R. c. Edgar				2019 QCCQ 1328
COURT OF QUEBEC
Criminal & Penal Division
CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF			MONTREAL
N° :		500-01-176688-189
DATE :	March 12th 2019
______________________________________________________________________
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE D. GALIATSATOS, J.C.Q.
______________________________________________________________________
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Prosecution
v.
ROBERT MICHAEL EDGAR (also known as ROBIN EDGAR)
Accused
______________________________________________________________________
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

[1]           The accused is charged on a single count information under 145(3)(b) of the Criminal Code with having failed to comply with the condition of an undertaking on March 26^th 2018.

[2]           The condition, signed and accepted by the accused on February 19^th 2018, prohibited him from:

Communicating or attempting to communicate in any way with Susan Montgomery and her family.

[3]           The undertaking was imposed after the accused was arrested and charged in December of 2017 with having criminally harassed the complainant, by engaging in conduct that caused her to reasonably fear for her safety while knowing that she was harassed,[1] contrary to s. 264(1) C.C.[2]

[4]           On March 26^th 2018, Mrs. Montgomery was at City Hall, her place of work, in her capacity of city councillor. She was seated directly behind the mayor of Montreal during the question-period portion of a public City Council meeting. The accused attended said meeting for the purpose of addressing the Council about the complainant. Unbeknownst to him, alerted to his presence, Mrs. Montgomery removed herself from the room right before he entered since his presence made her anxious. Once at the podium, the accused proceeded to make various remarks about the complainant.

[5]           The issue in this case is whether or not those statements engaged the criminal liability of Robert Michael Edgar.

[6]           The outcome of this trial turns in large part on the interpretation of the above-mentioned condition. In particular, the primary issue is whether or not the exchange constituted a communication or an attempt to communicate with Mrs. Montgomery.

[7]           The case also rests on a careful assessment of the accused’s intent, since s. 145(3) C.C. is a full mens rea offence. This latter element requires the Court to assess the credibility and reliability of the accused’s account.

[8]           Essentially, the Crown argues that the accused used the question-period context as a guise to do precisely what he knew he was prohibited from doing, namely: communicate with the complainant to express his discontent about perceived injustices.

[9]           Conversely, the defence argues that Mr. Edgar was merely addressing the Council, not Mrs. Montgomery, which he was entitled to do. He adds that the undertaking’s conditions expressly allowed him to attend the meeting in question. In fact, he knew his conditions well and carefully tried to avoid breaching them. More fundamentally, he asserts that it is his basic right to denounce (publicly and to elected officials) what he perceives to be misconduct committed by a city councillor.

[10]        To be clear, this is not the trial of any alleged criminal harassment by the accused. It is not the trial of whether or not he committed defamatory libel towards the complainant.

[11]        Similarly, this is not the trial of whether or not Mrs. Montgomery acted inappropriately on March 18^th 2018, as alleged by the accused.

[12]        Finally, this is not the trial of whether or not Mrs. Montgomery, by merely being a parishioner of a given church (like any other citizen or worshipper), is somehow complicit in alleged decades of sexual abuse by clergymen.

[13]        All of those debates (including the latter that seems patently absurd on its face) are left for another forum, at another time.

[14]        Insofar as they were discussed in the evidence at trial, these incidents are only relevant to providing context to the charge at bar, which is straightforward: whether or not the accused communicated or attempted to communicate with the complainant on March 26^th 2018.

[15]        In assessing whether or not there was communication and for what purpose, the context within which it occurred is very important.[3]

FACTUAL OVERVIEW

1- The evidence of the prosecution

a)     The applicable undertaking on March 26^th 2018

[16]        The applicable undertaking was filed in evidence as exhibit P-1.

[17]        It was signed on February 19^th 2018, roughly one month before the alleged offence.

[18]        In addition to the communication prohibition, condition #4 of the undertaking reads as follows:

Abstain from being at the domicile, place of work and school of Susan Montgomery and her family, except for City Council meetings that are open to the public.

[19]        While the parties did not tender as evidence the previous version(s) of the undertaking, the testimony and submissions established that in their original form, as imposed by the arresting officers in December under ss. 498 and 503(2.1) C.C., the conditions had provided for a complete prohibition from being at the domicile, place of work or place of study of Mrs. Montgomery.

[20]        It appears that on February 19^th 2018, the Crown consented to a bail variation, effectively loosening said condition, thereby explicitly allowing the accused to attend City Council meetings.

b)     The testimony of Susan Montgomery

[21]        The complainant, Susan Montgomery, is the mayor of the Montreal-area boroughs of Côte-des-Neiges and Notre-Dame-de-Grâce.[4] In that capacity, she also serves as a city councillor on the Montreal City Council.

[22]        She explained that the accused has been protesting outside of the Unitarian Church (which she attends) for almost 20 years. His picket signs often named her specifically, defaming her by stating that she was complicit in a church cover-up of sexual abuse by the clergy.

[23]        She had seen him outside her church at least 100 times since 1998. The accused was there every Sunday.

[24]        In December of 2017, the accused was charged with criminally harassing her, pursuant to s. 264 of the Criminal Code.

[25]        The complainant acknowledges that on March 18^th 2018, she pushed his signs into the street with her foot. In voicing her exasperation, she expressed:

This is my church. Every Sunday, I have to pass by this man who has been harassing me for a good 20 years. And to be fair, I have lost patience.

[26]        In fact, she called the police on that day, but they did not intervene on the basis that the accused had not been violent. At the time, Mrs. Montgomery knew that the accused had conditions barring him from communicating with her. She also believed that he was prohibited from being at the church, though she later learned that the conditions had been revised, unbeknownst to her.

[27]        She explained that City Council meetings are generally open to the public on Mondays as of 1:00 pm, and that between 7:00 pm and 9:00 pm the Council takes questions from citizens. To participate, each citizen must arrive 45 minutes in advance and fill out a card identifying (1) his own name, (2) the topic that the question will cover and (3) to whom the question will be asked. A lottery then takes place in order to determine the order of the questions. The witness specified that typically, everyone who wishes to ask a question does get the opportunity to do so, even if that requires the Council to extend the question period.

[28]        During the meetings, the Council itself is projected on a television screen in the Grand Hall where the public gathers.

