" system, to the fortunate person who was named, was that they obtained management experience while still being able to return to their former position as a non-management employee and member of the union, after the "fonction supérieure" terminated. However, they had acquired this invaluable management experience in the interim.

 

[49]        It is clear from both the evidence of Ms. ABC and Mr. Rainville’s statement that using this system of "fonction supérieure" had the following consequences in this particular case: it by-passed job posting, it by-passed the application process and effectively prevented Mr. Tanisma from even knowing about or applying for a "chef de division" position for which he - not Ms. ABC - had actually applied when it was posted as a full-time position.

 

[50]        The evidence of Ms. DEF mirrored that of Ms. ABC. She had previously worked for Ms. C. Paquette, a manager for the City. Ms. Paquette knew Ms. DEF wanted to be promoted into management. In Ms. DEF’s case, a temporary position as a "chef de division" in the "Rosemont/Petite-Patrie" borough was offered to her by Ms. Paquette. She had not applied for this position either nor was there any competition and nor was it posted. She stayed in this "temporary" position for two years. She testified a key advantage to this "fonction supérieure" promotion was not the salary (which was only slightly increased) but rather the advantage of learning how to manage people.

 

[51]        In 2003, a permanent position came up as "chef de division: Permis et Inspection" and in March 2004, she underwent an evaluation by an external firm regarding her management capacities. This permanent job was never posted and nor was there a competition: this permanent management position was simply awarded to her.

 

[52]        Again, the evidence discloses that Ms. DEF was a qualified and motivated individual and the Court makes no negative comment whatsoever on any of her actions.

 

B-       Analysis

 

1-            Objection to Exhibit P-12, “Exposé factuel” Prepared for the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse by HRC Investigator Cécile Bouvrette on July 28, 2005 for Mr. Tanisma’s May 15, 2002 Complaint Against the City

 

[53]        Ms. Bouvrette, an experienced investigator for the Quebec HRC, was called as a witness by the Plaintiff.

 

[54]        Her investigation was undertaken under the powers provided by the Quebec Charter.[14]

 

[55]        The report has 28 pages plus annexes. It contains facts, unsworn declarations taken by the investigator of City employees and recommendations by the investigator, amongst other things.

 

[56]        The City objected to the filing into evidence of all its contents.

 

[57]        Parts of the objection are valid and other parts of the objection are not.

 

[58]        Recommendations and opinions of the HRC regarding alleged discrimination go to the central issue which this Court has to decide. They are not relevant to this Court’s inquiry. The objection is upheld as regards such opinions and recommendations.[15]

 

[59]        On the other hand, signed declarations of witnesses who also appeared before this Court will be allowed into evidence. In addition to all parties having had the opportunities to examine these witnesses on their written declarations, the declarations have had their reliability sufficiently guaranteed since they were obtained by the investigator acting under her statutory authority.[16]

 

[60]        Mr. G. Rainville passed away prior to this case coming to trial. His statement is admissible under art. 2870 , C.C.Q. on the grounds of impossibility and the reliability of his written declaration is guaranteed for the above reason.[17]

 

[61]        Finally, certain facts reported by Ms. Bouvrette, the investigator, will be permitted since she was called as a witness and could be cross-examined on those facts by either party.[18]

 

2.         What is Systemic or Institutionalized Discrimination?

 

[62]        In recent years, various courts, tribunals and commissions have had the occasion to define systemic discrimination, all of them in a similar way.

 

[63]        The Supreme Court of Canada describes discrimination pursuant to s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms[19] (the "Canadian Charter") in the following terms:

 

"... discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. ..."[20]

 

[64]        The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that "systemic discrimination" is a form of prohibited discrimination. Pursuant to s. 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act[21], it has defined systemic discrimination in employment as follows:

 

"[…] discrimination that results from the simple operation of established procedures of recruitment, hiring and promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to promote discrimination."[22]

 

[65]        The Quebec Court of Appeal in Gaz Métropolitain inc. v. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse[23] [hereafter, Gaz Métropolitain] adopted the notion of systemic discrimination provided by Mr. Justice Rivest in the first instance who stated the following:

 

"[36] Aussi, le Tribunal juge opportun de définir aujourd'hui la discrimination systémique comme la somme d'effets d'exclusion disproportionnés qui résultent de l'effet conjugué d'attitudes empreintes de préjugés et de stéréotypes, souvent inconscients, et de politiques et pratiques généralement adoptées sans tenir compte des caractéristiques des membres de groupes visés par l'interdiction de la discrimination. [Ed. note: citation from the Human Rights Tribunal]

 

[…]

 

[67] La preuve de discrimination systémique repose donc essentiellement sur un ensemble de faits tels que des politiques institutionnelles, des processus décisionnels, des comportements et des attitudes qui, souvent inconscients et anodins en apparence, produisent et maintiennent, lorsque conjugués les uns aux autres, des effets disproportionnés d'exclusion pour les membres de groupes visés par l'interdiction de la discrimination; malgré son utilité lorsqu'elle est disponible et pertinente, la preuve statistique n'est pas pour autant indispensable à sa démonstration."[24] [Ed. note: citation from the Court of Appeal]

 

[66]        In a text published by the Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne ("CODP") dated June 9, 2005, the following useful definition of systemic or institutional discrimination is given:

 

"La discrimination systémique ou institutionnelle découle de politiques pratiques et comportement qui font partie des structures sociales et administratives de l’organisation et dont l’ensemble crée ou perpétue une situation désavantageuses pour les personnes racialisées. Ces schèmes peuvent semblés neutres en apparence, mais ils n’ont pas moins un effet d’exclusion pour les intéressés. … La discrimination systémique ou institutionnelle est une barrière majeure pour les groupes racialisés particulièrement dans le contexte de l’emploi et dans le système d’éducation et de justice pénale. …"[25] (this Court's emphasis)

 

3-         How is Discrimination Established According to the Quebec Charter?

