Décision

Québec (Procureure générale) (Ministre du Développement durable,de l'Environnement et des Parcs) c. Giguère et Geoffroy inc.						2011 QCCS 2278
JP 1900    COUR SUPÉRIEURE
CANADA
PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC
DISTRICT DE			JOLIETTE
N° :		705-17-003320-098
DATE :	LE 9 MAI 2011
______________________________________________________________________
SOUS LA PRÉSIDENCE  DE				L’HONORABLE	MARK G. PEACOCK, J.C.S.
______________________________________________________________________
PROCUREURE GÉNÉRALE DU QUÉBEC, agissant pour le Ministre du Développement durable, de l'Environnement et des Parcs,                                     Demanderesse
c.
GIGUÈRE ET GEOFFROY INC., -et- MANON GAGNON, -et- SERGE PAQUETTE,                                     Défendeurs
-ET-
MUNICIPALITÉ DE LANORAIE,                                     Mise en cause
______________________________________________________________________
JUGEMENT
______________________________________________________________________

Introduction

 

[1]         The Attorney General of Québec ("the Attorney General") sought a permanent injunction to prevent the landowners, Mr. Paquette and Ms. Gagnon (collectively called "the Landowners") along with the excavating company with whom they had a contract, Giguère et Geoffroy inc. (the "Company") from continuing to operate a commercial sandpit on their property without the necessary authorizations under the Environment Quality Act ("Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement") ("LQE").[1] The Attorney General also sought a permanent injunction requiring the Defendants to level and restore the land.

 

[2]         The introductory proceeding had been taken by the Attorney General on December 22, 2009 and interlocutory injunction proceedings had been initiated but on February 18, 2010, postponed to an indefinite date. The matter was heard on the merits of the permanent injunction on April 5 and 6, 2011.

 

[3]         An element of urgency arose at this time since the evidence showed that the Landowners had signed a promise of purchase and sale on September 23, 2009 but for which a deed of sale was only to be signed on April 15, 2011.[2]

 

[4]            Mr. Paquette testified that the purchaser was to continue the same agreement he had with the Company regarding the excavation and removal of sand from the property.

 

[5]           In view of this evidence, and the public order nature of the LQE, the Court issued its Conclusions on April 7, 2011, with reasons to follow. The following are the reasons.

 

[6]            The Defendants argued that since the Landowners had an authorization from the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec ("the Commission") which authorized a non-agricultural use on this property which was otherwise designated for agricultural use only.[3] This non-agricultural use was the excavation and removal of sand, which formed sandhills ("buttes") on the property.

 

[7]           The Defendants argued that this authorization exempted them from obtaining any authorizations under the LQE and to the extent that there was any incompatibility between An Act Respecting the Preservation of Agricultural Land and Agricultural Activities ("Loi sur la protection du territoire et des activités agricoles") ("LPTA") and the LQE that the former act prevailed since the use was on land designated “agricultural” under the LPTA.

 

[8]           The Court will render this judgment under the following headings:

 

A-            Factual Context

B-           Does the Certificate of Authorization, Exhibit D-1, Obtained Under the LPTA  Avoid Any Requirement for Authorizations To Be Obtained under the LQE?

 

            i.          Applicable Law

            ii.         Breaches Under the LQE

            iii.        Whether the Regulation Has Been Breached?

C-           Have the Defendants Failed to Respect art. 20 and 22 LQE?

D-           Is the Plaintiff Entitled to A Permanent Injunction Against the Defendants?

 

[9]           The facts stated in this judgment, unless noted otherwise, are findings of fact by the Court based upon its appreciation of the evidence.

 

A-        Factual Context

 

[10]        The Landowners purchased the property in 2005. It was designated for agricultural use under the LPTA. The principal agricultural use made by the Landowners was in the raising of horses. They also rented part of the property for a period upon which sunflowers were grown.  This region of quality farming land in the Lanaudière had been previously known for its tobacco cultivation.