[29]        On March 26^th 2018, Mrs. Montgomery was present for the public Council meeting, for its entire duration. Her seat was directly behind that of the mayor of Montreal, Valérie Plante.

[30]        That same day, the accused attended City Hall and submitted a question card. It listed his name, indicated that his question would be directed to Mayor Plante, and identified the topic with one word: “Montgomery”.

[31]        When the complainant was alerted to Mr. Edgar’s presence and to the fact that he was about to ask a question, she physically withdrew from the room:[5]

When Mr. Edgar… he showed up quite often at City Council. I would leave the room. We have a little anti-chamber outside of the Council chamber so that we could still hear what’s happening, but we don’t see us.

[32]        In cross-examination, specified that she exited the room because she got nervous:

I mean, I just don’t know what this guy is going to do. He’s everywhere where I go… I see him all the time.

[33]        The complainant further specified that she had often withdrawn from the room in the past for the same reason, “so I wouldn’t have to look at him”, seeing that the accused was the next person to enter and ask questions.

[34]        She described the accused as being one of the regulars who often asks questions at City Council meetings, as he also did at Borough Council meetings. “He’s always at Council”, she explained.

c)     The video evidence from City Hall

[35]        A video recording of the question-period was filed as evidence, on consent of both parties.

[36]        When the accused arrived to the podium, the following words were uttered:

The accused:

Bonsoir, monsieur, euh… bonsoir madame la mairesse et les conseillers.

Avant de poser ma question, je veux juste commenter le professionnalisme et la courtoisie des agents du groupe d’intervention du SPVM qui m’ont arrêté pour harcèlement criminel de Sue Montgomery le 11 décembre dernier. Ils étaient très corrects avec moi, très polis, très respectueux et même gentils. Ils étaient des gentilshommes.

Alors, voilà.

Umm. Last Sunday, I was in the process of protesting outside the Unitarian Church of Montreal, against Unitarian Universalist clergy abuse and Unitarian Universalist cover-up and denial of clergy abuse, including the abusive misuse of Canada’s blasphemy law or anti-blasphemy law, seeking to silence me…

When I was very surprised to see your Deputy Mayor Sue Montgomery standing in front of me, about 10-15 feet away. I didn’t immediately recognize her, but when I saw her, you know, within a few minutes, I recognized her.

I’m under conditions not so speak directly with her… communicate directly with her. So I said nothing. She took out her cell phone, took a photograph, and then immediately made a phone call I believe to the police. She then proceeded to kick down all of my freestanding picket signs, including the picket sign that says “Unitarian Universalists misuse Canada’s blasphemy law to cover up pedophilia and rape”…

Moderator:

Mister? What would be your question, actually? Because we only have a minute and a half for your first question. Do you have a question for Mrs. Montgomery or anyone here?

The accused:

Well, my opinion is that this particular behaviour is unbecoming of any elected official. It’s an attack on my right to freedom of speech. It’s a great disrespect to the right to engage in peaceful public protest. It’s also an abuse and misuse of the SPVM… umm…

Moderator:

I just want to ask you to maybe go to the question.

The Accused:

I just want Valérie Plante’s opinion on this particular incident.

Valérie Plante, mayor of Montreal: [6]

J’aimerais vous rappeler, monsieur Edgar, que selon la Cour du Québec, vous ne pouvez pas vous adresser à madame Montgomery directement ou indirectement. Et par solidarité pour ma collègue, et pour l’intimidation que vous faites de façon systématique, je ne vais pas répondre : ni maintenant, ni jamais, à vos questions en lien avec madame Montgomery.

[applause by City Council]

Moderator:

Alors monsieur, si vous souhaitez poser une question à d’autres élus…

The Accused:

Yes, I think I will ask a follow-up question. Umm. I think I’ll ask Lionel Perez a follow-up question. Mr. Perez, I believe you’re concerned about ethics and the code of ethics, that elected officials are held to. Do you believe that this kind of behaviour that I have described - specifically an elected official coming to a peaceful public protest and kicking down picket signs, repeatedly throwing them into the street, and then calling the police to try and get a person arrested for alleged breaking of conditions when in fact this elected official is actually provoking the person seeking to get a reaction out of them - umm, what is your opinion on this regarding ethics?

Lionel Perez, city councillor:

I’m not gonna pass judgment on an event that may have occurred which I did not witness. And I will perhaps suggest that you stop using and instrumentalizing this institution to address specific issues with one elected official.

[applause by City Council]

2- The evidence of the defence

[37]        The accused testified in his defence.

[38]        He claims that he “very rarely” attends City Council and Borough Council meetings.

[39]        In fact, he had never been to any NDG Borough Council meeting before being arrested for criminal harassment. He only started going after his bail conditions were modified in such a manner to a allow him to attend public council meetings.

[40]        However, as for question-period at City Hall, he acknowledges that he has been a regular since 2013-2014, having started attending during the Coderre administration. Moreover, he rarely attended Council meetings without asking questions.

[41]        The accused explains that when he was arrested for criminal harassment of Mrs. Montgomery, he was “pretty well forced to sign conditions”; if he refused to sign, he would go to jail, “so he signed them”.

[42]        In their original form, the conditions of his undertaking prohibited him from communicating with the complainant. Moreover, “interestingly enough”, he was also barred from attending the Unitarian Church of Montreal and City Council meetings.

[43]        These conditions were concerning to the accused. In fact, even before signing them, he complained to the investigator in charge of the file and expressed that he was not happy about them.

[44]        He added that:

The condition which named the Unitarian Church of Montreal, obviously in my view prevented me from continuing my protest against clergy abuse and the cover-up and denial of clergy abuse, outside of the church. I felt that this was a suppression of my Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ right to freedom of expression and more specifically, to engage in peaceful and public protest.

And the other condition, in terms of the original conditions… it seemed to prohibit me from going to City Council meetings and asking questions of any kind. In other words, I basically couldn’t go to City Council meetings and ask questions that had nothing to do with Sue Montgomery and so on.

[emphasis added]

[45]        Eventually, on February 19^th 2018, his lawyer managed to have the conditions modified. The prohibition from attending the Unitarian Church was removed, allowing him to resume his protest in front of the church, “which was very important to him”. The conditions were also, explicitly providing that he could attend City Council meetings that were open to the public, including question-period.

[46]        According to his understanding, he had a right to attend the meetings and ask questions. He added:

Obviously, I had to avoid questions that were “direct questions” to Sue Montgomery and, you know, also perhaps avoid “indirect communications”.