 

[67]        In Law  v. Canada (Ministre de l’emploi et de l’immigration)[26], the Supreme Court of Canada, while not creating strict criteria, established the following guidelines to determine whether there was discrimination under art. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter. This article is the counterpart to art. 10 , of the Quebec Charter. These are the stated guidelines:

 

"3)   Par conséquent, le tribunal ayant à se prononcer sur une allégation de discrimination fondée sur le par. 15(1) doit se poser trois grandes questions:

 

(A)   La loi contestée: a) établit-elle une distinction formelle entre le demandeur et d’autres personnes en raison d’une ou de plusieurs caractéristiques personnelles, ou b) omet-elle de tenir compte de la situation défavorisée dans laquelle le demandeur se trouve déjà dans la société canadienne, créant ainsi une différence de traitement réelle entre celui-ci et d’autres personnes en raison d’une ou de plusieurs caractéristiques personnelles?

 

(B)   Le demandeur fait-il l’objet d’une différence de traitement fondée sur un ou plusieurs des motifs énumérés ou des motifs analogues?

 

et

 

(C)   La différence de traitement est-elle discriminatoire en ce qu’elle impose un fardeau au demandeur ou le prive d’un avantage d’une manière qui dénote une application stéréotypée de présumées caractéristiques personnelles ou de groupe ou qui a par ailleurs pour effet de perpétuer ou de promouvoir l’opinion que l’individu touché est moins capable ou est moins digne d’être reconnu ou valorisé en tant qu’être humain ou que membre de la société canadienne, qui mérite le même intérêt, le même respect et la même considération?"[27]

 

[68]        For present purposes, the relevant provisions of the Quebec Charter[28] on discrimination are s 10, 16 and 20 which state the following:

 

"

10.  Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.

 

Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.

 

.

.

.

16.   No one may practise discrimination in respect of the hiring, apprenticeship, duration of the probationary period, vocational training, promotion, transfer, displacement, laying-off, suspension, dismissal or conditions of employment of a person or in the establishment of categories or classes of employment.

 

.

.

.

20.    A distinction, exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes or qualifications required for an employment, or justified by the charitable, philanthropic, religious, political or educational nature of a non-profit institution or of an institution devoted exclusively to the well-being of an ethnic group, is deemed non-discriminatory."

 

[69]        A breach of s. 10 , Quebec Charter is established when the plaintiff can show on the balance of probabilities, a case of prima facie discrimination resulting from: (1) a distinction, exclusion or preference, (2) based on one of the prohibited grounds, and (3) which compromises his right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights.^[29]

 

[70]        To constitute actionable discrimination, a plaintiff must prove s. 10 , Quebec Charter discrimination in relation to a right protected under another Charter article. In other words, s. 10 does not set out an autonomous right. The application of the rights enunciated in this section are accessory to and depend on the existence of another right or liberty guaranteed by the Quebec Charter. In this respect, it differs from the equality right set out in s. 15, Canadian Charter.[30]

 

[71]        To take the present case, if a prima facie case of discrimination is proven pursuant to s. 10 and 16 , Quebec Charter, the defendant then has the burden to prove that the measure was justified on the balance of probabilities[31], under s. 20 , Quebec Charter which allows "a distinction, exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes or qualifications required by the employment".

 

[72]        The Supreme Court of Canada adopted a three-step test in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU[32] [hereafter, the Meiorin case] for determining whether an employer has established, that a prima facie discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement:

 

"[…] An employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of probabilities:

 

(1)   that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;

 

(2)   that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and

 

(3)   that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.

 

This approach is premised on the need to develop standards that accommodate the potential contributions of all employees in so far as this can be done without undue hardship to the employer […]."[33]

 

[73]        However, in Quebec, according to the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal, only the first and third parts of the test in Meiorin apply pursuant to s. 20 , Quebec Charter:[34]

 

"[66] In Québec law, the evidence must show, more particularly, that:

 

(1) The standard was adopted for a purpose rationally related to the

performance of the work concerned;

 

(2) The standard is reasonably necessary to achieve that legitimate purpose in

that it is impossible for the employer to accommodate employees with the same

characteristics as the excluded person without incurring an excessive constraint.

 

[67] The Tribunal wishes to stress that these two requirements are the only ones applied in Québec law inasmuch as, since the legislative amendments to section 20 of the Charter, the subjective component of the justified occupational requirement defence has been eliminated."

 

[74]        This interpretation of s. 20 , Quebec Charter was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Gaz Métropolitain^[35]:

 

 "[…] l'élément subjectif de la méthode d’analyse de l'arrêt Meiorin, précité, c'est-à-dire la preuve que l'employeur « a adopté la norme particulière en croyant sincèrement qu’elle était nécessaire pour réaliser [l]e but légitime lié au travail » n'est plus pertinent dans les recours intentés en vertu de la Charte québécoise. En effet, depuis l’amendement apporté par le législateur en 1982, l'article  20 de la Charte québécoise a été modifié par le remplacement de l'expression « exigées de bonne foi pour un emploi » par « requises par un emploi ». Par ailleurs, il s'impose à l'évidence que si la mauvaise foi de l'employeur est établie par la preuve, on ne pourrait parler d'exigence professionnelle justifiée."

 

[75]        Therefore, according to the first part of the test in Meiorin, the employer must identify the purpose of the policy whereas under the third part of the test, the employer must show that the policy is reasonably necessary to attain this objective and that it is impossible to accommodate the plaintiff without subjecting the employer to undue hardship (sometimes called "excessive constraint").

 

 4-        Are the "Mécanismes d’intégration" of the Transition Committee - Discriminatory on the Basis of Race?

 

[76]        The "Mécanismes d’intégration" policy instituted the following selection process:

 

"Modalités d’affectation à un poste régulier 

 

1.    L’employé cadre occupant, autrement que de façon temporaire, un poste régulier et/ou permanent prévu au plan d’effectifs dans un service ayant des activités non touchées ou dans un poste non touché tels qu’identifiés par le Comité de transition est confirmé dans son poste. L’employé cadre ainsi confirmé ne peut soumettre sa candidature à un autre poste sauf si l’autre poste est de niveau supérieur au sien.

 

2.    Tous les postes de cadre supérieur seront comblés par appel de candidatures et le Comité de transition pourra publier son appel de candidatures simultanément à l’interne et à l’externe, s’il le juge à propos.

 

Tous les postes de directeur d’arrondissement seront comblés par un appel de candidatures à l’interne, et par la suite, à l’externe lorsqu’aucun candidat ne rencontre les qualifications du poste.