 

[11]        The property is on the outskirts but within the municipality of Lanoraie.  Along its northwest boundary, there is a residential street with homes whose backyards abut this boundary.

 

[12]        In the part of the property that concerns this case (approximately the northern third of the lot), the land was hilly. In particular, there were certain sandhills which rendered the land difficult to both cultivate and drain. Coincidentally, the area where the Landowners kept their horses was muddy and it was recommended to them by an acquaintance, Mr. Giguère, President of the Company, that this problem could be resolved by replacing certain of the mud with sand (the “works”).

 

[13]        After a hearing before the Commission, the Landowners were authorized that approximately 5.04 hectares of the property[4] be permitted the non-agricultural use of removing a layer of sand.

 

[14]        The Certification of Authorization had a three-year duration i.e. from January 16, 2007 to January 16, 2010.

 

[15]        In the Commission's decision, it made reference to the fact that the excavation and removal of sand were intended to improve agricultural productivity.

 

[16]        The Landowners entered into an oral agreement with the Company for the performance of the works and the excavation and removal of the sand which took place over the next three years.

 

[17]         This period did not pass peaceably. There were numerous complaints by the neighbours and the Municipality of Lanoraie and there were four inspection reports by officers of the Ministère du Développement durable, de l'Environnement et des Parcs (hereinafter, "the Ministry") from July 13, 2007 to and including January 18, 2010.[5]  Certain complaints focused on blowing dust and sand, some of which also resulted from the ingress and egress of heavy dump trucks removing the sand.

 

[18]        The Defendants were served with three notices of infraction under the LQE[6] and ultimately with a demand letter threatening the present injunction proceedings on November 12, 2009 (Exhibit P-12).

 

[19]        The Court accepts that after January 16, 2010, the date of the expiry of the Certification of Authorization from the Commission, no further sand was excavated or removed from the property by the Company.

 

B-        Does the Certificate of Authorization, Exhibit D-1, Obtained Under the LPTA  Avoid Any Requirement for Authorizations To Be Obtained under the LQE?

 

            i.           Applicable Law

 

[20]        The law to protect agricultural territory and activities has as its goal to preserve and protect the use of agricultural land for agricultural use only and in the context of sustainable development, to promote the development of agricultural businesses in lands designated for agricultural use.[7]

 

[21]         “Agriculture” is defined by the LPTA as:

 

"Art. 1. 1^o La culture du sol et des végétaux, le fait de laisser le sol sous couverture végétale ou de l'utiliser à des fins sylvicoles, l'élevage des animaux et, à ces fins, la confection, la construction ou l'utilisation de travaux, ouvrages ou bâtiments à l'exception des immeubles servant à des fins d'habitation."

 

[22]        The Commission is the administrative body established to carry out the objectives of the Act and in particular to "assurer la protection du territoire agricole".[8]

 

[23]        While the Commission has a mandate to protect agricultural land and agricultural activities (art. 12 LPTA), it may - in conditions it determines - allow non-agricultural uses on agricultural land (art. 62 LPTA). Environmental protection as defined by the LQE is not one of its enumerated functions.

 

[24]        The LQE has two potentially relevant statutory dispositions, both of which require authorizations from the Ministry where quantities of sand are being excavated and transported:

 

a)         under art. 22 LQE where that activity "… est susceptible d'en résulter une émission, un dépôt, un dégagement ou un rejet de contaminants dans l'environnement ou une modification de la qualité de l'environnement …"; and

 

b)         under the "Règlement sur les carrières et sablières, Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement" of the LQE[9] (the "Regulation") where a person is operating a sandpit as defined by that Regulation.

 

[25]        In the 1996 case of P.G.Q. v. Dickie,[10] the Superior Court also had to consider whether the removal of sand over a 28-hectare area required only the Certificate of Authorization under the LPTA or whether authorization was also required under the predecessor law to the LQE. Ultimately, the Court found that both authorizations were required. From that case, the following legal principles can be drawn:

 

a)         since art. 20 and 22 LQE are the statutory cornerstones for the protection of the environment, they must be interpreted in a large and liberal way;

 

b)         conversely, any exceptions or exclusions to these articles must be interpreted restrictively; and

 

c)         in the context of protecting the welfare and health of the Québec population, the LQE has two focuses:

 

i.          one is corrective: to permit the elimination of sources of contamination and pollution; and

 

ii.         the other is preventive: where achieving a safe environment is ensured through the Regulation of various activities.