Umm, I would like to say that my understanding of “indirect communication”, based on advice that I had from a variety of people, is that it’s quite narrowly defined in the law. And that essentially, “indirect communication” basically means that I have to tell another person to give a message to another person. That’s my understanding of it.

If my understanding is not correct, but that’s my understanding of it: it’s quite narrowly defined.

Also for instance: the “indirect communication” provision, as I understand it, doesn’t prevent me from talking to the media, if the media asks me questions and I answer those questions, and those answers are published in newspapers or on TV or whatever, and Sue Montgomery reads the report or sees on the news, that that’s not considered to be “indirect communication”.

That’s my understanding of “indirect communication”. It’s very narrow. Not a broad definition of any kind.

[47]        On March 26^th 2018, his purpose in attending City Council was to bring Mrs. Montgomery’s behaviour to the attention of Mayor Plante and the whole Council. According to the accused, 8 days earlier, the complainant had inappropriately confronted him during his protest outside of the church. She photographed him, called the police and tried to have him arrested without valid reason. Finally, she threw his picket signs into the bicycle lane and into the street in an attempt to provoke him to breach his conditions.

[48]        According to the accused, his question was “absolutely for [mayor] Valérie Plante, not Sue Montgomery since I knew I could not communicate directly with Sue Montgomery”.

[49]        He testified that the incident of March 18^th should be of concern to the mayor and to other politicians. The accused described it as an abuse of her power as a borough mayor and as a city councillor.

[50]        When he entered the Council chamber, he first gave his prelude to his question and then sought Mayor Plante’s opinion.

[51]        In examination in chief, he stated that “as the video shows”, Sue Montgomery was not in her seat, adding that “I had no reason to believe that she was even in the room”.

[52]        The accused explained in his testimony the importance of the public question-period: “It’s an opportunity for Montreal citizens to come and ask their politicians questions about very public matters. You’re not just asking a question to the particular politician, but that question is put out to the whole public, and to every single city councillor in that room; they all hear the question; they all know what the question is about”.

[53]        In his view, he was well within his rights to ask the question.

[54]        Mr. Edgar also acknowledged that the public in the Grand Hall also watches the developments inside the Chamber on closed-circuit television. In cross-examination, he described it as a “big screen”.

[55]        When asked by his own attorney if he had seen the complainant at any point that evening, the accused answered that he did not recall. He acknowledged that it was possible that he had. Immediately after making that concession, he quickly added:

But I would only say that I had every right to be there, based on the reduction of the conditions.

Even if I saw Sue Montgomery, in either the Hall of Honor or even in the Council chambers, the conditions were such that it said clearly that I could go to public meetings of City Council… Like any citizen, in my view, I had every right to ask questions at Montreal City Council. The only thing I could not do is ask Sue Montgomery questions.

[56]        In cross-examination, he claims not to have checked to see if Mrs. Montgomery was at her seat before entering the chamber to ask his question. Once he entered the room, he does not remember whether or not he saw her, adding that it is not clear in his memory, in addition to having imperfect vision. Thus, she might have been there and he might just not have seen her. He made no attempts to ensure that she was absent, reiterating that he was entitled to ask a question about her.

[57]        He added: “as I said before, even if she was [present], I believe that I was within my rights to be there and to ask a question”.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[58]        On behalf of the Crown, M^e Allard submits that the accused willingly “played with fire” by presenting himself to the microphone at question-period and making the statements that he did, despite being aware of the communication prohibition. He points to the fact that the accused made no attempt to even verify if Mrs. Montgomery was in the room (at her Council seat) when he addressed the Council as a whole, which the complainant was a part of. This, according to the Crown, shows a clear lack of intent to respect his condition, contrary to what the accused asserts in his testimony.

[59]        Furthermore, the Crown asks the Court to espouse an interpretation of “communicate” that includes any sharing of information, as inspired by the Latin origin of the word.

[60]        Ultimately, counsel asks me to conclude that the accused’s intent was to express to the complainant how unhappy he was about how she had treated him, knowing she was there and knowing she would hear it.

[61]        On behalf of Mr. Edgar, M^e Trevick argues that there was no communication, either direct or indirect. In his submission, the term “communication” connotes conveying information or a message to someone.

[62]        He adds that there was no message conveyed and no information was intended to Mrs. Montgomery. In fact, she already had the information mentioned by the accused, since she had been present when the March 18^th incidents occurred.

[63]        As for the fact that he addressed the entire Council in his opening remarks, the defence submits that it was merely a polite and generic greeting.

[64]        Ultimately, the questions were not directed at the complainant. In that sense, it is not different from him making other statements about her in public, which he is undoubtedly allowed to do. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that the accused even knew she was there. Finally, he reminds that the undertaking’s conditions had expressly been modified for the purpose of allowing him to attend the meeting in question. He was in good faith and did not intend to breach the condition.

[65]        He specifies that the undertaking did not contain any proximity restriction and even if there was “communication”, it was at best accidental and incidental.

[66]        In the circumstances, it was both legitimate and appropriate for him to want to address City Council in order to denounce was he perceived as improper conduct by a borough mayor.

[67]        Parenthetically, he argues that “things changed” when the complainant was elected as mayor. Since she became a public official, she should expect to be subjected to more scrutiny, whether it is pleasant or not.

[68]        Neither party submitted any caselaw in support of its position.

THE LAW

1- The premise that the conditions were applicable and valid

a)     No collateral attack on the court order

[69]        Both parties agree that the undertaking was in good standing on March 26^th 2018.

[70]        To state the obvious, at this stage, the Court must take the conditions of the undertaking as it finds them.

[71]        I mention this from the outset because various statements made by the accused in his testimony hinted towards a clear resentment towards his conditions. If fact, he expressed that he begrudgingly signed them in order to avoid being brought to court in custody.

[72]        Be that as it may, he signed them.

[73]        Ultimately, as the Quebec Court of Appeal reiterated in the cases of R. v. Gaudreault[7] and R. c. Boumachra,[8] it is trite law that court orders (such as bail conditions) must be scrupulously respected unless and until they are cancelled or replaced. The accused must comply with conditions, even if the underlying charges ultimately fall apart and even if he strongly disagrees with them.