 

Dans tous les autres cas, après l’application du point 1 des modalités d’affectation, le processus d’intégration sera fait à l’interne et par la suite à l’externe lorsqu’aucun candidat ne rencontre pas les qualifications du poste.

 

3.    Sous réserve de ce qui précède, seule la candidature des employés cadres ou celle d’un employé non cadre occupant un poste cadre depuis au moins douze (12) mois au moment du dépôt de sa candidature sera considérée.

 

4.    Sous réserve des dispositions prévues au point 1, les employés cadres peuvent soumettre leur candidature à tous les postes cadres affichés pour lesquels ils répondent aux exigences. Cependant, un cadre ayant été nommé à un poste suite à un processus de sélection ne peut postuler ou maintenir sa candidature pour un autre poste pendant la période d’intégration.

 

5.    La dotation des postes cadres s’effectue normalement par strate ou niveau hiérarchique, et ce, par ordre décroissant.

 

6.    À l’exception des cas mentionnés au point 1, tous les postes sont comblés par mode d’affichage d’une durée de dix (10 jours ouvrables).

 

7.    Le poste est accordé au candidat qui répond le mieux, de l’avis du Comité de transition, aux exigences du poste et aux critères de sélection établis. À compétence égale, la priorité est donnée à l’employé de l’arrondissement ou du service dans lequel le poste doit être comblé.

 

8. Les modalités ou processus de présélection et de sélection peuvent varier en fonction notamment des niveaux de postes à être comblés."[36] (this Court’s emphasis)

 

[77]        For the "Mécanismes d’intégration" ("Mécanismes") selection process to constitute systemic discrimination vis-à-vis visible minorities a breach of, both s. 10 and 16 , Quebec Charter must be proven. As stated above, a breach of s. 10 , Quebec Charter is established when the plaintiff can show, on a balance of probabilities, a prima facie case of discrimination as a result of: (1) a distinction, exclusion or preference, (2) based on one of the prohibited grounds, and (3) which compromises his right to full and equal recognition and exercise of a human right.[37]

 

[78]        On its face, the "Mécanismes" does not purport to treat visible minorities differently nor does it exclude them directly from applying for management positions. The policy appears "race neutral", as it presents a selection process based on merit and competence.[38]

 

[79]          However, pursuant to eligibility criteria of the "Mécanismes", only civil servants who have worked as managers or who have the equivalent of 12 months of management experience as "fonction supérieure” can apply for these permanent management positions.

 

[80]        Since systemic discrimination can be difficult to prove directly, it can be shown using circumstantial evidence:

 

"La discrimination n'a pas à être directement prouvée, elle peut s'inférer des circonstances, à partir de présomptions suffisamment graves, précises et concordantes."[39]

 

Also, a defendant does not have to have acted intentionally in order for a plaintiff to establish a case of systemic discrimination.

 

[81]        The Court heard evidence from Ms. Josée Lapointe, who since June, 2011 was the "Directrice de la dotation, main-d’œuvre et de la rémunération des cadres" for the City.  In 2001, she was working in the Human Resources department for the City.

 

[82]        She testified that due to the immensity of the municipal merger project, regular staffing rules did not apply. However, she also indicated at the time of the merger in 2001 that the appearance of equity was important since the new City did not want to find itself with too many managers on the payroll. The Court deduces this was both an economic and staffing reason to limit the eligibility criteria to existing managers. However, it would not explain why persons holding management positions as "fonction supérieure" would also be permitted to apply.

 

[83]        The Court deduces that the extension of this criteria to those in "fonction supérieure" was because the City was pressed for time to have experienced persons fill the permanent management jobs and did not have time to train the inexperienced who might otherwise have excellent qualifications but lacked specific management experience.

 

[84]        She testified that the "Mécanismes" was in force throughout 2002 and for a short period thereafter.

 

(a)           Does the "Managers Only Need Apply" Eligibility Criterion Constitute Prima Facia Discrimination?

 

[85]        The Court determines that this criteria discriminated against Mr. Tanisma based on his race because there was a clear under-representation of members of visible minorities amongst City managers. This conclusion arises in part from the City’s own documents.

 

(i)        Existing Under-Representation of Visible Minorities in Management Positions

 

[86]        According to statistics reported by the City of Montreal’s 2000 Employment Equality Program, visible minorities were under-represented in the City’s management positions. Employees from cultural communities hold 5.8% of the City’s management positions[40] (visible minorities 2.2%, ethnic minorities 3.4% and aboriginal people 0.2%), although they represent 20% of people on the job market. As well, visible minorities are under-represented in director positions ("cadres de direction") where they hold only 3.3% of positions. The report also identifies a greater concentration of people from cultural communities in blue collar and white collar jobs, but an under-representation in permanent professional and management positions. These statistics present a crucial factor in evaluating the existence of under-representation of visible minorities and the general effects of systemic discrimination in hiring and promotion at the City of Montreal in 2001.[41]

 

[87]        In the present case, the City of Montreal’s 2000 Employment Equality report summarizes the reasons for the under-representation of minorities as follows:

 

"Cette absence est révélatrice de la difficulté des communautés culturelles à accéder aux emplois cadres contractuels et à obtenir des fonctions supérieures. Elle est aussi le résultat du  non-respect par les services de la directive relative au Programme d’accès à l’égalité qui exige d’afficher les postes contractuels pour les catégories de cadres et professionnels."[42]

 

[88]        In 1995, an administrative directive from the City specified two measures:

 

 a)        mandatory posting of all temporary management and professional positions; and

 

b)         hiring one member of a cultural group when at least three similar positions are being filled.[43]

 

[89]        The 2001 Program also confirms the 1995 Policy as follows: "Respect de la règle inscrite dans la directive relative à l’application du programme d’accès à l’égalité et concernant l’affichage obligatoire des emplois temporaires pour les catégories cadres et professionnels."[44]

 

[90]        These statistics in paragraph 86 hereof are critical in evaluating the existence of under-representation of visible minorities and the general effects of systemic discrimination in hiring and promotion at the City of Montreal in 2001.[45] They also corroborate the importance of job posting for temporary management positions.