 

[26]        It is with this background of the LQE that the Court turns to the first argument raised by the Defendants which is to the effect that art. 98 LPTA expresses the Legislator's intent that the protection of agricultural land and agricultural activity override the LQE.

 

[27]        The relevant paragraph of that art. 98 is:

 

"La présente loi prévaut sur toute disposition inconciliable d'une loi générale ou spéciale applicable à une communauté ou à une municipalité."

 

[28]        The Court does not agree with this submission for the following reasons:

 

a)         the original version of this article from December 22, 1978 uses the words "… applicable à une communauté, à une corporation municipale ou à une corporation de comté". This makes clear that the legislation encompassed by the phrase "une loi générale ou spéciale" is a law such as An Act Respecting Land Use Planning and Development  ("Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme") i.e. a law directed to local government, and not the LQE; and

 

b)         the Court is reinforced in this view when one considers the third paragraph of art. 98:

           

            "Une personne qui obtient une autorisation ou un permis conformément à la présente loi, ou qui exerce un droit que celle-ci lui confère ou lui reconnaît, n'est pas dispensée de demander un permis par ailleurs exigé en vertu d'une loi, d'un règlement du gouvernement ou d'un règlement municipal". [Court's emphasis]

 

The Legislator is deemed to know all of its legislation at the time it is legislating. This principle - in combination with the legal principle that any restrictions to the LQE must be read restrictively - mean that this third paragraph of art. 98 requires that a commercial sandpit for which a certificate of authorization had been obtained on agricultural land must also have an authorization under the relevant provisions of the LQE. This is in fact the same conclusion reached by the Superior Court in the Dickie[11] case although no specific mention was made of article 98 in that case.

 

[29]        The second argument made by the Defendants asserts that art. 79.19 LPTA which requires a tolerance by neighbours of certain inconveniences caused by agricultural activities (amongst others, by dust) protects them:

 

79.19. En zone agricole, les inconvénients causés par les poussières, bruits ou odeurs qui résultent d'activités agricoles n'excèdent pas les limites de la tolérance que se doivent des voisins dans la mesure où ces activités sont exercées, sous réserve de l'article 100 [Ed. note: a "grand fathering clause"]:

 

 1° conformément aux normes réglementaires prises par application de la Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement (chapitre Q-2) en matière de poussières ou de bruits et, en matière d'odeurs, conformément aux normes visant à atténuer les inconvénients reliés aux odeurs inhérentes aux activités agricoles, découlant de l'exercice des pouvoirs prévus au paragraphe 4° du deuxième alinéa de l'article 113 de la Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme (chapitre A-19.1);

 

 2° conformément aux dispositions de la Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement pour ce qui concerne tout élément n'ayant pas fait l'objet de normes réglementaires.

 

[30]        This article has no application to the facts of this case precisely because the activity authorized under the Commission's Certificate of Authorization is a non-agricultural activity i.e. the excavation and removal of sand. The measure of tolerance required by art. 79.19 LPTA is restricted to "activités agricoles" only.

 

[31]        The Court now turns to consider the Attorney General's assertions that the Defendants have breached the LQE and its Regulation concerning "sandpits". This Court is concerned only with the civil and not penal implications where a breach of the law is proven on the balance of probabilities. For this reasons, the civil term "breaches" will be used.