[74]        More generally, these cases are an illustration of the well-established rule prohibiting collateral attack of court orders. The rule, which has been consistently applied by every appellate court across the country,[9] was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Bird.[10] In fact, the Court stressed that an accused cannot defend a breach by asserting that the condition violated his Charter rights.

[75]        In R. v. Domm, Doherty J.A. had similarly expressed that giving a constitutional flavour to a collateral attack did not displace the rule: “even [court] orders that are constitutionally unsound must be complied with unless set aside in a proceeding taken for that purpose”.[11] In that case, the accused evidently disagreed with the court order, believing that it infringed his right to freedom of expression. In R. v. Krawczyk, the British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed a similar defence in a case where a prominent protester argued that the court order conflicted with her freedom of expression.[12]

[76]        McLachlin J. (as she then was) said it best in Canada v. Taylor, in which she aptly expressed:

… if people are free to ignore court orders because they believe that their foundation is unconstitutional, anarchy cannot be far behind. The citizens’ safeguard is in seeking to have illegal orders set aside through the legal process, not in disobeying them.[13]

[77]        Similarly, in addition to court orders, as pointed out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Oliveira, the rule against collateral attack also applies to the presumed validity of an undertaking issued by a police officer.[14]

[78]        In addition to the foregoing, I must consider the impugned condition in its context, taking into account the other conditions as a whole. As such, as correctly pointed out by the accused and by defence counsel, said conditions were specifically modified on February 19^th 2018 in order to allow the accused to attend “city council meetings that are open to the public”.[15]

[79]        Although it seems incongruous and incomprehensible to the Court that the prosecution would consent to modifying bail conditions in order to explicitly allow an accused, charged with criminal harassment, to attend the place of work of a frightened complainant,[16] that is the situation created by the February 19^th 2018 amendment to the undertaking.

[80]        As such, Mr. Edgar was allowed to attend City Hall for City Council meetings.

b)     The fact that Susan Montgomery is a public figure

[81]        As mentioned above, one of the main issues in this case is whether or not the exchange of March 26^th 2018 amounted to communication or an attempt to communicate with Susan Montgomery.

[82]        If there was an attempt to communicate (which will be addressed below), the nature of said communication is not relevant. Nor is the underlying motivation of the accused in wanting to so communicate with the prohibited recipient.

[83]        I mention this because in the course of the submissions, defence counsel stressed that as public figures, elected officials should expect to be subject to scrutiny and criticism in the public sphere, especially from their own constituents.

[84]        Such an assertion is patently correct. It is obvious and was not seriously disputed by the Crown.

[85]        However, with great respect, it is entirely beside the point.

[86]        While they do face increased scrutiny, and rightfully so, elected officials in no way forfeit their right to be protected by the law, or their right to be free from assaultive or harassing behaviour. They do not relinquish their right to be victims. No public official abandons these basic protections, no matter how public her position is. To suggest otherwise would amount to declaring open season on politicians.^[17] The electorate does not expect such a sacrifice from its municipal councillors. The Constitution certainly does not require it.

[87]        Assuming - as I must at this juncture - that the condition was valid, it applied, no matter what type of message is communicated to the complainant and no matter what the purpose was.

[88]        No extrinsic mala fides is required by s. 145(3)(b) C.C. The offence is not restricted to negative, insulting, threatening, harassing or illegitimate communication. Any and all communication is barred.

[89]        In fact, it is not uncommon in domestic matters for accused to breach bail conditions by communicating with the complainant simply to express their love, affection, remorse, or some other seemingly positive message. Or to alert them that they forgot their headlights on. Those are all still breaches.

[90]        At the other end of the spectrum are accused who breach bail conditions by communicating with complaints in order to threaten or insult them.

[91]        The law does not distinguish the two: both are violations of a communication prohibition.

2- General principles regarding the burden of proof and the finding of facts

[92]        As both parties acknowledged in their submissions, there are no “conflicting” versions per se, with respect to the events of March 26^th 2018.

[93]        However, as mentioned above, there is independent evidence in the case at bar, in the form of the video recording of the session during which the accused made the litigious statements. The video is an objective and reliable silent witness.

[94]        Thus, while the accused is the only one to have offered an account explaining his actions, this in no way shelters his testimony from scrutiny. After all, there may be inherent frailties within his own account, considered in light of the video footage, that affect its credibility as to what his true intentions were.

[95]        It is trite law that Mr. Edgar, like every other person charged with a crime, is presumed to be innocent, unless and until the Crown has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown bears the burden of proof throughout the entire trial, from beginning to end. The accused does not have to present evidence or prove anything. Moreover, it is not enough for the Court to believe that he is probably or likely guilty.

[96]        Conversely, proof establishing absolute certainty is not required of the Crown, nor may the doubt be imaginary, frivolous or irrational.[18] Such a burden would be nearly impossible to meet. Nevertheless, the reasonable doubt standard falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities.[19]

[97]        Reasonable doubt must stem from reason and common sense and is logically connected to the evidence or lack thereof. It cannot be based upon sympathy, pity or prejudice.[20] Finally, it cannot be grounded in hypotheticals, speculation or fanciful conjecture.[21]

[98]        At all stages of its analysis, the Court must consider the evidence as a whole. The evidence must not to be compartmentalized in watertight partitions or be assessed in a piecemeal fashion.

[99]        The Crown need not prove all of the facts in its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown is required only to prove the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

[100]     Here, credibility and reliability are important, insofar as the accused denied any intent to breach his conditions and testified at length regarding his understanding of their scope. Although both concepts are often intertwined to a certain extent, they do remain fundamentally different. Credibility relates to the witness himself and to his truthfulness, veracity and integrity, while reliability relates to the accuracy and quality of his account.[22]

[101]     In its assessment, the Court may accept all, part or none of a witness’s testimony.[23]

[102]     After all, reasonable doubt may arise from the prosecution’s evidence.[24]

[103]     Finally, because there are no conflicting versions between the accused and the complainant, the R. v. W.(D.)[25] analysis does not apply per se.[26] Nevertheless, I have instructed myself to apply its spirit and underlying principles in my assessment of the evidence.

[104]     These basic rules all flow from the elementary principle of the presumption of innocence in criminal matters.

3- The essential elements of failure to comply with an undertaking: s. 145(3) C.C.

a)     The actus reus and mens rea of the offence

[105]     Undertakings for release require strict compliance and an accused person must vigilantly adhere to the conditions.