 

(ii)       Objectives of City's Own Equality Program

 

[91]        These objectives were stated as:

 

"Un programme d’accès à l’égalité vise à assurer, aux groupes victimes de discrimination en raison de leur sexe, âge, origine ethnique ou nationale, d’un handicap ou de tout autre motif, des chances égales dans le domaine de l’emploi. Ces programmes ont pour principal objectif de corriger le traitement inégal qui se fonde sur des systèmes de pratiques, de valeurs ou de règles dont l’interaction complexe a pour effet de maintenir les membres de ces groupes dans une situation d’inégalité qui n’est pas nécessairement reliée à des comportements individuels intentionnels.

 

Ces programmes sont également un moyen de planification de gestion des ressources humaines qui vise à assurer à l’entreprise l’accès à un bassin de main-d’œuvre de plus en plus diversifiée et qualifiée."

 

[92]        In the same document, the City notes the following[46]:

 

".

 .

 .

(iv)       "Application de l’objectif du Programme"

 

"Nomination de membres des communautés culturelles et de femmes dans des emplois cadres, lorsqu’ils sont sous-représentés."

 

(v)        Promotion

 

 "Application d’un taux de nomination pouvant aller jusqu’à 50% pour les membres de communautés culturelles et les femmes dans les emplois de promotion ou ils sont sous représentés."

 

[93]         To paraphrase, since government is meant to be "for the people and of the people", for government to be "by the people", the ranks of its civil service should reflect the diversity of its population.

 

[94]        Furthermore, under the heading: "Mesures spécifiques de redressement visant à accélérer les résultats du programme de l’An 2001", the City states the following:

 

"Normalement, les objectifs quantitatifs établis dans le cadre du programme d’accès à l’égalité doivent également s’appliquer aux promotions, dans le respect des règles de la convention collective et des mesures spéciales mises en place par le Comité de transition. Un objectif de 50% au maximum devrait donc s’appliquer dans tous les cas où le comblement d’un poste temporaire ou permanent se fait à partir du bassin interne."

 

[95]        Finally under the heading "Les Résultats du Programme de 1991 à 2000 (Tableau V)", the City said:

 

"Bien que la Ville actuellement à la suite de la réalisation de l’analyse de disponibilité de main-d’œuvre, d’objectifs d’embauche par emploi, il demeure intéressant d’utiliser l’objectif global de 25% afin de comparer les résultats obtenus au cours des années d’application du programme.

 

.

.

.

 

La faiblesse relative des résultats de l’année 2000 s’explique par :

 

·         une diminution de la proportion des étudiants membres des communautés culturelles embauchés cette année;

·         une absence de membres des communautés culturelles dans les emplois de cols bleus non spécialisés;

·         une absence de membres des communautés culturelles dans les emplois cadres et professionnels temporaires." (this Court's emphasis)

 

[96]        An important question is whether this earlier evidence - which clearly shows deficiencies in the City's equal opportunity program - can be applicable to the merged City in 2002.

 

[97]        In the Bilan 2000, the City raises the following caveat:

 

"En effet, l’augmentation du nombre d’employés et le redéploiement de ceux-ci dans de nouvelles structures auront pour conséquence de rendre caduque toutes les analyses préalables à l’implantation d’un programme d’accès à l’égalité dans l’emploi. C’est donc dans un contexte totalement différent que s’appliquera la nouvelle Loi sur l’accès à l’égalité."[47]

 

[98]        It is legitimate to ask whether these admissions regarding under-representation in the former City of Montreal can apply to the merged City - and the specific facts of Mr. Tanisma’s complaint in 2002 - because of the new structures and increased number of employees.

 

[99]        The Court determines that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently "grave, précise et concordante" to find that existing systemic discrimination was not ameliorated in 2002.

 

[100]     Firstly, the City filed no evidence to the contrary for the year 2002. Secondly, Ms. Lapointe in testimony that was both balanced and candid, recognized that the new City could continue still to have a problem with the integration of visible minorities in management positions. However, she did testify that there was a culture of "continuous improvement" in the Human Resources department such that it would be unfair to compare the situation in 2002 to the situation that presently exists today.

 

[101]     However, the Court concludes that in late 2001 and 2002, it should have been clear to the responsible individuals in the merged City that to restrict eligibility criteria to "managers only" - or those in "fonction supérieure" for the previous twelve months - would have an unduly discriminatory effect on non-managers who were members of a visible minority.

 

[102]     Mr. Patry, "conseiller principal en ressources humaines: Service dotation et rémunération" who is presently one of Ms. Lapointe’s subordinates, noted that the City's largest pool to recruit for management positions were from the professionals group i.e. such as the urban planners of which Mr. Tanisma, Ms. DEF and Ms. ABC had formed part. At the same time, he noted that second generation immigrants whose parents had come from either Haïti or the Maghreb were good sources of employees for the City.

 

[103]     Having determined that the "managers only" criteria was prima facia discriminatory, the Court will now consider the application of the City’s defence under s. 20 , Quebec Charter: bona fide job requirement.

 

(b)        Whether a Defence Exists Under Art. 20 , Quebec Charter

 

[104]     The first part of the Meiorin test is met. Both the requirement to place existing management personnel in the merged City structure as well as the requirement to do so quickly without expanding great effort and time in training, are both rational and reasonable explanations for the "Managers Only Need Apply" criteria (including those in "fonction supérieure" management positions).

 

[105]     However, as explained earlier, the City must also meet the last of the Meiorin tests that:

 

"The standard is reasonably necessary to achieve that legitimate purpose in that it is impossible for the employer to accommodate employees with the same characteristics as the excluded person without incurring an excessive constraint."

 

[106]     To meet this test, the City needed to demonstrate such an impossibility (or "excessive constraint") - based upon eliminating this "Managers Only Need Apply" criteria - and allowing all professionals to apply, as an example.

 

[107]     In this regard, the City has failed to meet the burden of proof placed upon it. Not only was there a complete absence of any evidence regarding impossibility but equally importantly, the fact that Ms. DEF and Ms. ABC were able to carry out these "chef de division" jobs while themselves having similar qualifications to Mr. Tanisma, demonstrates that no exceptional additional training was probably required.

 

[108]     The Court emphasizes that it makes no finding that the City intended this "Managers Only Need Apply" criteria to eliminate opportunities for visible minorities and others. However, as noted earlier, intent is not necessary to find a breach under art. 49 , Quebec Charter so long as discrimination is shown.