 

            ii-         Breaches under the LQE

 

[32]        The Ministry issued three different notices of infraction to the Company:

 

a)         on August 22, 2007, alleging operation of a sandpit without the necessary certificates of authorization per art. 22 LQE and art. 2 of the "Regulation". The Ministry required an immediate cessation of all activities and that a plan showing "des correctifs" be provided by September 6, 2007. In default, the Ministry threatened "les mesures appropriées";

 

            The evidence is to the effect that the Company continued its operations. There is no evidence of any corrective plan being submitted nor was any penal prosecution undertaken by the Ministry;

 

b)         on August 22, 2008 (one full year later), the Ministry served a notice of infraction on the Company alleging the same two articles were contravened and added one more: that the sand pit was operating less than a 150 meters from a neighbouring residence (art. 10 and 11 of the Regulation).

 

            The notice required immediate cessation of activities and threatened again appropriate measures in default.

 

            The Company continued its activities and again, the Ministry did not take any penal prosecution; and

 

c)         on August 6, 2010 (now two years later), the Ministry served a notice charging two other infractions: the first that the emission of sand dust was "susceptible de porter atteinte … au bien-être ou au confort de l'être humain" (contrary to art. 20 LQE) and "les émissions de poussières provenant … des tas d'agrégats … d'une sablière" susceptible of negatively impacting the welfare or comfort of human beings (contrary to art. 31 of the Regulation). This notice of infraction which was written by the same inspector as the second infraction on August 22, 2008 only required that the Company take the appropriate measures to stop the emission of dust and sand from the Landowners' property towards the neighbouring properties.

 

[33]        Absent any explanation, the Court is both perplexed and concerned that no earlier enforcement procedures were taken by the Ministry before the present injunction proceedings in December 2009. In fact, the only enforcement proceeding brought to the Court's attention was the Introductory Motion in the present case dated December 22, 2009, which took its normal course to this trial on the merits and for which no interlocutory injunction was ever taken.

 

            iii.         Whether the Regulation Has Been Breached?

 

[34]        The definition of "sandpit" in the Regulation has two relevant components for the purposes of this litigation: firstly, the nature of the extraction and secondly, the commercial purpose. The definition of "sandpit" under art. 1 s) of the Regulation is: "tout endroit d'où l'on extrait à ciel ouvert des substances minérales non consolidées, y compris du sable ou du gravier, à partir d'un dépôt naturel, …" Amongst others, the definition requires that this extraction be "à des fins commerciales ou industrielles" or "pour remplir des obligations contractuelles".

 

[35]        The area to be included in the definition of "sandpit" is also defined under the concept of "aire d'exploitation". Art. 1 b) defines "aire d'exploitation" as: "la surface du sol d'où l'on extrait des agrégats, y compris toute surface où sont placés les procédés de concassage et de tamisage et où l'on charge ou entrepose les agrégats;".

 

[36]        No one may operate a sandpit as defined as art. 1 s) of the Regulation without obtaining a certificate of authorization from the Minister that conforms with art. 22 , LQE.

 

[37]        In a case where "plusieurs personnes peuvent extraire les agrégats", art. 2 of the Regulation requires that the property owner be the one presenting the application for the certificate of authorization. Under art. 3, the applicant must furnish a very detailed list of information which includes a plan to rehabilitate the land so that it can be returned to the natural environment after its sandpit use is completed (art 35).

 

[38]        Art. 37 requires that the restoration plan that the applicant must file to obtain the permit, must contain one or more of the following options:

 

" …

 

a)     régalage et restauration de la couverture végétale du sol (arbres, arbustes, pelouse ou culture);

 

b)      remplissage par de la terre, du sable ou de la pierre et restauration de la couverture végétale de la surface;

 

.

.

."

 

[39]        The Regulation also provides strict guidelines that must be followed as far as the restoration of the soil is concerned:

 

            a)         restoration of the soil is mandatory in the case of a new sandpit (art. 36);

 

b)            if soil with vegetation and removed soil have been kept after excavation, they must be stored separately and must, at the end of use, be put back on the levelled land to facilitate the growth of further vegetation (art. 40); and

 

c)             the restoration must be done progressively with the emptying of the sandpit (art. 41).

 

[40]        Two other aspects of the Regulation are relevant for the disposition of this case: minimal setbacks from neighbours (art. 11) and the prevention of atmospheric pollution (art. 25).