[106]     The actus reus for s. 145(3) C.C. is straightforward: the commission of an act which is prohibited by the undertaking. In the case at bar, it depends entirely on the interpretation to be given to “communicate or attempt to communicate” in Mr. Edgar’s conditions. That issue will be canvassed below.

[107]     As for the mens rea for the offence of failure to comply, a significant body of caselaw had developed over the years. There seems to be some disagreement among the authorities as to the type of intent required, in particular: whether the fault element is subjective or objective.[27]

[108]     Most cases hold that the mens rea is subjective.[28] It is concerned with the accused’s actual intent and his appreciation of the circumstances, as opposed to those of the reasonable person.

[109]     As described by Steel J.A. in R. v. Custance, the mental element consists of the accused having voluntarily performed the act which constitutes the actus reus.[29] Even if it is a “full mens rea” offence requiring subjective intent, the Crown need not prove that the accused intended to breach his undertaking, rather, only that he intended to commit the actus reus.[30]

[110]     It addition to actual intent, the doctrines of wilful blindness and recklessness apply fully.

[111]     In other words, if an accused sees the risk and nonetheless takes the chance, this will fulfill the mens rea requirement. This was held in the leading case of R. v. Custance[31] and recently adopted in Quebec by the Superior Court in R. c. Lemay.[32]

[112]     Unlike the prevailing view, in a recent decision rendered by a five-member panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal earlier this year, in R. v. Zora, that Court adopted a different position and held that the mens rea is objective. Writing for the majority, Stromberg-Stein J.A. reasoned as follows:

In my view, the duty-based nature of s. 145(3), combined with the risk-based nature of bail provisions, support Parliament’s intention for the application of an objective fault standard. This is consistent with the plain language, context and purpose of the offence. An objective fault standard requires proof of a marked departure from what a reasonable person in the same situation would do. If there is a reasonable doubt that a reasonably prudent person would not have foreseen or appreciated the risk or could have done something to prevent the breach, an acquittal must follow. This is sufficient to ensure only the morally blameworthy will be convicted.[33]

[113]     Ultimately, the objective vs. subjective debate need not be decided in the case at bar, for factual reasons explained below.

[114]     In any event, I am bound by the precedents of the Quebec Superior Court. In R. c. Lemay, David J. held that s. 145(3) C.C. is a “full mens rea offence”, requiring subjective intent. That settles the state of the law in Quebec, unless and until our Court of Appeal says otherwise.[34]

[115]     For these reasons, I will adopt the majority approach and apply a subjective mens rea to the offence.

[116]     In most cases, direct evidence of intent is difficult to obtain. Typically, the Crown asks the Court to infer intent from the accused’s conduct and the context.[35]

[117]     But what happens if the accused claims to have misinterpreted the condition?

[118]     In R. v. Whelan, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that a misunderstanding of the meaning of a court order affords no defence to an accused in a prosecution for failure to comply.

[119]     The accused in that case knew of the condition, but had acted on his lawyer’s [faulty] legal advice[36] and argued that he was thus unaware that his behaviour was unlawful. In dismissing his argument, the Court explained:

If a court were to accept this argument, however, a mistake of law would constitute a valid defence and accuseds would have to know that the act they were committing was unlawful in order for the Crown to obtain a conviction. This argument displaces the mental element of the offence, suggesting that it should relate to the legality of the act and not to the act itself.[37]

[…]

The respondent’s actions were undertaken, not on any misapprehension as to the facts [i.e. what behaviour he engaged in], but rather on his lawyer’s opinion as to what the order of O’Regan J. meant. That reliance did not afford him a valid defence.[38]

[120]     Where an accused operates on a personal belief that his condition allows him to behave in a certain way, that does not constitute a valid defence. The Crown need not prove that the accused knows the illegality of his conduct.[39]

[121]     A classic example of the principle was illustrated in the recent case of R. v. Allaby. In that matter, the accused was charged with breach of probation and s. 161 C.C. prohibition orders. As a result of various sexual convictions, he had a lifetime prohibition from attending specified areas in which children were present or reasonably expected to be present. In particular, he was barred from attending “community centres”. Yet, on a daily basis, the accused went to a downtown Regina public library over a 2-month period. Children of all ages frequented the library. The accused testified that he did not believe the library constituted a “community centre” for the purpose of the prohibition orders. As he understood his conditions, he was allowed to be at the library.

[122]     Alas, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal disagreed with him and ruled that the library was in fact a “community centre”.[40] As for the requisite intent, the accused’s mistaken understanding that the library was not a community centre was not a defence:

Mr. Allaby was not mistaken about what he had done. He was clearly aware that he was bound by two court orders that prohibited him from attending a community centre where children under 16 years and 14 years of age respectively were either present or could reasonably be expected to be present. He deliberately chose to go to the RPL. On the evidence presented at trial, Mr. Allaby was mistaken about the ambit of the term “community centre” and the legal consequences of his actions. Such a mistake was one of law and could not operate as a defence and negate his intention to commit the offences save in the case of officially induced error. The trial judge erred in determining that his mistake was a defence given the evidence before him.[41]

[123]     The Manitoba Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion in R. v. Custance. In that case, the accused clearly knew of the conditions of his recognizance, one of which ordered him to reside at a specified apartment. The accused “truly believed” that he could still comply with the condition by sleeping in a car in the building’s parking lot. The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the misunderstanding amounted to a mistake of law, which is not a defence. He was merely mistaken about the legal consequences of his voluntary actions.[42]

[124]     Thus, the issue of the accused’s understanding of the scope of “communicate” is not relevant. What is clear is that Mr. Edgar’s actions were not undertaken based on any misapprehension of facts. Quite the contrary, he knew exactly what he was doing and intended to do so:

-   He went to City Hall;

-   He filled out a question card, in which he identified “Montgomery” as the topic;

-   He announced that he would address his question to Mayor Plante;

-   He participated in the lottery and waited his turn;

-   He made his way up to the microphone;

-   He willingly, and in premeditated fashion, made his speech and asked his questions.

[125]     His intent will be discussed below with the Court’s findings of fact.

[126]     If the Court concludes that he did in fact communicate or attempt to communicate by acting as he did, and that he intended to so act, it does not constitute a defence for him to assert that “he did not think this amounted to communication” in criminal law.