 

 

[109]     At present, Ms. Lapointe pointed out that the City is seeking to use innovative programs to encourage greater participation of visible minorities in the City’s workforce. In a document entitled "Bilan 2008 - 2012, Accès à l’égalité à l’emploi", the report notes that of 201 "stagiaires" hired on by the City from September 2008 to March 2012, 153 were from visible minorities and ethnic groups and fully 100 of these "stagiaires" were subsequently employed by the City following their stage.

 

5-         Whether the "Fonction supérieure" Process is Discriminatory Under the Quebec Charter

 

[110]     A preliminary remark is in order. Paragraph 2 of "Modalités d’affectation à un poste régulier" of the "Mécanismes", required that where a management job was posted internally and no successful candidate was chosen, there was to be an external posting. There is no evidence of whether this external job posting ever took place. While an external posting would not have been of any assistance to Mr. Tanisma - an internal candidate - such an external posting would have made external candidates who were members of a visible minority, aware of these opportunities.

 

[111]     Now, to the issues at hand. The next two questions to be answered are:

 

a)         was the "fonction supérieure" process discriminatory:

 

(i)         as being contrary to the "Mécanismes"; or

 

(ii)        as being contrary to the equal access to employment program and the Quebec Charter?

 

(a)       Contrary to the "Mécanismes"?

 

[112]     In the heading, "Modalités d’affectation", reference is made to "postes réguliers".

 

[113]     The uncontradicted evidence of Ms. Lapointe is that "régulier" means permanent. Therefore, the "Modalités d’affectation" did not apply to temporary positions such as those created through the "fonction supérieure" process.

 

[114]     No evidence was provided to explain how, why, or when the specific permanent position that Mr. Tanisma applied for - "chef de division - urbanisme et Services aux entreprises" for the Côte-des-Neiges/Notre-Dame-de-Grâce borough - was converted to a "fonction supérieure". Accordingly, the Court cannot determine whether this was done with any discriminatory intent.

 

 

 

(b)       Contrary to the Program and the Quebec Charter?

 

[115]     At its most basic level, this "fonction supérieure" process was 100 percent exclusionary except for the one person who was inserted into the position. Accordingly, for all those persons who were excluded, this practice would appear to be "race neutral" since it excluded all but that one person.

 

[116]     However, this first impression is deceptive. In fact, the "fonction supérieure" process created systemic discrimination for visible minorities and was contrary to the City’s own Equality Program. That Program not only required transparency in job posting but it promoted affirmative action to allow members of the visible minorities to access management positions where they were under-represented.

 

[117]     Ms. Lapointe, presently in charge of the City’s staffing for managers, testified that now there is a mandatory requirement that all management positions, whether temporary or permanent, be posted even if the final power of selection remained in the boroughs for a borough position.

 

[118]     When asked about the "fonction supérieure" practice, Ms. Lapointe confirmed hat she is still confronted daily with this problematic - but well-rooted - practice. She recognized that eliminating this practice required "a major change in culture" for the City. She recognized as well the difficulty created for visible minorities when such a practice is followed.

 

[119]     As far as the situation of Ms. DEF being hired for a permanent position without any external posting and after simply completing a management aptitude test by an external firm, she had no explanation for how this occurred other than to say it "may be a local practice".

 

[120]     Ms. ABC explained herself the great value to the fortunate individual who was named to the "fonction supérieure" because this provided invaluable experience in management which was a very beneficial qualification when one applied later for a permanent management position.

 

[121]     Anecdotal evidence was provided by two professionals: one Mr. Tanisma himself and another, Mr. C. Duvivier. Their evidence showed just how valuable this "management" experience could be.

 

[122]     At the time of trial in 2012, Mr. Duvivier was 69 years of age. He was hired by the City in 1990. He started as a "conseiller en immobilier, Groupe 2" and he continues to hold that post today, although he has been for the last ten years at the top of his salary scale. During his employment, Mr. Duvivier has also been a union leader.

 

[123]     Mr. Duvivier holds a Masters in Economics degree. He also holds a Masters of Public Administration from UQAM obtained in 1994 and an MBA from McGill obtained in 2009. Forty percent for the cost for these latter two degrees was paid for by the City.

 

[124]     Mr. Duvivier, who is also Haitian-born, applied for management positions in the period 1990-2001. He testified that he was never accepted for such positions because he did not have any management experience. As recently as 2009, he indicated he applied for the position of "chef de division - Service aux aménagements et aux entreprises" in the Villeray borough. This borough has a sixty percent immigrant population which is why - according to Mr. Duvivier’s testimony - his own immigrant background would have been useful. Despite this, he said that he was not invited to an interview. According to the City, this was because he did not have management experience.

 

[125]     He further testified that despite his lengthy association with the City and in the City's unions, he does not know anyone from a visible minority who moved from the professional group to become a manager. His evidence in this regard is compelling since as a union leader, there were 130 professionals for whom he was responsible.

 

[126]     On cross-examination, he indicated that the posted requirements for the Villeray position were a B.A. and at least one year of management experience.

 

[127]     As for Mr. Tanisma, he testified that the four of his colleagues who became managers through the "fonction supérieure" process also had masters’ degrees like himself. In Mr. Tanisma’s specific case, the importance of management experience is demonstrated by the "Mécanismes" itself and specifically, the eligibility requirement that to apply for a management position, one either had to be a manager or be twelve months in a management function as a "fonction supérieure".

 

[128]     The Meiorin tests were not fulfilled by the City. The City lead no evidence as to the rational purpose of the practice nor any evidence of any excessive constraint i.e. why posting the position and allowing other urban planners to apply would have constituted an excessive constraint. The Court notes that even after Mr. Rainville was promoted again in December 2002, Ms. ABC herself used the "fonction supérieure" approach to have Mr. GHI promoted in or about December 2002 as "chef de division", after she left that specific job because of a promotion she received. Presumably, if there were excessive constraints, this evidence might have been introduced through her, but it was not.

 

[129]     On the basis of all the foregoing evidence, the Court determines that this practice of "fonction supérieure" constituted systemic discrimination against Mr. Tanisma as a member of a visible minority specifically as regards this position: "chef de division - urbanisme et Services aux entreprises dans les arrondissements" for the Côte-des-Neige/Notre-Dame-de-Grâce borough.