 

[41]        Firstly, art. 11 requires that a new sandpit must be set back a minimum of 150 meters from any residences.

 

[42]        Secondly, if any piles of aggregate from a sandpit permit an emission into the atmosphere of dust which is visible more than 2 meters from the source, then the operator of the sandpit must take the necessary measures to prevent these emissions and their consequences (art. 31).

 

[43]        The three-inspection reports that were prepared prior to the notices of infraction all confirm that the operations of the Company met the definition of "sandpit" of art. 1 s) of the Regulation. Those inspections showed that the Company was: (i) digging using hydraulic shovels to remove the sandhills, (ii) sifting out unwanted rocks using a large mechanical shifting machine, (iii) loading the sand into large dump trucks with a front end loader and (iv) weighing each of the loads of sand on the dump trucks on its own weigh scale brought to the property.

 

[44]        Photographs taken by the inspectors showed that the ground cover vegetation had been removed from a large section of the land to expose the sand underneath. This sand was then put into large piles in a row. The evidence demonstrated that the residential street, Lilas Street, was approximately 70 meters from the sand pit operations and certainly less than 150 meters.

 

[45]        Mr. Giguère himself admitted that at the end of the three-year authorization period, approximately one half of the authorized 5-hectare surface had been excavated and the sand removed. The photos graphically demonstrated a large well-organized sandpit operation with heavy equipment displaying the Company's logo. Mr. Giguère reinforced this impression through his testimony that the Company had put in its own gravel road to provide a proper roadbed for its heavy dump trucks to take out the sand as well loaning to Mr. Paquette a cistern truck to water the sandy parts of the road to seek to control the dust raised by the back and forth of the dump trucks.

 

[46]        Furthermore, the evidence confirmed both the commercial and contractual nature of the excavation and removal of the sand. Mr. Giguère testified that over the course of the three years, he had loaned the Landowners approximately $80,000.00 and in addition, had provided approximately $20,000.00 worth of ground maintenance work to improve their horse rearing facilities. The Company took two loan-hypothecs on the property to secure its loan: the loans were to be repaid at $1.00 for each ton of sand trucked out over $20,000.00 worth. The Court understood that the Company felt it would remove approximately 90,000 cubic meters of sand (roughly 150,000 tons).

 

[47]        Furthermore, Mr. Giguère testified that he had a contract with the City of Repentigny (Exhibit P-8) in 2009 for which the Company received $9.25 per ton of delivered sand. In its own tender for the sand contract, the Company itself listed the property as the "carrière" where the sand would be obtained. The Court adopts the reasoning in the Dickie case wherein[12] the Superior Court recognized that different uses of the land may have different objectives at different times:

 

"Bref, l'agriculture est l'objectif lointain, le drainage, un objectif prochain et l'exploitation commerciale d'une sablière, l'activité immédiate. La fin ultime visée par M. Dickie ne permet tout simplement pas d'éviter l'application de la L.P.E. [Ed. note: Loi sur la protection de l'environnement] et du Règlement sur les carrières et sablières".

 

[48]        At the same time, the Court is satisfied on the basis of the evidence of the inspection reports that the closest residence on Lilas Street which abutted the northwest boundary of the property was less than a 150 meters from the "aire d'exploitation".

 

[49]        For these reasons, the Court determines that the Company and the Landowners breached the articles in the Regulation and LQE alleged in the notices of infraction. Most particularly, they were operating a commercial sandpit without the necessary certificate of authorization under the Regulation.

 

[50]        The Company asserted that the 150-meter setback required by the Regulation rendered it "functionally incompatible" with the Certificate of Authorization granted under the LPTA. According to the Company, this setback requirement effectively prevented it from undertaking the excavation and removal of the sand that had been authorized by the Commission since the property did not have sufficient width to permit this setback. The Court disagrees. Firstly, the LPTA already contemplates, as we have seen in art. 98 (3), that the holding of a certificate of authorization from the Commission is not sufficient where different legislation requires other permits. Secondly, the Landowners chose to place themselves under the jurisdiction of the Regulation by selling the sand to the Company i.e. by commercializing the extraction and removal.