[127]     Finally, the mens rea of the offence does not require proof that by communicating, the accused would, to his knowledge, cause Mrs. Montgomery fear or even upset.[43]

[128]     If the Crown succeeds in proving the breach beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden then shifts to the accused to establish, on a balance of probabilities,[44] a reasonable excuse.

b)     The meaning of “communicating or attempting to communicate”

[129]     A determination of this matter requires a careful consideration of its factual context.

i) The proper approach to interpreting the condition

[130]     In R. v. C.D.C., Gorman J. suggested that any interpretation of “communication” must commence with a consideration of the purpose that it serves in the context of the undertaking.[45]

[131]     I agree that the fundamental purpose behind the bail system should inform the interpretation of the condition.

[132]     Otherwise stated, what is the whole point of imposing such conditions in an undertaking or recognizance? Generally, the purpose of bail conditions is to mitigate the risks of releasing an accused person into the community by imposing a minimum uniform standard of conduct having regard to societal interests rather than personal standards of conduct.[46]

[133]     It seems obvious that communication prohibitions are designed to protect certain individuals from an accused and to provide complainants with some assurance or confidence that they do not have to be fearful or concerned about the accused contacting them.

[134]     On that point, I agree with Watson J.A.’s description in R. v. Lofstrom:

The object of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code - namely s. 145(3) and s. 515 - are plainly to provide an enforceable means for a Court to supplement the entitlement of anyone to go about their lives being entitled to be left alone by another person particularly where that other person’s proximity frightens or concerns them.[47]

[emphasis added]

[135]     While those remarks refer to proximity in the context of a non-contact order, the principles therein apply just as forcefully in the context of a non-communication order.

[136]     Similar remarks were echoed by Gorman J. in R. v. C.D.C., albeit in the context of a probation order, which is different:

… such a condition is designed, in part, to provide a victim with protection and peace of mind. It is important that we not forget that even the slightest contact by an offender with his or her victim after an offence has been committed can be a deeply disturbing, troubling and intimidating occurrence for some victims of crime. Thus, these words must be given a meaning which promotes the purpose of placing them in such orders. They must not be interpreted in a manner which would render them meaningless.[48]

[emphasis added]

[137]     Finally, in R. v. Nowack, Greene J. suggested that a strict construction of bail conditions is appropriate, as is the case for statutes, since the accused faces criminal liability. As such, any ambiguity must be resolved by favouring the defence. She added however that the “spirit and purpose” of the bail condition must also be taken into account. In particular, where a strict interpretation of a bail condition would serve only to frustrate the purpose of the bail, then despite the potential for penal consequences, the purpose behind the inclusion of the condition should override.[49]

[138]     Let us recall here: Mrs. Montgomery had to get up and leave the room due to her fear of the accused. That should not be underestimated. Luckily, a great majority of citizens will never have to experience such an ordeal, namely to have to get up and leave from your workplace, due to a man that constantly follows you. No citizen ever should.

[139]     The very purpose of the bail condition was to provide her with some measure or reprieve, peace of mind and psychological protection, as she awaits the trial in the predicate criminal harassment charge against a man who has allegedly followed her around for 20 years.

[140]     In the circumstances, while I am careful not to read “communicate” in an overbroad manner, I also am not inclined to interpret it in a way that expressly frustrates the reason it was included.

ii)    Caselaw having interpreted the scope of “communication”

[141]     Obviously, mere presence at a place does not constitute communication. Even visual presence (standing alone) will not be enough. If it was, merely passing each other on a sidewalk or being present in a restaurant in view of each other would attract penal consequences, which is not what Parliament intended. Taken one step further, merely staring at someone - without more - cannot be a breach of a communication order either.[50]

[142]     Instead, there must be some form of interaction or attempt to interact.[51]

[143]     There is however a spectrum of conduct that qualifies as communication. It will not always require “person A” uttering words directly to “person B”, face-to-face.

[144]     The assessment will always be fact specific and context-driven.

[145]     The leading authority is R. v. Legere. In that case before the Ontario Court of Appeal, the parties both agreed that the word “communicating” should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. The Court adopted the following non-exhaustive propositions:

ü  “Communicate” can be: to impart, transmit information.

ü  “Communicating” contemplates an exchange of information between persons, whether it be oral or otherwise.

ü  Mutuality implicit in an exchange of information is not always required. However, there must be some imparting of information from one to another.

ü  “Communicating” involves the passing of thoughts, ideas, words or information from one person to another.

ü  “Communicating” can occur by acts or gestures as well as by words.

ü  “Communication” is different from mere “contact”.[52]

[146]     The concept of communication has been interpreted widely by the Courts.

[147]     In particular, I find De Filippis J.’s analysis in R. v. Wittekind insightful and persuasive. In that case, given the specific circumstances, the Court concluded that taking pictures of the complainants constituted communication.

[148]     The accused was originally charged with criminal harassment of her neighbours that walked their dogs in the same park, in an affluent Toronto neighbourhood where she herself lived. She had constantly followed them, asked them personal questions and refused to “give them space”. When they asked her for more privacy due to her being too personally intrusive, the accused had increased her unwanted activities. After being charged under s. 264 C.C., she was released on an undertaking to not communicate with the two complainants.

[149]     One year later, the accused took several photographs of the complainants walking their dogs. The complainants testified that the accused’s conduct made them feel uncomfortable and worried. They reacted with fright and shock.

[150]     At trial, the issue on the charge of failure to comply (s. 145(3) C.C.) was whether or not the photographing of the complainants amounted to “communication”. The judge’s analysis is quite apposite:

As already stated, I do not accept Ms. Wittekind's explanation as to why she took these pictures. I have found she intended to assert her presence because she knew the complainants would be upset by this. Ms. Wittekind testified that she thought "to communicate with" meant "to talk to". The defendant did not talk to the complainants while taking the pictures. Does this mean she did not communicate with them?

[…]

It will be seen that the ordinary definition of “to communicate” is not restricted “to talking”. This is the legal definition as well. In R. v. Goldman, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 976, it was held that "communication involves the passing of thoughts, ideas, words, or information from one person to another". In R. v. Fegan, [1993] O.J. No. 733 (Ont.C.A.) the Court stated that "communication in the sense of private communication contemplates an exchange of information between persons, whether it be oral or otherwise". However, "communication" is not the same as "contact" and, in a judicial interim release order, the two words do not have the same meaning; see R. v. Legere (1995), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 555 (Ont.C.A.).