 

[130]     In conclusion, the Court determines that this practice constituted systemic discrimination in contravention of the Quebec Charter.

 

6-         Basis of Legal Liability

 

[131]     In the case of Gauvin et al v. Ville de Montréal[48], the Plaintiffs alleged:

 

a)         discrimination on the grounds that the "Programme de départ assisté" that was implemented by the "Comité de transition" in 2001and 2002 was discriminatory on the basis of gender; and

 

b)         alleged entitlement under art. 49 , Quebec Charter. Mr. Justice Jean-Pierre Senecal applied the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Beliveau St. Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employés de service public inc.[49] which confirmed that the Quebec Charter did not create a parallel system of compensation to the ordinary rules of civil law.

 

[132]     Mr. Justice Senécal also established that since the alleged Charter discrimination was based on conditions of employment, that it was in essence a contractual recourse. In his case, the specific conditions for employment were governed by a collective agreement.

 

[133]     In the present case, Mr. Tanisma’s application for a management position and the subsequent impugned events concerning how the temporary position was ultimately filled, are part of the larger employment relationship between himself and the City. Since he was an internal candidate, the alleged liability is of a contractual rather than delectual nature.[50]

 

7-         Recourses

 

(a)       Demand to Be Integrated Into Management

 

[134]     Mr. Tanisma has asked this Court to order the City to integrate him into a management position. Mr. Tanisma asked the Court to order that he be named to an unidentified management position "rétroactivement avec tous les droits, privilèges et avantages qu’il aurait obtenus n’eurent été les actes discriminatoires et illégaux commis à son égard".

 

[135]     Such an integration was ordered for one of the complainants in the Gaz Métropolitain[51] case: a Ms. Côté who had passed all the requirements for this position and was only stopped when the medical examination found out she was pregnant.

 

[136]     The Court of Appeal has noted the difficulties in implementing such orders many years after the impugned discrimination.[52]

 

[137]     For the reasons that follow, the Court does not believe that mandatory integration is an appropriate remedy here.

 

[138]     Firstly, while the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Tanisma is a highly experienced and capable urban planner, the Court is not the employer and cannot substitute itself for the employer to evaluate whether Mr. Tanisma should be awarded a management position ahead of other candidates, including other candidates from visible minorities.

 

[139]     Secondly, this difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that Mr. Tanisma makes no specific reference to a particular management position. Different positions will require different skills.

 

[140]     Thirdly, there was evidence that on-the-job administrative experience could be considered in certain circumstances to be the equivalent of management experience. However, the Plaintiff produced no evidence to prove such comparable experience. For example, in the two "projets particuliers de l’urbanisme du quartier" that he worked on - in the Maisonneuve borough and in the Pointe-aux-Trembles borough - the final documents show him in the role of co-ordinator but show other persons under the heading "superviseur administratif" and "Direction".

 

[141]     Fourthly, in view of the merger and demerger that the City has undergone, the Court has no evidence regarding its present structure to know where or when suitable management position availabilities for Mr. Tanisma could be procured.

 

[142]     Finally, the Plaintiff is currently on sick leave and there is no evidence of when he will be medically fit to return to work.

 

[143]     Accordingly, this aspect of the claim is not granted.

 

(b)       Material Damages

 

[144]     In his pleadings, Mr. Tanisma asks for an amount of $160,000.00 as compensation for lost income that he would have received had he been promoted back in 2002 to a management position as "chef de division".

 

[145]     However, he does not provide any evidence support for the type of salary that he would have received or the benefits.

 

[146]     From this Court’s perspective, Mr. Tanisma has not proven on the balance of probabilities the differential in salary. Moreover, the evidence of Ms. Lapointe was that the salary difference between a professional and a manager in 2002 could have been approximately $2,000.00 in terms of annual salary but that marginal benefits were similar.

 

[147]     However, the Civil Code of Quebec requires that Mr. Tanisma prove that his damages were certain.

 

[148]     It is the Court’s decision that in fact what Mr. Tanisma lost is not an actual management position but rather "a loss of opportunity" to obtain such a position. In Baudouin and Deslauriers[53], these authors note that the simple loss of opportunity can constitute a direct prejudice where, exceptionally, damages can be awarded. The authors cite the case of Soterm inc. v. Société du parc Industrielle et Portuaire de Bécancour[54], amongst others.

 

[149]     The Quebec Human Rights Tribunal in the Gaz Métropolitain[55] case awarded between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00 to a group of women complainants who were systemically discriminated against in various job test procedures. The Quebec Human Rights Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court of Canada case of Lawson v. Laferrière.[56] In the individual awards of $10,000.00, the Tribunal found that the women after completing the theoretical examination could not compete further because of their failure in the practical exam, which exam discriminated on the basis of gender.

 

[150]     This amount was upheld in appeal by the Court of Appeal.

 

[151]     The evidence in the present case demonstrates the high level of confidence and the commitment of Mr. Tanisma to the employer both with projects he performed in the context of his work and related but extra-curricular work concerning his own community.

 

[152]     In applying Laferrière v. Lawson elsewhere, the Court of Appeal has emphasized that even under the legal rubric of "loss of chance", that loss of chance must be proven to exist on the balance of probabilities.[57]

 

[153]     The following factors convince the Court that it is more probable than not that - absent the discrimination - Mr. Tanisma would have obtained a management position had he been given an opportunity to compete for the temporary position:

 

a)            the success of his four colleagues who were urban planners and became successful managers through the "fonction supérieure" practise;

 

b)            the fact that professionals formed the greatest pool of City employees for future managers; and

 

c)            the conscientiousness, intelligence and ability demonstrated in his pre-2002 written work filed into evidence.[58]

 

[154]     The evidence discloses that the professional group (which includes urban planners) is the most important source of new managers for the City. This is corroborated by the uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Tanisma that his four colleagues who were promoted into management through "fonction supérieure" all seemed to have had successful careers in management, of varying durations.

 

[155]     Accordingly, had Mr. Tanisma been given his opportunity in management, there is no reason to believe his experience would have been greatly different. This rationale supports a greater claim for damages under loss of chance.

 

[156]     There can be no certainty that Mr. Tanisma would necessarily have obtained a permanent management position if he had been provided with an interview, since no one was chosen for this permanent position. However, on the probability of his getting a temporary and later a permanent management position, the Court feels that the $10,000.00 amount is an appropriate compensation for his loss of opportunity resulting from prohibited discrimination.