 

C-        Have the Defendants Failed to Respect art. 20 and 22 LQE?

 

[51]        The Règlement relatif à l'application de la Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement[13] exempts certain activities from the application of art. 22 of the LQE, including art. 2 (12) "Les activités agricoles …". This exclusion does not apply here because, as has been previously noted, the activities of extraction and removal of the sand are specifically classified as non-agricultural activities and that is why the Defendants required the certificate of authorization from the Commission.

 

[52]        The evidence shows that dust and sand from the piles of excavated sand were in the air as shown by the inspection report of one of the Ministry's inspectors of March 25, 2010. Photos in this report clearly show dust and sand blowing into the air contrary both to art. 25 of the Regulation, and since the sand was blowing into the eyes and ears of the inspector, contrary to art 20 (2), LQE.

 

[53]        Mr. Paquette sought to rebut this evidence by testifying that the day in question had exceptionally high winds.

 

[54]        The Court is not prepared to accept his evidence for two reasons:

 

a)         the inspector's report notes under paragraph 2 that the winds in question had a speed of approximately 32 kilometres an hour as recorded at the nearby meteorological station of L'Assomption; and

 

b)         Mr. Paquette's recollection was spotty on matters of importance. For example, he testified that he needed reports from the Company as to the exact weight of the sand being removed for the purposes of the financing he was receiving for the property. However, when asked how much sand was removed, he could not remember. Such a lack of memory is inconsistent with the importance he had attributed to receiving exact figures on the quantity of sand removed.

 

[55]        Accordingly, the Court determines that not only was the blowing sand and dust "susceptible de porter atteinte" to the wellbeing and discomfort of human beings, it was also clearly visible more than two metres away. The inspector's photos are graphic in this regard.

 

[56]        Again, the Court determines that the facts show that the Defendants have breached the articles.

 

D-        Is the Plaintiff Entitled to A Permanent Injunction Against the Defendants?

 

[57]        As has been seen, art. 22 , LQE must be given a large and liberal interpretation because of the importance the Legislator accords to the protection of the environment and the direct effect of a safe environment on the health and well-being of Québec citizens.

 

[58]        In both art. 20 and 22, LQE, the Legislator has carefully chosen the words "… est susceptible d'en résulter une émission, un dépôt, un dégagement … dans l'environnement …"

 

[59]        Two important principles arise from the case of Auto-Core Désulmé et Gervais ltée v. P.G.Q.[14] concerning the application of art. 22 LQE. The first principle is: (a) all that is required to have art. 22 LQE apply is an objective possibility that a project may cause a modification in the quality of the environment: not whether such has been actually observed and (b) the word "susceptible" must be given a large interpretation since art. 22 has not only a preventive purpose but a purpose to educate and instill a willingness to comply with the law.

 

[60]        Both the LQE and the jurisprudence confirm that a permanent injunction will issue if a certificate of authorization is required under art. 22 LQE and has not been obtained.[15]

 

[61]        Article 19.2 C.C.Q. permits a quia timet injunction i.e. a preventive injunction which seeks to anticipate events that have not yet occurred rather than to restore the status quo.[16]

 

[62]        There is no evidence that the sandpit was in operation at any time after January 16, 2010.  However, the agreement of purchase and sale (Exhibit P-17) noted that the contract for sand between the Landowners and the Company was excluded from the sale. Accordingly, the Landowners could reinstitute their arrangement with the Company to excavate and remove sand at any time prior to the deed of sale being signed. Moreover, as has been mentioned, Mr. Paquette testified himself that the intention of the new purchaser was to continue some arrangement to that effect with the Company.

 

[63]        Given this evidence, the Plaintiff is justified in requesting a permanent injunction to prevent any further operation of this sandpit unless and until the owners of the property and the Company (or any of its successors) have obtained the requisite permits both from the Commission and under the LQE.