Ms. Wittekind concedes that in taking the pictures she "might" have been in "contact" with the complainants, but did not "communicate" with them. I disagree. Ms. Wittekind took pictures of the complainants to harass them by sending a message that she would continue to interfere in their lives. I do not believe that Ms. Wittekind misunderstood the meaning of "to communicate". I have no doubt that she knowingly communicated with Ms. Nuttall and Dr. Derenda. In any event, such a misunderstanding would be a mistake of law and does not amount to a defence. Ms. Wittekind breached her undertaking not to communicate with the complainants and must be found guilty.[53]

[emphasis added]

[151]     The matter of R. v. Lofstrom is also particularly instructive. In that case, the accused knew that he was prohibited from contacting or communicating with the complainant. He also knew that she wanted nothing to do with him. Nevertheless, the recognizance conditions explicitly allowed him to go to his church (which the complainant also attended). Thus, the accused did go to the church in question for Sunday mass, where the complainant was. He stood 15-20 metres away from her. Soon after she left the church with her children, the accused walked around the sanctuary and told the other congregants that he was allowed to be there. He then distributed copies of the recognizance containing his handwritten words “I cannot contact or communicate, but they may”.[54]

[152]     Although the main issue pertained to the “contact” condition, the Alberta Court of Appeal also addressed the issue of “communicating”, holding that the trial judge could have found that on those facts, by passing a message to the other parishioners, the accused could be inferred to be seeking to pass the same message to the complainant.[55]

[153]     I also mention the matter of R. v. Mladenovic, in which the Ontario Superior Court held that pointing directly at a nearby complainant and speaking insultingly about her to others in a voice loud enough for her to hear constituted “communication” in violation of a s. 810 C.C. court-ordered peace bond.[56] The accused had done so 2 months after signing his conditions. He crossed the complainant at their church. Incidentally, much like the case at bar, the recognizance expressly permitted the accused to attend the church in question. What is factually distinguishable, however, is the fact that Mladenovic was a mere 6 feet away from the complainant when he uttered the insults.

[154]     I accept the definitions proposed in R. v. Legere, by which communication generally involves a transmission of information. However, the definition is not so limited. In fact, even in that decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal also contemplated the “passing of thoughts or ideas” from one person to another.

[155]     I mention this because common sense dictates that uttering words to confront, insult, taunt or heckle someone also constitutes communication. Similarly, complaining to someone also undoubtedly constitutes communication. Yet, those forms of communication do not involve conveying “information” per se.

[156]     As such, I attach little weight to the accused’s argument that “no information was transmitted to Mrs. Montgomery” since she already knew of the events of March 18^th, having lived them herself.

ANALYSIS

a)     The Court’s findings of fact

[157]     As mentioned above, this case turns primarily on the interpretation of the condition prohibiting “communication”.

[158]     Nevertheless, the Court must assess the truthfulness and reliability of the accused’s testimony, as they have an impact on the application of the legal principles, to a certain extent.

[159]     In the case at bar, does the Court believe the accused on the elements of his version inconsistent with guilt?

[160]     The answer is no. In particular, it does not believe the accused’s assertions that he made a good-faith attempt to respect the communication prohibition, or that he misunderstood its meaning. For the following reasons, the Court does not believe the accused regarding his stated intentions on the evening of March 26^th 2018. His testimony suffered from inherent contradictions and some patently unrealistic assertions.

[161]     For instance, I dismiss the accused’s suggestion that he did not know if Mrs. Montgomery was even at the council meeting. In the circumstances of this case, the suggestion borders on the outrageous. After all, she was the sole object of his attention. He had scrutinized her for 20 years. She was the reason he was there: to discuss her. She was sitting right behind the mayor, at centre stage, before withdrawing. The accused knew where her seat was, as he acknowledged by referencing the video and stating “she’s not in her seat in the video”.

[162]     It seems obvious to the Court that the accused was following the Council meeting, waiting for his turn to speak, from the Grand Hall (which he himself described, including its big screen showing the meeting inside). The evidence established that the complainant was in her seat until shortly before the accused took the podium.

[163]     More fundamentally, it was Mrs. Montgomery’s place of work. City councillors sit at City Council. There was no reason whatsoever (advanced by the accused or otherwise) that she would not be there. In fact, he fully expected her to be there, which was precisely why he actively lobbied his attorney to negotiate a variance to his bail conditions.

[164]     In that sense, his claim that he had “no reason to believe that the complainant was even in the room” is patently convenient and unrealistic. Likely realizing this fact himself, the accused hastened to add that he might have seen her earlier that night, also quickly affirming - and repeating - that even if he did see her, he had every right to be there and ask his question.

[165]     As for his repeated claim that he wanted to ask “questions”, said claim was dispelled by his own testimony as it progressed. It was also dispelled by the video itself.

[166]     Instead, he clearly wanted to denounce and complain. Not inquire or ask anything.

[167]     In fact, interrupting his soliloquy twice, the City moderator had to ask him if he actually had a question.

[168]     Instead, the accused gave a long preamble having nothing to do with the incident of March 18^th, the incident he purportedly wanted to raise. He merely wanted to denounce his prior arrest for criminal harassment pertaining to Mrs. Montgomery.

[169]     When he did address the March 18^th incident, it was merely a recounting of what he perceived as deplorable behaviour by the complainant.

[170]     This was after his greeting: “Good evening mayor and councillors” (which he knew included Mrs. Montgomery). Furthermore, as he testified, it was important to put the “question” to every single city councillor in that room (which included Mrs. Montgomery, subject to her location, which will be addressed below).

[171]     I conclude that his goal was to voice the continuing resentment he bears towards Mrs. Montgomery, in her presence and before the Council, in order to show her that he would continue to interfere in her life.

[172]     In coming to this conclusion, I also consider, in my assessment of the evidence as a whole, that the accused has been persistently challenging and accusing Mrs. Montgomery for almost 20 years. While the complainant testified that “he was everywhere she went” for the last 20 years, the accused did not deny said allegation at any point during his testimony.