 

(c)        Moral Damages

 

(i)         Applicable Law

 

[157]     The law in this area has been carefully analysed by Madam Justice Michèle Rivest in the original Gaz Metropolitain decision before the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal.[59]

 

[158]     Her findings on moral damages were not modified by the Court of Appeal.

 

[159]     Madam Justice Rivest refers to the case of Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd.[60]

 

[160]     That case confirms the principle that:

 

"The perpetrator of discrimination takes the victim as it finds them. If past traumatic experience makes a person more vulnerable to the effects of repeated instances of discrimination, it is a discriminator, not the victim, who must bear the compensatory burden."

 

[161]     That case involved an aboriginal woman who had been previously discriminated against and who faced further discrimination in a commercial shopping centre by the centre’s security staff. The Human Rights Tribunal found discrimination and awarded $15,000.00 in moral damages.

 

[162]     In the Gaz Métropolitain[61] case at first instance, one of the complainants, Ms. Côté, had successfully completed an initial interview and been told she "had what it took".  However, in her first year, she failed the theoretical test. She was encouraged to complete further training by the employer and to re-take the test. She participated in a pilot project and again failed the theoretical test - one year later. However, one year after that, she did complete the test successfully and but for a medical examination that had found her pregnant, she would have obtained the job.

 

[163]     She testified that the experience with her employer made her feel "completely demolished". She testified that going through this job testing process was "very discouraging" and she felt there was much deception despite the alleged "lip-service" being given to equal access to opportunity.[62]

 

[164]     She went on to indicate how difficult it was for a woman to be in this type of non-traditional employment. As Ms. Côté testified: "… tu fais un cours de monteur de lignes, où c’est que tu veux aller avec ça, là, à part à Hydro! …"[63]

 

[165]     In these circumstances of discrimination based on gender, Madam Justice Rivest awarded $20,000.00 moral damages to this particular complainant, an amount upheld in appeal.

 

[166]     The particular evidence regarding Mr. Tanisma has strong parallel to that of Ms. Côté.

 

[167]     Under cross-examination, he indicated that he was aware of four of his colleagues Ms. ABC and Ms. DEF, and Messrs. XYZ and MNO who in or around the same period were promoted to these management positions by way of "fonction supérieure". He noted that Ms. ABC had continued in management for approximately four to five years and he understood that Ms. DEF was still in management with the City.

 

[168]     Mr. Tanisma was a single father raising a son. He testified that this experience with his employer gave him the feeling that he was "worthless".

 

[169]     The Court observed Mr. Tanisma’s demeanour throughout the hearing. He spoke, looked and acted like a broken man. His testimony demonstrated that after giving loyal and devoted service to his employer, he felt that his loyalty had been betrayed by the employer.

 

[170]      The City made no attempt in cross-examination to diminish Mr. Tanisma’s qualifications other than to have him indicate that his last major project was the "Pointe-aux-Trembles Programme particulier d’urbanisme" in May 2001.

 

[171]     This was a year before Mr. Tanisma made his complaint to the HRC on May 14, 2002.[64]

 

[172]     Seeing his colleagues - with qualifications equivalent to his - succeed through the "fonction supérieure" process added “insult to injury” for Mr. Tanisma. It sapped his interest and motivation.

 

[173]     Ms. Deborah Donnelly, who has been Mr. Tanisma’s common law spouse since 2007 and who has known him since 2005 testified at trial.

 

[174]     Her testimony was given in a balanced and sincere fashion.

 

[175]     She testified that since 2007, she has noticed deterioration in Mr. Tanisma’s morale. He has become less and less motivated and, in the last two years, has had no energy.

 

[176]     Mr. Tanisma filed no medical evidence.

 

[177]     However, it is uncontradicted that Mr. Tanisma has been on medical leave from the City since January 2012 and was diagnosed with stenosis in July 2011. This is a condition involving a compression of the vertebrae in the neck that makes sitting difficult, including the type of sitting in front of a computer.

 

[178]     Since the time of the facts giving rise to this particular claim, Mr. Tanisma has had to confront numerous challenges both at work and elsewhere.

 

[179]     For example, the evidence discloses that after making his original complaint to the HRC and not receiving any report from them, he took mandamus proceedings against the HRC. The date of Mr. Tanisma’s original complaint was May 15, 2002 and the investigator’s "exposé factual" was dated July 28, 2005.[65] The HRC’s final report was dated January 20, 2006.[66] As a result of the mandamus proceeding, the Commission ruled that it was in a conflict of interest and exercised its discretion "de ne pas saisir un tribunal aux bénéfices du plaignant" in accordance with art. 84 , Quebec Charter.

 

[180]     The Court raises these matters simply to point out that the Plaintiff’s present demoralized condition may be caused by many stressful factors, some of  which are not appropriate considerations for the Court on the facts of the present case, including the stenosis.

 

[181]     That said, race and gender are two of the most important grounds for discrimination. This is not to diminish the importance of the other enumerated categories but rather to emphasize that in matters of race or gender, there is nothing that a human being can do to change their status: it is a fate of their birth.

 

[182]       Accordingly, discrimination on the basis of race and gender go to the very essence of a person’s being and constitute a direct attack on their self-worth. The influence that the present discrimination has had on Mr. Tanisma can be seen by the following citation from his original 2002 complaint to the Human Rights Commission which he wrote in the few months following his original employer’s email denying him an interview:

 

« Ces mécanismes d’embauche sélective sont des stratégies discriminatoires qui existent depuis des années à la ville et ont pour fin sinon de bannir les postes importants de cadres aux membres des minorités du moins à en restreindre leur accès à ces derniers. Les gestionnaires qui appliquent ces mécanismes le savent fort bien et aucune instance juridique jusqu’ici, n’a réussi à sévir contre leur abus et leur racisme latent, sournois et pernicieux pour les contraindre à changer ces pratiques.

 

Après 15 ans de services de professionnel occupant le poste de conseiller en aménagement urbain, je ne crois pas que l’objectif de carrière entrepris avec beaucoup d’intérêt, d’espoir et surtout d’enthousiasme puisse se réaliser. Trois administrations municipales n’ont pas réussi à prouver leur capacité et leur volonté à intégrer les minorités à des postes importants.