 

[64]        No witnesses on behalf of the Attorney General testified as to the present state of the land that had been excavated. While Mr. Giguère testified that most restoration was done, the law requires that all restoration be complete. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to request that the Defendants solidarily complete the restoration of the land as required by the Commission’s Certificate of Authorization (Exhibit D-1) and as they would have been required had they received the requisite permit from the Ministry pursuant to art. 36 and following of the Regulation. The permanent injunction will issue solidarily against all Defendants since it was the combined involvement of all three which permitted the breaches to occur.

 

[65]        The Mis En Cause filed an appearance and was represented by counsel at trial. It supported the submissions of the Plaintiff. It did not file any written pleading. In the circumstances, the Municipality will bear its own costs, and will neither pay nor receive judicial costs.[17]

 

Préambule

 

[66]        ATTENDU QUE le Tribunal a entendu la preuve et les représentations des parties concernant cette demande d'injonction permanente;

 

[67]        ATTENDU QU'il y a urgence à rendre les Conclusions puisque non seulement les lois impliquées, Loi sur la protection du territoire et des activités agricoles et Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement, sont d'ordre public mais les propriétaires de la propriété, madame Gagnon et monsieur Paquette apparemment vont signer un acte de vente pour vendre celle-ci le 15 avril 2011;

 

[68]        ATTENDU QUE le Tribunal est satisfait sur la base de la preuve soumise et des arguments présentés par les procureurs que tant la preuve et le droit soutiennent l'émission d'une injonction permanente, incluant, entre autres raisons, que la sablière était opéré par les défendeurs sans les certificats d'autorisation appropriés selon le Règlement sur les carrières et sablières;

 

[69]        ATTENDU QUE des motifs complets suivront d'ici 30 jours de la date du présent jugement;

 

Conclusions

 

            PAR CONSÉQUENT, POUR LES MOTIFS À SUIVRE, LE TRIBUNAL:

 

[70]        ACCORDE l'injonction permanente comme suit:

 

a)          ORDONNE à la défenderesse Giguère et Geoffroy inc., ses dirigeants, administrateurs, représentants, employés et mandataires, à la défenderesse Manon Gagnon et au défendeur Serge Paquette de ne pas exploiter une sablière, incluant, sans limitations, les activités suivantes en autant qu'elles soient afférentes à l'exploitation d'une sablière: décapage, d'extraction de sol, sable et gravier, de concassage et/ou de tamisage de sable et gravier, de mise en pile, de chargement de sable et gravier en vue du transport, sur le lot P-291 du cadastre de la paroisse de Saint-Joseph-de-Lanoraie, circonscription foncière de Berthier, et ce, jusqu'à l'obtention des certificats d'autorisation idoine en vertu de la Loi sur la protection du territoire et des activités agricoles et la Loi sur la qualité de l'environnement; et

 

b)          ORDONNE à la défenderesse Giguère et Geoffroy inc., à la défenderesse Manon Gagnon et au défendeur Serge Paquette d'étendre sur ledit lot les piles de sable qui s'y trouvent et de régaler le terrain, puis de remettre et étendre sur les surfaces dudit lot d'où il a été retiré le sol arable qui y est présentement entreposé, le tout dans les quatre-vingt-dix (90) jours de la signification du présent jugement;

 

[71]        LE TOUT, avec dépens, incluant les frais d'expertise.

 

		(S) MARK G. PEACOCK, J.C.S. __________________________________ MARK G. PEACOCK, J.C.S.
Me Simon Larose / Me Benoit Boucher BERNARD, ROY (JUSTICE-QUÉBEC) Procureurs de la demanderesse Procureure générale du Québec
Me Michel Bastien Procureur du défendeur Giguère et Geoffroy inc.
Me Ian Champagne Procureur des défendeurs Manon Gagnon et Serge Paquette
Me Alain Généreux Procureur de la Mise en cause Municipalité de Lanoraie
Dates d’audience :	Les 5 et 6 avril 2011