[173]     This shows an extreme - and alarming - level of persistence and relentlessness that contradicts the accused’s professed efforts of compliance with his condition. I note, parenthetically, that in his testimony, the accused repeatedly referred to the complainant as “Sue”,[57] a strange sign of familiarity that is difficulty explained. The evidence showed that they are neither friends nor acquaintances.

[174]     The accused was determined and uncompromising in his will to get his message across, to continue protesting against the church and to continue challenging Mrs. Montgomery.

[175]     By the tone adopted in his testimony and by the very content of his answers, it appears clear that the accused resented the fact that he was subjected to bail conditions. He expressed that he was “forced” to sign them and he repeatedly complained that they infringed on his freedom of expression and his right to peacefully protest.

[176]     Rather than wish to scrupulously respect them, the Court finds that he did everything he could to carefully circumvent them.

[177]     On this point, it is interesting to recall that in their original form, according to his testimony, the conditions were unfair since they prevented him from attending City Council meetings to ask any questions, including those that had nothing to do with Mrs. Montgomery. He seemed to invoke that as a reason to want them modified, i.e. to ask questions unrelated to the complainant. Yet, as the chronology showed, once his conditions were modified, the very first “question” he put to the Council was regarding Mrs. Montgomery.

[178]     I give no credit to the fact that the accused allegedly misinterpreted the scope of the condition, based on “advice received from a variety of people”. First of all, as explained in R. v. Whelan, misunderstanding of the scope of the condition does not constitute a defence. In fact, that is so even when the misunderstanding stems from faulty legal advice. I note that in the case at bar, Mr. Edgar did not identify who said advice was obtained from. He certainly did not suggest it was a lawyer or a public official.[58] In theory, such advice may have been sought from anyone, including extremists or anarchists having no regard for the judicial system or endorsing an overbroad perception of their rights. The evidence is silent on the source(s).

[179]     In any event, more fundamentally, as mentioned above, I do not believe that the accused sincerely thought he was complying with the undertaking.

[180]     Nor do I believe that he strived to respect his condition, as he contends. Had that been his actual intent, he would have at the very least verified if Mrs. Montgomery was in the room. He did not, as he admits.

[181]     To borrow the expression used by Watson J.A. in R. v. Lofstrom, writing for the Alberta Court of Appeal, I conclude that the accused was merely behaving on his idiosyncratic and self-serving interpretation[59] of his condition.

[182]     I agree with the Crown that the accused used the question-period setting as a ruse to get around his communication prohibition. In that sense, his mens rea went beyond recklessness. The Court finds actual, calculated intent.

[183]     Following its careful review of the evidence, and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence and the applicable onus and standard of proof, the Court makes the following factual findings:

Ø  The accused did know that Mrs. Montgomery was in the Council meeting on the evening of March 26^th 2018.

Ø  When Mrs. Montgomery exited the Council chamber moments before the accused took the podium, it was on her own initiative and unbeknownst to the accused.

Ø  Despite knowing that she was there, he nevertheless felt that he was entitled to make his statements, even in her presence. In other words, even if he had seen her sitting snuggly in her seat near Mayor Plante, the accused would have made the same speech.

Ø  The accused’s intent was to confront and taunt Mrs. Montgomery.

[184]     The Court must now determine, on the facts as found, if there was communication and accordingly, if the Crown established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

b)  Did his actions amount to “communication”?

[185]     It is clear from Mrs. Montgomery’s testimony that her interactions with the accused have left her emotionally exhausted. Her exasperation while testifying was palpable.

[186]     As expressed in R. v. C.D.C., R. v. Lofstrom and R. v. Nowack, I must consider the spirit and purpose of the communication prohibition while interpreting its terms. Here, as mentioned above, the undertaking was meant to provide Mrs. Montgomery with some measure of reprieve, peace of mind and psychological protection against a man who has allegedly followed her around for 20 years.

[187]     In the case at bar, was there a transmittal of information - or the transmittal of a message - from the accused to the complainant on March 26^th 2018, in the City Council chamber?

[188]     The accused used words, which are much more concrete than “communication by photographing”, which had occurred in R. v. Wittekind.

[189]     In the circumstances of this case, I conclude that the accused’s comments were made in the presence of the complainant. They were made at her place of work, while she was working. The fact that she removed herself moments before, and went behind a wall, does not make her any less present at that City Council meeting during the accused’s address.

[190]     To suggest that she was absent is a matter of semantics. Especially considering that she removed herself (unbeknownst to the accused, by his own admission) and went in the anti-chamber precisely to avoid Mr. Edgar.

[191]     In that sense, though the distance is greater than it was in R. v. Mladenovic, the situation was akin to talking [to others] about a nearby complainant and speaking about her in a voice loud enough for her to hear.

[192]     This is clearly a way of transmitting a message to her.

[193]     This case also bears an obvious resemblance to the matter of R. v. Lofstrom, where the Court of Appeal concluded that communication could be inferred even after the departure of the complainant from the building, as it could be inferred that the accused sought to have the message passed on to Mrs. Montgomery.

[194]     By making his statements, the accused knew that the complainant would be upset by this.

[195]     The communication was hardly accidental or incidental to the normal day-to-day activities in the community. The accused specifically went to City Hall to make that speech and to confront the city councillor. His actions were carefully crafted to have an appearance of compliance.

[196]     To be clear, I accept that the accused wanted to bring the March 18^th matter up in this public forum to denounce what he perceived as unjust treatment by the councillor. To do so however, he attempted to send her the message as well - then and there. As such, his motive in communicating with her should not be conflated with the level of volition and intent requisite to the offence under s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.[60] Courts should always be careful to avoid confusing motive with intent.[61]

[197]     I therefore conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused had the requisite mens rea to commit the offence and that it constituted, in fact, a communication with Mrs. Montgomery.

[198]     Other than his purported misunderstanding of the condition, no excuse or justification was offered. Given my conclusions above, I thus find that the accused failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his breach.

CONCLUSION

Based on the very unique set of facts established by the evidence, I conclude that the Crown has proven each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the accused is found guilty of failing to comply with his condition of release, contrary to s. 145(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the quality of the arguments advanced by counsel and the professional manner in which they conducted the trial.

 

 

 

 

		__________________________________ D. GALIATSATOS, J.C.Q.
Me François Allard Counsel for the Crown
Me Jordan Trevick
Counsel for the accused
Hearing date:	February 26th 2019