 

Personnellement, ma dignité humaine, mon honneur et la reconnaissance de mes compétences ont été carrément bafoués, pendant quinze ans, tout simplement parce que je suis visible.  Cela a beaucoup affecté ma santé même si entre-temps j’ai réussi à respecter avec beaucoup de succès mes engagements professionnels vis-à -vis mon employeur. J’ai toujours refusé de faire partie des « réseaux » pour obtenir des promotions, car ma compétence et mes autres qualités personnelles dans une société de droit et de respect, devraient à mon avis suffire."

 

[183]     The extent of the disappointment felt by Mr. Tanisma was heightened by the City’s purported commitment to equal opportunity through its Equality Program.

 

[184]     There are some important parallels between the present case and that of Ms. Côté in the Gaz Métropolitain case. Both cases involve two of the most important aspects of discrimination: race and gender. Both involve individuals who were exceptions in the roles they were undertaking. Both Mr. Tanisma and Ms. Côté made substantial efforts to improve their qualifications within their respective organisations and were initially motivated by a good faith belief that they would be treated fairly by their employers. Both had their confidence and faith in their respective employers undermined by discrimination.

 

[185]     The Court determines that the same amount of moral damages, as accorded to Ms. Côté in the Gaz Métropolitain case -  $20,000.00 - should be awarded on the evidence of the present case to Mr. Tanisma.

 

(d)       Punitive Damages: Whether the Plaintiff Has Proven Intentional Harm Under Art. 49 para. 2, Quebec Charter

 

[186]     The Plaintiff alleges the City was in bad faith.

 

[187]     For punitive damages to be awarded, the Plaintiff must prove that the interference with his Quebec Charter rights was both unlawful and intentional.

 

[188]     In the St.-Ferdinand case, the Supreme Court of Canada found that intentional interference may be proven in one of two ways:

 

a)            by a state of mind that implies a desire or intent by the person committing the acts (hereafter, the "impugned party") to cause the consequences of their wrongful acts; or

 

b)            when the impugned party acts with the full knowledge of the immediate and natural or at least extremely probable consequences that their conduct will cause.[67]

 

[189]     Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has underscored that intentional interference involves more than mere recklessness or simple negligence.[68]

 

[190]     In an article written before she was named to the Superior Court, Madam Justice Claude Dallaire summarized several methods for proving intentional interference:

 

a)            where there is an admission by the impugned party showing they understood the nature and the extent of their actions;

 

b)            where words expressed by the impugned party show vengeance;

 

c)            where subterfuge is proven;

 

d)            where there is an absence of explanation to justify conduct; or

 

e)            where the lack of credibility of the impugned party renders their explanations improbable.[69]

 

[191]     Following its review of the evidence, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving intent. The evidence of Mr. Rainville is limited to his written declaration to the HRC investigator, as well as the sworn testimony of Ms. DEF and Ms. ABC before this Court and Ms. ABC's unsworn declaration to the investigator.

 

[192]     The Court was given pause to reflect on the following elements:

 

a)            the successful persons - Ms. DEF and Ms. ABC - also belonged to an identified and under-represented group - women - and at the same time were experienced urban planners; and

 

b)            one of the senior managers, Mr. Rainville provided rational explanations for hiring Ms. Champagne because of her competence, such an uncontradicted explanation, in and of itself, raises a defence under art. 20, Quebec Charter against this allegation of intentional interference with human rights. At worst, even if the hiring managers showed favouritism, the evidence falls short of proving intentional discrimination on the basis of race.

 

[193]     Regarding her reasons for recommending Mr. GHI to replace her by way of "fonction supérieure", Ms. ABC gave the following reasons to the HRC investigator:

 

a)            he had worked with a private firm;

 

b)            his work in the permits’ department of another municipality;

 

c)            that he had executed several contracts involving urban planning;

 

d)            he had much technical experience;

 

e)            he was able to create consensus; as well as

 

f)             having 20 years of experience.

 

[194]     As for Mr. Rainville, he told the investigator that his reasons for choosing Ms. ABC were:

 

a)            her extensive knowledge;

 

b)            her competency as an urban planner in the development area;

 

c)            her managerial aptitudes both with regard to finances and material; and

 

d)            her capacity to direct people.

 

[195]     The Court determines that the City - through this evidence - has established a reasonable justification which can "faire obstacle à la preuve du caractère intentionnel de l’atteinte et mener au rejet de la réclamation en dommage exemplaire".[70]

 

[196]     At the same time, given the emphasis placed by the City on its equal opportunity program, the Court can presume that a senior manager such as Mr. Rainville had been made aware of this program by his employer. It cannot make such a presumption for Ms. ABC. However, even were the Court to find a constructive presumption in this regard, the actions by these two individuals could at best be considered reckless as to the consequences of not following job posting required by the City’s equal opportunity program. However, the Court does not feel it goes as far as the requirements established by the Supreme Court of Canada to prove intent.

 

[197]     Accordingly, no punitive damages are awarded.

 

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

 

[198]     ORDERS the City to pay to Mr. Tanisma damages of $30,000.00 with legal interest and indemnity, as provided by law, from the date of service of these proceedings;

 

[199]     ORDERS the City to ensure that all management positions are clearly and publicly posted appropriately for access both internally, and where appropriate externally, to ensure the widest exposure to potential candidates;

 

[200]     STRONGLY RECOMMENDS that upon Mr. Tanisma’s full time return to work with the City that he be given every reasonable opportunity within the confines of the law and the equal access to opportunity program of the City to obtain a management position;

 

[201]     STRONGLY RECOMMENDS that the City provides Mr. Tanisma with any available professional development courses to provide him with management skills that he otherwise could have developed over the years and thus put him in a position to regain his ability to compete for such management positions in the future, if he so wishes;

 

[202]     ALL WITH COSTS.

		(S) MARK G. PEACOCK, J.S.C. __________________________________
Me. Aymar Missakila
Attorney for Plaintiff
Me. Marie Noël Jacob from the office of Perrier Avocats
"Avocate conseil" for Plaintiff
Me. Gilles Dubé Me. Nicole Forget
DAGENAIS, GAGNIER, BIRON
Attorneys for Defendant
Dates of hearing:	October 24, 25 and 26, 2012